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Summary 
Financial intermediation plays a central role in connecting capital demanders, i. e. firms, and capital 
suppliers, i. e. investors. My essays focus on two types of financial intermediaries, namely 
investment banks, who provide a variety of services for firms and institutional investors, and sell-
side security analysts, who analyze and provide information about firms, mainly, to institutional 
investors. The first essay studies security analysts’ cognitive biases in issuing earnings forecasts; the 
second essay studies analysts’ capital expenditure forecasts; and, the third essay studies the 
underwriting relationship value between investment banks and their client firms.    
The first chapter studies how sell-side security analysts are exposed to cognitive biases, specifically 
belief-persistence and overconfidence biases, and how investors respond to these biases. The belief-
persistence bias is analysts’ tendency to stick to their prior beliefs. The overconfidence bias is 
analysts’ tendency to overvalue their private information compared to public information (Chen & 
Jiang 2006). In addition, I propose that analysts’ overconfidence bias is more severe when their 
private information is supported by their prior beliefs. The sensitivity of analysts’ overconfidence 
bias to the consistency between their private information and their prior forecasts is called 
confidence-enhancement bias. This study makes two contributions. First, it contributes evidences of 
overconfidence, belief-persistence, and confidence-enhancement biases of securities analysts by 
analyzing these biases simultaneously. Second, it shows that investors react negatively to analysts’ 
cognitive biases, and suggests that the market demands objective analysts.   
To capture the biases, I examine how analysts’ earnings forecast formation, which is the 
incorporation of public information, their private information and their prior earnings forecasts, 
deviate from the suggestions of the Bayesian decision theory. Public information is measured as the 
consensus of all outstanding forecasts. A belief-persistence-bias-free analyst would put no 
additional weight on her prior forecast because the information content of her prior forecast has 
been incorporated in the consensus. An overconfidence-bias-free analyst would put optimal weights 
on the public and their private information depending on the information precision.  I examine the 
sample of analysts’ annual earnings forecasts in the US market from 1994 to 2010, and find that 
analysts are subject to these biases. Analysts put an additional weight of 55% instead of 0% on their 
prior forecasts. Analysts’ overconfidence bias, which is measured as the fraction of the difference 
between real weight and the optimal weight over the real weight on the private information, is 53% 
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instead of  0%. Analysts’ confidence-enhancement bias, the difference in overconfidence bias 
between supported and unsupported private information, is 15%.   
To study the effects of these biases on forecast informativeness, I regress stock abnormal returns 
around the forecast announcements on forecast deviations from the prior forecasts and the 
interaction between the forecast revisions and analysts’ biases in the previous years. I find that the 
market reacts more strongly to less overconfident analysts; the difference in forecast 
informativeness between bottom and top overconfidence bias quintiles is 18% of the average 
forecast informativeness. The market also reacts more strongly to analysts who are exposed less to 
the belief-persistence and confidence-enhancement biases. The difference in forecast 
informativeness between bottom and top belief-persistence (and confidence-enhancement) bias 
quintiles is around 9% (and 8%) of the average forecast informativeness.  
The second chapter studies analysts’ capital expenditure (CapEx) forecasts addressing four 
principal questions: Do CapEx forecasts improve information content of analysts’ reports? Which 
analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts? What are the determinants of CapEx forecast 
accuracy? And, are CapEx forecasts related to analysts’ careers? CapEx forecasts have been 
overlooked by the academic community despite the fact that CapEx forecasts have become 
increasingly popular among analysts; in 2011, 57% of analysts issued at least one CapEx forecast 
on 70% of covered firms. In addition, there exists an extensive literature studying the relationship 
between managers’ CapEx decisions and firm values, which suggests that CapEx information is 
valuable to investors. Although the direction of the relationship between changes in firm investment 
levels and changes in firm value is inconclusive, the effects of the firm’s investment level on firm 
value are certain. 
First, to assess the information value of CapEx forecasts, I study stock price behavior around 
analysts’ forecasts. I run regressions using forecast informativeness, which is defined as the 
absolute value of stock cumulative abnormal returns around analysts’ report announcements, as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the CapEx forecast dummy variable, the relative 
CapEx forecast accuracy variable, and control variables. I find that CapEx forecasts significantly 
improve the reports’ information value, and more accurate CapEx forecasts are more valuable to 
investors than less accurate ones.   
Second, I use logistic regression, controlling for firm-year fixed effects, to identify which analysts 
are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. I find that frequency of  CapEx forecasts is related to 
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certain conditions. Analysts with less experience and working for brokers where issuing CapEx 
forecasts is a common practice, may have more motivation to issue CapEx forecasts. Working for 
big brokers, performing well in earnings forecasts, and being voted as star analysts may reduce an 
analyst’s costs of CapEx forecast issuance. Finally, analysts covering fewer stocks and issuing more 
earnings forecasts on a stock may have more resources allocated to the stock.  
Third, similar to earnings forecasts, CapEx forecasts that are issued later in the forecasting period 
are more accurate than those issued earlier. CapEx forecast accuracy is positively correlated with 
prior CapEx forecast accuracy, and the analyst’ CapEx forecasting experience. In addition, I do not 
find a robust relationship between CapEx forecast accuracy and contemporary earnings forecast 
accuracy; the two types of forecasts may require different skills. 
Fourth, I use logistic regressions to study the probability of analysts’ disappearance from the 
I/B/E/S database in the following year, and find that analysts, who issue CapEx forecasts, are less 
likely to leave the profession, and more accurate CapEx forecasters are less likely to leave the 
profession than less accurate CapEx forecasters.     
The third chapter studies the underwriting relationship value between investment banks and their 
clients. I re-examine the usage of Lehman’s collapse on the 15th of September, 2008, to measure the 
underwriting relationship value, as proposed by Fernando, May, & Megginson (FMM hereafter) in 
the Journal of Finance (2012). The authors argue that Lehman’s clients experienced abnormal 
returns of nearly 3% below those of other big banks’ clients in the seven day period around 
Lehman’s collapse because of the lost underwriting relationship value.  
I have three concerns about their methodology. First, Lehman’s collapse was not simply a shock to 
the underwriting industry; it was a shock to the whole economy. There were also other noticeable 
events around the collapse, e. g. Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch on the same day 
and American International Group (AIG)’s credit rating downgrade the day after. Second, firms 
with different characteristics were affected differently by Lehman’s collapse and other events 
around the collapse. I find that the collapse mostly affected small, young, high market-to-book ratio, 
and potentially distressed firms, and specific industries. Third, there is a hidden assumption behind 
FMM’s methodology that Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ clients were similarly affected by 
the collapse, except that Lehman’s clients had additional effects because of their lost underwriting 
relationship. However, I find that Lehman’s clients, on average, were from more severely affected 
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industries compared to the clients of other big banks. Lehman’s clients were significantly bigger, 
younger, more leveraged and closer to potential distress than other big banks’ clients.  
To measure the marginal effect of being a Lehman client on the firm’ stock price reaction to 
Lehman’s collapse, I run ordinary least squared regressions on all the big banks’ clients sub-sample. 
I find that it is invalid to reject the null hypothesis, namely that being a Lehman client has no 
marginal effect on the stock price reaction to Lehman’s collapse. The marginal effect of being a 
Lehman client drops from -2.7% to -0.9% (i. e. insignificant) after controlling for industry abnormal 
returns around the collapse, and to -0.3% (i. e. insignificant) after controlling for industry abnormal 
returns around Lehman’s collapse and firm characteristics. To avoid endogeneity issues, the 
industry abnormal returns are calculated from the abnormal returns of firms, which were neither 
clients of Lehman nor clients of other big banks. 
There are four possible explanations for my finding. First, the underwriting relationship value is 
minimal. Second, the underwriting relationship value is significant but very short-lived. Third, 
investment banks have stronger bargaining power, and capture most of the underwriting 
relationship value. Fourth, the underwriting relationship value between Lehman and its clients 
might not have been destroyed by the collapse because Lehman’s investment banking division was 
likely to be acquired by other banks. In fact, Barclays declared its interest for Lehman’s investment 
banking division immediately after the collapse. 
In conclusion, the first essay shows that sell-side security analysts are subject to overconfidence, 
confidence-enhancement and belief-persistence biases, while the market demands bias-free 
analysts. The second paper suggests that capital expenditure (CapEx) forecasts are informative, but 
costly. Therefore, analysts’ motivation and issuing costs affect their decisions to issue capital 
expenditure forecasts. CapEx issuance and accuracy also reduce the chance of being terminated 
from the analyst profession. The third paper discards the finding of Fernando et al. (2012) by 
showing that being a Lehman’s equity underwriting client has insignificant marginal effects on the 
stock price reaction to Lehman’s collapse. My essays urge further research on the real effects of 
analysts’ biases, the under-explored area of analysts’ CapEx forecasts, and the inconclusive 
existence of the underwriting relationship value.    
Chapter I 
1 
 
Chapter I: Analysts’ Cognitive Biases in Earnings Forecasts & Market Response 
This paper studies how sell-side security analysts are exposed to cognitive biases, specifically 
belief-persistence and overconfidence biases, and how investors respond to these biases. My 
findings suggest the following scenario: Analysts tend to give earnings forecasts close to their prior 
forecasts on the firms (i. e. belief-persistence bias). At the same time, analysts tend to deviate from 
the consensus by overweighting the private information (i. e. overconfidence bias). The tendency to 
deviate from the consensus is stronger when the private information is supported by their prior 
forecasts (i. e. confidence-enhancement bias). The belief-persistence bias is sensitive to the time 
distance from the forecast announcement to the earnings announcement, while, the confidence-
enhancement bias is sensitive to the dispersion of the public information’s constituents. The 
investors penalize analysts’ biases by reacting less strongly to forecasts issued by analysts with 
higher biases in the previous year. Additionally, I demonstrate that the overconfidence bias is 
conceptually and empirically distinct from the forecast boldness (i. e. the absolute distance between 
the forecast and the consensus). 
JEL classification: G02, G24 
Keywords:  Security Analyst, Earnings Forecast, Cognitive Biases, Overconfidence, Belief 
Persistence, Confidence Enhancement, Market Reaction, Informativeness 
1 Introduction 
Earnings forecasting is one of the main services that sell-side security analysts, who are 
informational intermediaries between firms and investors, provide to investors. Security analysts 
collect information from different sources, carry out research, and produce earnings forecasts over 
the year. Investors expect analysts to give objective and accurate forecasts; however, the forecasts 
are distorted by analysts’ cognitive biases. The biases could be unconsciously controlled by human 
psychology or motivated by analysts’ strategies, e. g. pleasing the firms’ managers to gain more 
informational access or signaling superior ability to gain more recognition1. Overconfidence bias, i. 
e. an analyst believes her information or ability is superior to others, could be the most prominent 
bias affecting analysts’ behavior (Bondt & Thaler 1990). In my paper, the overconfidence bias is 
                                                    
1
 (Lim 2001; Chen & Matsumoto 2006; Ke & Yu 2006; Libby et al. 2007; Jackson 2005) 
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analysts’ tendency to overvalue their private information to the public information and to deviate 
from the consensus. Another noticeable bias of analysts is belief-persistence bias, which is the 
tendency for prior beliefs to persist. Prior research documents that financial analysts, as human 
beings, are subject to these biases2.  
In this paper, I examine these biases by observing how analysts incorporate the public information, 
private information and their prior earnings forecasts to form their current earnings forecasts. In 
addition, I study the effects of analysts’ overconfidence and belief-persistence biases on the 
informativeness of earnings forecasts (i. e. the stock price reactions to the forecasts). From the 
investors’ perspective, the biases distort the objectiveness of the forecasts. I conjecture that higher 
biases are likely to be associated with lower ability, lower trustworthiness and, therefore, lower 
market reaction to earnings forecasts.  
Chen and Jiang (2006) use Bayesian decision theory to examine the overconfidence bias, based on 
the relationship between real weights and optimal weights that analysts split between public and 
private information. An analyst is subject to the overconfidence bias if she puts too much weight on 
her private information than she should do, according to the Bayesian decision theory. Their 
methodology, not only compares the optimal weights and the real weights that analysts put on the 
private information, but also discriminates analysts’ forecast behavior and information precision. 
The scenario in their paper is that an analyst is giving out an earnings forecast on a firm based on 
the public information reflected in the consensus of all outstanding forecasts and her private 
information, which is not a part of the consensus. My research adopts Chen and Jiang’s scenario 
with a modification. An analyst is giving out an earnings forecast revision, not only based on the 
public and her private information, but also on  her prior beliefs, reflected in her prior forecast on 
the firm in the same fiscal year. An analyst is subject to the belief-persistence bias if the prior 
forecast heavily influences the current forecast.  
The theoretical and empirical disentangling of the biases presents several challenges. There are 
many causes leading to analysts’ belief-persistence bias, such as cognitive dissonance and strategic 
optimism, and one of those is overconfidence (Nickerson 1998). An analyst may be overconfident 
on the precision and accuracy of her prior forecast and believes that the prior forecast contains more 
information than it is recognized by the public (ex-ante). Consequently, she assigns too heavy of a 
                                                    
2
 (Chen & Jiang 2006; Friesen & Weller 2006; Yezegel 2014) 
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weight on the prior forecast to form the current forecast. I separate these two biases based on an 
arbitrary assumption that the information contained in the prior forecast is public, i. e. the consensus 
contains all the information of the prior forecast. Therefore, any additional weight that an analyst 
puts on the prior forecast is evidence of the belief-persistence bias (Lingle & Ostrom 1981; 
Sherman & Zehner 1983). This belief-persistence bias is either from ex-ante reasons (e. g. 
unconscious desires to confirm her prior belief or persistently following an optimistic/pessimistic 
strategy) or ex-post reasons (e. g. tendency to search, collect, and over value the information 
supporting her prior belief or ignore information opposing to her prior belief). The belief-
persistence bias is close to the anchoring effect, with the anchor being the prior forecast. Friesen & 
Weller (2006) add analysts’ previous year optimism/pessimism into the Chen and Jiang’s scenario, 
and find evidence of the belief-persistence bias; more optimistic/pessimistic analysts last year tend 
to be more optimistic/pessimistic this year. Their result predicts that an analyst, in my scenario, puts 
an additional weight on her prior forecast. 
In my model, analysts’ forecasts are balanced between three factors: the rational combination of the 
public and private information, the tendency to keep the forecast close to the prior forecast (i. e. 
belief-persistence bias), and the tendency to deviate from the consensus (i. e. overconfidence bias). 
In addition, I propose that the tendency to deviate from the consensus will be stronger if the analyst 
receives some confidence boost. The agreement between the prior forecast and the private 
information could provide this confidence boost; as a consequence the analyst would  become even 
more overconfident on her private information, if her private information is supported by her prior 
forecast (Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987). This bias is called “confidence-enhancement bias”, and 
by definition, the confidence-enhancement bias is an add-on to the overconfidence bias. The 
confidence-enhancement bias can be viewed as one type of the belief-persistence bias; analysts put 
more weight on the private information if it is consistent with their prior beliefs. However, it is 
distinguished from the belief-persistence bias. The prior belief in the belief-persistence bias is the 
prior forecast, and the belief-persistence bias pulls the current forecast closer to the prior forecast. 
On the other hand, the prior belief in the confidence-enhancement bias is whether the prior forecast 
is greater or smaller than the current consensus. I predict that the confidence-enhancement bias will 
pull the forecasts away from the consensus if the private information is supported by the prior 
belief.  
The analyst’s perceived significance of private and public information can also be affected by the 
belief-persistence bias because she pays more attention on information which is closer to her prior 
Chapter I 
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forecast. To simplify, I assume that the effects of the belief-persistence bias, on the collecting and 
processing information to achieve the private information and the consensus, are implied in the 
weight put on the prior forecast. The question becomes: How do the belief-persistence, 
overconfidence, and confidence-enhancement biases affect the weight splitting over the consensus, 
private information and the prior forecast? The belief-persistence is the misweighting behavior 
between the prior forecast and the combination of the public and private information. The 
overconfidence bias is the misweighting behavior between the public and the private information. 
The confidence-enhancement bias is how the agreement between the prior forecast and the private 
information affect the weighting behavior between the public and private information. The private 
information supports her prior belief if both private information and prior forecast are higher or 
lower than the consensus of available forecasts. The private information opposes her prior belief if 
one of the two is higher than the consensus and the other is lower than the consensus.  
I examine earnings forecasts issued by security analysts from year 1994 to 2010 and have following 
findings on the existence of overconfidence and belief-persistence biases. Firstly, analysts are 
exposed to the belief-persistence bias by putting a weight of 55% instead of 0% on her prior 
forecast to form the current forecast. Secondly, analysts have average overconfidence bias of 53%. 
The overconfidence bias is defined as the fraction of the real weight subtracted by the optimal 
weight, over the real weight on the private information. The difference in overweighting between 
positive and negative private information is 26% (i. e. smaller than 53%), which suggests that 
analysts are overconfident toward both positive and negative private information. Chen and Jiang 
do not control for the prior forecast and document that analysts overweight positive private 
information and underweight negative private information.  
There is evidence of belief-persistence-enhancement bias, that the difference in overconfidence bias 
between supporting forecasts and opposing forecasts is about 15% of the average overconfidence 
bias. Supporting forecasts are forecasts on the same side with prior forecasts with respect to the 
consensuses, and opposing forecasts are forecasts on the opposite side. While the belief-persistence 
bias is sensitive to the forecasting horizon (i. e. the distance from the forecast to the earnings 
announcement date), the confidence-enhancement bias is sensitive to the dispersion among 
outstanding forecasts. There is little information and few forecasts constituting the consensus at the 
beginning of the forecasting period. An analyst has more room to fulfill her confirmative desire 
since she can unwind this bias in the future revisions; therefore she tends to stick to her prior belief. 
On the other hand, a high dispersion within the consensus suggests that analysts are receiving 
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different private information. In that chaos, an analyst has higher demand for the verification of her 
private information, and the prior forecast becomes more salient to the analyst’s confidence in her 
private information. 
My research shows that there is no significant relationship between the belief-persistence bias and 
analyst’s prior accuracy. Capable analysts may have ability to detect unconscious biases, and 
unwind these biases. In addition, analysts who pursue forecast accuracy put effort to eliminate 
biases for more accurate forecasts.  These capable analysts, however, may become overconfident on 
their prior forecasts and supporting private information, which increases the belief-persistence bias. 
Additionally, I document no robust relationships between the belief-persistence bias and other 
analyst characteristics, such as historical boldness, All-America status, experience, coverage 
breadth, and size of the brokerage house.        
To study the effects of overconfidence, belief-persistence, and confidence-enhancement biases on 
forecast informativeness (i. e. the reaction of the market around the forecast issuances), I regress 
three-day buy-and-hold market adjusted abnormal returns around the forecast announcements on 
forecast deviations from the prior forecast and the interactions between the forecast revisions and 
analysts’ biases in the previous years3. The estimated coefficient of the deviation measure the 
informativeness of the forecasts and the estimated coefficients of the interactions measure how 
much the previous cognitive biases affect the current forecast informativeness. I measure an 
analyst’s biases in a year from all forecasts issued by the analyst during the year.  
I examine the effect of the biases on the earnings forecast informativeness over the period from year 
1994 to 2010. I find that market reacts more strongly to less overconfident analysts. The difference 
in informativeness between bottom and top overconfidence bias quintiles is around 18% of the 
average informativeness. The overconfidence bias is distinguished from the forecast boldness (i. e. 
absolute deviation from the consensus). The boldness measurement contains both actual private 
information and overconfidence bias. An analyst tends to give more bold forecasts if her private 
information is either reliable or significantly different from the public information. She also tends to 
give more aggressive revisions if she is subject to the overconfidence bias. I find that analysts’ 
historical boldness increases the market reactions to their forecasts, which implies that investors 
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 (Park & Stice 2000; Clement & Tse 2003; Hilary & Hsu 2013) 
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appreciate the underlying quality of the bold forecasts more than the risk of the overconfidence bias 
in those forecasts. 
I also find that the market reacts more strongly to analysts exposed less to the belief-persistence and 
confidence-enhancement biases, although the effects are weaker than the effect of overconfidence 
bias. The difference in informativeness between bottom and top belief-persistence (and confidence-
enhancement) bias quintiles is around 9% (and 8%) of the average informativeness. The effects of 
the overconfidence and belief-persistence biases on forecast informativeness are even higher than 
the effect of previous firm-specific accuracy. The market’s negative reactions to analysts’ cognitive 
biases suggest that the market demands objective analysts. Investors can recognize the existence of 
these biases, but they are unable to fully relax the analysts’ cognitive biases from the forecasts to 
obtain the true underlying forecasts; therefore, they undervalue forecasts given by analysts with 
high biases. The biases also signal low ability to incorporate different information to produce 
accurate forecasts.  
My paper contributes to both psychological and behavioral financial literature. The extant 
psychological literature documents the belief-persistence bias in a number of professions, such as 
politics, medicine, and science (Nickerson 1998); however, the belief-persistence bias is not 
adequately explored in the security analysts setting. . Behavioral financial research mainly focuses 
on analysts’ other biases including optimism4, overreaction/ underreaction5, and herding6 biases. 
My study contributes evidence of overconfidence, belief-persistence, and confidence-enhancement 
biases of security analysts by analyzing these biases simultaneously. This paper also contributes to 
the literature on investors’ reactions to security analysts’ biases. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 studies the existence and properties of the belief-persistence bias. Section 3 
studies the relationship between analysts’ overconfidence and belief-persistence biases and 
informativeness of earnings forecasts. I offer concluding remarks in section 4. 
                                                    
4
 (Butler & Lang 1991; Sinha et al. 1997; Lin & McNichols 1998; Easterwood & Nutt 1999; Lim 2001; Matsumoto 
2002; Hong & Kubik 2003; Chen & Matsumoto 2006; Ke & Yu 2006; Libby et al. 2007)  
5
 (Bondt & Thaler 1990; Abarbanell & Bernard 1992; Amir & Ganzach 1998; Hilary & Menzly 2006; Gu & Xue 2007) 
6
 (Trueman 1994; Hong, Kubik, et al. 2000; Welch 2000; Clement & Tse 2005; Jegadeesh & Kim 2010) 
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2 Analysts’ Cognitive Biases 
2.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Belief-persistence bias happens when a person acquires information over time, and when she tends 
to put too much weight on the prior information and is reluctant to modify the belief formed earlier 
(Freedman 1965; Lingle & Ostrom 1981). Belief-persistence bias is one specific case of 
confirmation bias. In general, the confirmation bias is the tendency that a person has to 
unintentionally or intentionally prefer information supporting her favored hypotheses or beliefs. A 
person with confirmation bias tends to find or limit her attention to information supporting her 
favored hypotheses, and neglects the information supporting alternative possibilities (Koriat et al. 
1980; Lingle & Ostrom 1981). She has greater preference and puts more weight on favored 
information. She requires less evidence to accept and more evidence to reject a favored hypothesis 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987).  
Although having been extensively studied by philosophers and psychologists, the confirmation bias 
attracted the interest of the behavioral financial researchers only in the last few decades. In finance, 
the belief-persistence bias is usually referred to as overconfidence (in prior believes) and 
conservatism behaviors (Edwards 1982); however, the extant literature mainly focuses on the 
behavior of investors. The conservatism is consistent with the under-reaction behavior of investors 
(Fama 1998; Barberis et al. 1998). Investors overestimate precision of private information (i. e. 
become overconfident) when the public information confirms their prior trades (Daniel et al. 1998). 
There are few papers examining how security analysts are exposed to the confirmation bias. 
Although financial analysts require a great degree of objectiveness, there is no guarantee that 
analysts are free from the belief-persistence bias. Therefore I would like to validate, under my 
specific setting that the prior beliefs are reflected in the analysts’ prior forecasts, whether analysts 
are affected by the belief-persistence bias in issuing earnings forecasts. Because analysts acquire 
information over forecasting period, therefore, I study the belief-persistence bias that analysts tend 
to put too much weight on their prior forecast and are reluctant to deviate from their prior forecasts. 
Hypothesis 1: Security analysts are subject to the belief-persistence bias by putting too much 
weight on their prior firm earnings’ forecasts. 
Consistent with prior research, I would expect that analysts rely on their prior forecasts too much, 
while making their current forecasts. Friesen & Weller (2006) find that analysts who were more 
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optimistic (pessimistic) in the previous year tend to be more optimistic (pessimistic) this year. 
Yezegel (2014) finds that security analysts are affected by the belief-persistence bias by examining 
analysts’ recommendation revisions following quarterly earnings announcements based on the 
earnings surprise with respect to the consensus of the outstanding forecasts and their prior forecasts. 
The author states that an analyst puts less weight on the consensus earnings surprise if the reported 
earnings confirm her prior recommendation.  
Chen and Jiang (2006) study how analysts misweight their private information and find that 
analysts overweight positive private information (i. e. overconfident) and underweight negative 
private information (i. e. under-confident). On average, they find insignificant misweighting 
behavior. I would like to reexamine their findings in the presence of belief-persistence bias.  
Hypothesis 2: Security analysts are subject to the overconfidence bias by overweighting their 
private information. 
Analysts’ weighting behavior between their private information and the public information is 
influenced by external factors, e. g. Chen and Jiang finds that analysts overweight positive private 
information than negative private information. I conjecture that analysts prefer to deviate from the 
consensus to signal that they have more information or higher researching ability; therefore, they 
will overweight the private information more if it has higher validity. Being supported by the prior 
forecast is a justification for the private forecast, and analysts tend to be more confident on their 
supported private information. This argument is the basis for the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Security analysts are subject to the confidence-enhancement bias by being more 
confident on private information which is supported by their prior forecasts and less confident on 
the private information which is not supported by their prior forecasts.     
If the belief-persistence bias exists, I would like to discover factors which influence the belief-
persistence bias.  Griffin & Tversky (1992) argue that people make decisions based on the strength 
(extremeness) and weight (predictive validity) of the information. Ones tend to focus on the 
strength and have insufficient adjustment for the weight. At the beginning of the forecasting period, 
an analyst tends to be more confident on her prior judgment (i. e. the belief-persistence is stronger) 
because the strength is high and the weight is low. Desiring to confirm the prior belief, an analyst 
tends to do that earlier than later during the forecasting period because she has more time to reverse 
her opinion, if necessary.  
Chapter I 
9 
 
Hypothesis 4: Belief-persistence bias is stronger at the beginning than at the end of the forecasting 
period. 
When there is high dispersion among outstanding forecasts, analysts are accessing different 
information or interpreting the information differently. In that confusion, an analyst may wish to 
find justification for her private information, and the prior forecasts may become more important to 
her confidence in her private information. Therefore, I would like to validate the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Confidence-enhancement bias is stronger when there is higher dispersion among 
analysts. 
2.2 Testing Methodology   
I adopt the Bayesian framework used by Chen and Jiang. At time  − 1, an analyst gave a forecast 
of 	 for a firm’s earnings (denoted as z).  At time	, she revises her forecast based on the public 
information contained in the consensus of outstanding forecasts of all analysts including her 
(denoted as c) and her private information (denoted as y) (Figure 1). If she is bias-free, then she puts 
optimal weights on those two and her forecast will be		
. If she is affected by the 
overconfidence bias, then she put more weight than the optimal weight on her private information, 
which makes her forecast to be  as demonstrated on Figure 1. If she is subject to the belief-
persistence bias and her prior forecast were	f′ instead of	f, she would have been steered 
toward	f′, and the forecast would have been f′ instead of f.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Without loss of generality, I assume that z follows a diffuse zero-mean normal distribution, 
 =  +  and	 =  + . In which,  ~ 0, 
 ! and	~ "0, 
#$.  The precisions of public and 
private information are % and	%. If she puts optimal weights on those two, which minimize the 
expected squared distance from the forecast f to the actual firm’s earnings z, the forecast will be the 
expected value of the actual value conditional on the public and private information by the Bayesian 
rule. 
	
 = &1 − ℎ(.  + ℎ.  = *+|, -       (1) 
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In which, ℎ ≡ 	
#	
#/
 	 7.  
The optimal weights are not always the weights used by the analyst because she may overvalue the 
precision of her private information or undervalue the precision of the public information. 
Assuming that she puts a weight of k on her private information, when k is greater than h, the 
analyst puts too much weight on the private information and vice versa. Her real forecast is: 
 = &1 − 1(.  + 1.           (2) 
I substitute y from (2) into (1) to obtain: 
*+|, - = &1 − ℎ(.  + ℎ. 23&4(.4 5  
*+|, - = 464 .  + 64 .   
*+& − (|, - ≡ *+&7*(|, - = 464 . & − ( ≡ 8. 9:;      (3) 
In which,	7* =  − , 9:; =  − , and  8 = 464 . 
The intuition of this model is that the deviation of the forecast should not have power to predict the 
ex-post error of the forecast if the analyst acts rationally. The coefficient estimate  α= in the 
regression 7* = 8. 9:; +  converges in probability to 464 !. A positive or negative α= suggests 
private information overweighting or underweighting. Therefore, it can be used as a measure of the 
overconfidence bias. The absence of the intercept presumably assumes that there exist only 
misweighting behavior.   
With the present of the belief-persistence bias, an analyst’s realized forecast is a combination of the 
public information c, her private information y and her prior forecast. The equation (2) 
becomes	&1 + >( = &1 − 1(.  + 1.  + >. , in which  is her prior forecast and >/&1 + >( 
measures the weight put on her prior forecast8. The equation (3) becomes	*+&7*(|, - =8. 9:; + &1 − 8(. >. @ABCA9:;, in which, 9:;@ABCA =  − . Consequently, the value	>D =
                                                    
7
 Please refer to Appendix A for a proof 
8
 Please refer to Appendix B for further explanation 
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αE=/&1 − α=( obtained from the regression 7* = 8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. 9:;@ABCA +  measures the 
belief-persistence bias. A bias-free analyst will correctly incorporate her prior forecast with 
forecasts of other analysts to form the consensus and her αE should be zero. 
The confidence-enhancement bias proposes that the agreement between & − ( and  & − ( 
affect the overconfidence bias. Therefore, the interaction term Dev×Confirm is included in the 
equation (3), in which, Confirm equals 1 if & − ( and  & − ( having the same signs, and 
equals 0 otherwise. The equation (3) becomes	*+&7*(|, - = 8. 9:; + &1 − 8(. >. 9:;@ABCA +
G. 9:;. HCIBAJ. Subsequently, the estimated coefficient GK  from the regression 7* = 8F +8. 9:; + 8E. 9:;@ABCA + G. 9:; × HCIBAJ +  measures the confidence-enhancement bias. 
In addition to informational misweighting biases, there are other biases which are independent from 
the informational weighting behavior.  For example, analysts tend to be more optimistic when the 
dispersion among analyst forecasts is higher than when the dispersion is lower (Ackert & 
Athanassakos 1997). These biases in combination with misweighting biases form analysts’ 
behavior. Chen and Jiang also mention these biases as the “added-bias”, which is subsumed in the 
intercept. I extend their models further by allowing the intercept to be a function of the financial 
environment, firm and analyst characteristics. In addition, I assume that the intercept (including the 
firm-fixed effects) comes from the analysts’ bias behaviors, which is called the “added-bias”. The 
models with the “added-bias” are not necessary to have the same results as the models without the 
“added-bias”. Friesen & Weller (2006) add belief-persistence bias into the model. They measure 
the analyst’s prior belief by her forecast bias in the previous year.  
Chen and Jiang also offer a probability test based on the following argument. If an analyst is free 
from the overconfidence bias, she will be equally likely to overshoot or undershoot the actual value. 
If she is overconfident, she will be more likely to overshoot when her private information is higher 
than the consensus and more likely to undershoot when her information is lower than the consensus. 
The formal formula is: MNOBPI&7*( = OBPI&9:;(Q = 8∗ + . I use (*) to distinguish between 
linear models and logistic models. The estimated coefficient 8∗S is a measure of overconfidence 
bias. Even though the argument is valuable, the probability test is valid only when the “added-bias” 
term is not included in the model. When the “added-bias” is included, the FE in this logistic 
regression should be deducted by the intercept 8 in the equation (3). It would be much more 
complicated to do that when 8 is a function of other variables. Therefore, I do not perform this 
probability test in my analysis.   
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The “added-bias” and overconfidence bias are potentially affected by the environmental 
characteristics and analyst characteristics; therefore, I control for financial environment 
characteristics and analyst characteristics in both intercept and interaction terms with Dev. Firm 
characteristics are controlled through firm fixed effect, which capture aggregate effects of all firm 
characteristics on the regressions. I obtain the overconfidence bias and the belief-persistence bias by 
running the following model. Following Chen and Jiang, I cluster by industry-year to capture the 
heteroskedasticity among industries. 
Model I (OLS Regression with Firm Fixed Effects and Industry-Year Clustering): 
7* = 8F + TM. UVW + TX. UVWYZ[\Z + ]. HCI^AC_O +   
In which, Dev is the difference between the current forecast and the consensus, DevPrior is the 
difference between the prior forecast and the current forecast, and the “Controls” include the 
distance to earnings announcement (Horizon), the dispersion in the consensus (Dispersion), the 
analyst’s past accuracy (ACCURACY), the analyst’s past forecast boldness (BOLDNESS), the 
analyst’s All-American status (STAR), the analyst’s experience (EXPERIENCE), number of stocks 
currently covered by the analyst (BREADTH) and size of the analyst’s brokerage house 
(BROKERSIZE). The estimated coefficient α= of Dev is the measure for overconfidence bias. A 
positive	α=  suggests overconfidence bias and negative 	α=  suggests under-confidence bias. Chen 
and Jiang, and Friesen and Weller suggest a positive α= . The estimation >D = 	8E=/&1 − 8=( 
measures the belief-persistence bias. Friesen and Weller suggest, and Hypothesis 1 predicts a 
positive	>D and Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive 8=. 
In order to test the existence of the confidence-enhancement bias (Hypothesis 3), I add the 
interaction term Dev×Confirm, along with interaction terms between Dev and the “Controls”, into 
Model I. In addition, I add the interaction term 9:; × @COB^B;: to capture the optimism behavior of 
the overconfidence bias (Chen & Jiang 2006), in which Positive equals 1 if Dev is positive and 
equals 0 otherwise. 
Model II (OLS Regression with Firm Fixed Effects and Industry-Year Clustering): 
7* = 8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. 9:;@ABCA + ]. HCI^AC_O + `M. UVW × a\bc[Zd + GE. 9:; ×@COB^B;: + e. 9:; × HCI^AC_O +   
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In the formula above, the “Controls” include Horizon, Dispersion, ACCURACY, BOLDNESS, 
STAR, EXPERIENCE, BREADTH, and BROKERSIZE. The estimated coefficient GS of the 
interaction term 9:; × HCIBAJ is a measure of the confidence-enhancement bias. If GS  is 
positive, the overconfidence measures are higher (i. e. the analyst put more weight on the private 
information) when the private information is supporting her prior belief, and vice versa. Hypothesis 
3 predicts a positive GS  (i. e. the existence of confidence-enhancement bias on top of the 
overconfidence bias).  
To investigate the relationship between the belief-persistence bias and characteristics (Horizon, 
Dispersion, and ACCURACY), I add the interaction terms between DevPrior and 9:; × HCIBAJ 
with characteristic varibales into Model II.  
Model III (OLS Regression with Firm Fixed Effects and Industry-Year Clustering): 
7* = 8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. 9:;@ABCA + ]. HCI^AC_O + fM. UVWYZ[\Z × a\bgZ\hi + G. 9:; ×HCIBAJ + GE. 9:; × @COB^B;: + eE. 9:; × HCI^AC_O + j.UVW × a\bc[Zd × a\bgZ\hi +   
In which the Controls includes Horizon, Dispersion, ACCURACY, BOLDNESS, STAR, 
EXPERIENCE, BREADTH, and BROKERSIZE.  I do not separate Horizon, Dispersion and 
ACCURACY from the “Controls” because the separation causes unnecessary expansion of the 
regressions’ presentation. Hypothesis 4 expects a positive estimated coefficient GKklmnlo of the 
interaction term DevPrior×Horizon. Hypothesis 5 suggests a positive estimated coefficient pqrs
tmslo of the interaction term Dev×Confirm× Dispersion.  
2.3 Variables Construction and Data Overview 
The dependent variable FE stands for “Forecast Error”, and is defined as the current earnings 
forecast minus the actual earnings. The key independent variable Dev stands for “Deviation from 
the consensus” and equals to the current forecast minus the current consensus. These variables have 
unit of $/share. DevPrior stands for “Deviation from Prior Forecast”, and equals to the prior 
forecast minus the current forecast. Confirm equals 1 if the forecast and the analyst’s prior forecast 
are both bigger or both smaller than the consensus and equals 0 otherwise.  
The “Controls” is a set of financial environment and analyst characteristics at the time of forecasts. 
Horizon is the logarithm of the number of days to the earnings announcements. Dispersion is the 
standard deviation of the forecasts constituting the consensus. This variable measures the degree of 
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agreement among analysts covering the stock at the time of the forecast. ACCURACY is the realized 
firm-specific accuracy of the analyst in the previous year. It is defined by this equation: ]HHuv]Hw = 1 − &AxI1&CA:xO^	xyOC_z^:	:AACA( − 1( &IzJ:A	C	xIx_O^O − 1(⁄  (Hong 
and Kubik 2003).STAR equals 1 if the analyst is currently voted as an All-American analyst. 
EXPERIENCE is the logarithm of the number of days since her first forecast in I/B/E/S. Finally, 
BROKERSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts working for the broker in the current year.  
My research uses on analyst forecasts, analyst statuses, and actual earnings per share in the period 
from 1994 to 2010. The data is obtained from I/B/E/S and collected from Institutional Investors 
magazines.  Since I am interested in the belief-persistence bias, I keep only observations with 
available prior forecasts. FE, Dev, DevPrior and Dispersion are suffered from the outlier issue. The 
range of FE is from minus 2 million to 8 million and the range of Dev is from minus 5 million to 10 
million, which imply there is a high risk of the outlier issue. I winsorize these variables at 1% on 
both tails to ensure my analysis is not affected by the outliers.   
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of FE, Dev, DevPrior, Confirm and control variables 
(ACCURACY, STAR, EXPERIENCE, BROKERSIZE, Dispersion and Horizon) after winsorizing. 
The final sample includes about 1.1 million of observations. FE and Dev have ranges of [-1.9; 5.2] 
and [-1.6; 1.0]. On average, 55% of the revisions are confirmative with the analyst’s prior forecasts. 
This is preliminary evidence of the belief-persistence bias since one would expect an equal chance 
of obtaining supportive and opposing private information.    
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The correlation matrix shows no risk of multicollinearity issue. The correlation between FE and 
Dev is approximately equal minus 8%. There are two possible reasons for this: the first reason is 
that FE and Dev have V-shaped relationship as documented by Chen and Jiang, the second one is 
that FE and Dev are affected by the between-group variation. Figure 2 illustrates how the deviation 
among groups may distort the correlation between FE and Dev. In this figure, there are three 
imaginary firms represented by round, star, and square symbols. Each of them has a positive 
correlation between FE and Dev; however, the regression on the pool of uncentered data may end 
up with a negative correlation as demonstrated. Therefore, the correlation on the pooled sample 
does not say much about the real correlation between FE and Dev after controlling for the variance 
among different firms.  
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[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The data, actually, urges to control for the variation among firms; Figure 3 illustrates that. This 
figure presents the overconfidence and belief-persistence bias on the sub-sample of positive and 
negative Dev. The graph on the left is fitted lines from OLS regressions (7* = 8 + G. 9:; + ) on 
positive and negative Dev, and on supporting and opposing forecasts without controlling for firm 
fixed effects. The graph on the right is fitted lines from the same regressions on the same sub-
samples but using centered FE and Dev at the firm level. The left graph is consistent with one graph 
presented by Chen and Jiang, and it suggests that analysts are overconfident when Dev is positive 
and underconfident when the Dev is negative. Meanwhile, the right graph documents a minimal 
underconfidence bias in the negative Dev sub-sample. Therefore, the data is affected by the 
between-group variation issue. Additionally, these figures are subject to potential changes after 
controlling for belief-persistence bias and other control variables.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
There are two methods to solve this issue: centering variables at the firm level and controlling for 
firm fixed effects. I adopt the latter one, controlling for firm fixed effects, since it does not only 
solve the between-group variation issue, but also control for unobservable firm characteristics 
which may affect the biases. In addition, the fixed effects estimator are consistent, while, centering 
estimators may produce inconsistent coefficients which lead to incorrect references (Gormley & 
Matsa 2013) 
2.4 Empirical Results 
Table 2 demonstrates the existence of the overconfidence and belief-persistence biases. The first 
column presents results of Model I (i. e. 7* = 8F + TM. UVW + TX. UVWYZ[\Z + ]. HCI^AC_O +(. The estimated coefficients documents the belief-persistence bias of 1.25 (i. e.8E= 8=⁄  or 0.587/(1-
0.53)), which means that an analyst puts a weight of 56% (i. e. 1.25 &1 + 1.25(⁄ ) on her prior 
forecast. If she has treated her prior forecast the same as forecasts of other analysts, she would put 
zero weight on her prior forecast since the consensus has already contained her prior forecast. A 
positive weight on the prior forecast suggests that the analyst put too much weight on her prior 
forecast in forming the new forecast. This result supports Hypothesis 1 that analysts are subject to 
the belief-persistence bias.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The positive estimated coefficient 8= of the variable Dev in Model I suggests that analysts are 
overconfident. In general, analysts overweight the private information by about 53%. This result 
supports Hypothesis 2 that analysts are subject to the overconfidence bias. The positive estimated 
coefficient GES of the interaction term 9:; × @COB^B;: in Model II (i. e. F* = 8F + 8. 9:; +8E. 9:;@ABCA + ]. HCI^AC_O + `M. UVW × a\bc[Zd + GE. 9:; × @COB^B;: + e. 9:; ×HCI^AC_O + ) suggests that analysts optimistically overweight the private information, which is 
consistent with Chen and Jiang. The difference in overconfidence bias between positive and 
negative private information is 30%, which is smaller than the average overconfidence bias. 
Therefore, analysts are overconfident with respect both to negative private information, while Chen 
and Jiang document a different result, in which analysts are overconfident to positive private 
information and underconfident to negative private information. 
The second column of Table 2 presents results of Model II. The positive estimated coefficient GS of 
the interaction term Dev×Confirm suggests that analysts are subject to the confidence-enhancement 
bias. The confidence-enhancement bias is about 8% which account for 15% (i. e. 0.08/0.53) of the 
average overconfidence bias. This result is supporting Hypothesis 3 that analysts are affected by the 
confidence-enhancement bias.  
The third column of Table 2 presents results of Model III (i. e. 7* = 8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. 9:;@ABCA + ]. HCI^AC_O + fM. UVWYZ[\Z × a\bgZ\hi + G. 9:; ×HCIBAJ + GE. 9:; × @COB^B;: + eE. 9:; × HCI^AC_O + j.UVW × a\bc[Zd × a\bgZ\hi + ). 
The positive estimated coefficient of the interaction term @ABCA9:; × ~CABCI suggests that the 
belief-persistence bias is stronger at the beginning of the forecasting period than at the end of the 
period. The difference in belief-persistence bias between forecasts made at 75 and 25 percentiles of 
the horizon is about 43% (i. e. 0.27*(5.58 – 4.64)/0.59) of the average belief-persistence bias. This 
result supports Hypothesis 4. The positive estimated coefficient of the interaction term 9:; ×HCIBAJ × 9BO%:AOBCI suggests that the confidence-enhancement bias is more severe when there 
is higher dispersion among analysts. The difference in confidence-enhancement bias between 
forecasts made at 75 and 25 percentiles of the forecast dispersion is also about 30% (i. e. 0.18*(0.16 
– 0.03)/0.08) of the average confidence-enhancement bias. This result supports Hypothesis 5.  
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Finally, the estimated coefficients interactions terms between	9:;@ABCA,	9:; × HCIBAJ, and 
analysts’ characteristic variables reflect the effects of analysts’ characteristics on their biases. There 
are some slightly significant relationships between analysts’ characteristics and analysts’ biases; 
however, these relationships are not survived through the robustness checks, and there if no clear 
theoretical intuition for these relationships. Taking the relationship between analysts’ accuracy and 
belief-persistence bias for an example, a more capable analyst may have ability to recognize the 
belief-persistence bias within the self and correct it in a rational manner. However, the historical 
accuracy may create an illusion in the analyst’s awareness of the prior forecast’s accuracy. 
Therefore, an analyst who is more accurate in the past may be exposed to the belief-persistence bias 
more than another analyst who is less accurate in the past.    
2.5 Robustness Checks 
I perform four robustness checks and the results are summarized in Table 3. Firstly, in the main 
analysis, I use the forecast error (FE), deviation from the consensus (Dev), prior forecast deviation 
(DevPrior) and the current forecast dispersion (Dispersion) on a “per share” basis, and I winsorized 
those variable at 1% level to solve the heteroskedasticity issue. The differences in number of 
outstanding shares among firms may be the cause of the issue. I normalize these variables by the 
stock price to have variables on “per dollar” basis by dividing these variables to the stock prices 
two days before the forecasts. This method may eliminate the variability in the number of shares 
outstanding, and consequently, reduce the heteroskedasticity. However, the heteroskedasticity issue 
still remains, and therefore, I winsorize the obtained variables at 1% level. I perform the same 
analysis and find consistent results. The measures of biases are lower than those in the main 
analysis. Horizon is still the main factor driving belief-persistence bias, while Dispersion is the 
main factor driving confidence-enhancement bias. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Secondly, Chen and Jiang assign weights on forecasts constituting the consensus proportionally to 
the inverted time distance to the current moment. Consequently, the time-weighted consensus gets 
closer to the more current forecasts compared to the equally weighted consensus. They claim that 
the two measures of the consensus have similar results. I substitute the time-weighted consensus 
into the equally weighted consensus in the main analysis, and have similar results. 
Chapter I 
18 
 
Thirdly, I split the data into two periods: during the boom from 1994 to 2000 (also before the Fair 
Disclosure Regulations) and during the crises from 2001 to 2010 (also after the Fair Disclosure 
Regulations). There is no big difference in overconfidence bias between two periods. However, 
there is an increase in belief-persistence bias during the later period. I conjecture that an analyst 
gives forecasts based on news collection and news analysis. After the Fair Disclosure Regulations, 
analysts may emphasize more the news analysis which makes the forecast become more persistent 
to the prior forecast. Finally, I check whether the fixed effects change the results significantly. I 
rerun the models in the main analysis without the fixed effects and find that the results are not much 
different to the main analysis with the firm fixed effects.   
3 Analysts’ Cognitive Biases and Market’s Response 
3.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The information content of the security analysts’ reports has been extensively studied. Forecast 
informativeness is defined as the market’s reaction around the forecast announcement in the 
direction of the forecast revision. Different studies have slightly different definitions of forecast 
informativeness, e. g. using different window lengths around the forecasts, measuring market 
reaction per unit or per direction of the deviation, and defining deviation from the prior forecast or 
from the consensus. The extant literature mostly show positive (negative) abnormal returns for 
upward (downward) earnings forecast revisions9. Stickel (1992) studies the association between 
forecast informativeness and analysts’ status (i. e. analysts who are voted as All-American analysts 
by institutional investors through surveys conducted by the Institutional Investor magazine). They 
find that higher-status analysts have greater impact on stock prices than their lower-status peers. 
Forecasts issued by analysts with better historical track records in earnings forecast accuracy have 
greater impact on the security prices than analysts with worse historical tract records. This 
relationship is stock-specific and does not spill-over to other stocks covered by the same analyst 
(Park & Stice 2000).  
There are a limited number of papers investigating the relationship between analysts’ biases on the 
forecast informativeness. Hugon & Muslu (2010) examine how the conservatism (i. e. the 
difference in analysts’ reactions to positive and negative news) affects the forecast informativeness. 
                                                    
9
 (Givoly & Lakonishok 1979; Abdel-Khalik & Ajinkya 1982; Lys & Sohn 1990; Asquith et al. 2005) 
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They argue that analysts have motivation to please managers by being more optimistic (i. e. 
exaggerating upward revisions more than downward revisions); however, they also have motivation 
to keep their reputation by issuing more conservative (i. e. less aggressive) forecast revisions. The 
authors find that investors react stronger to forecasts given by more conservative analysts. 
There are three potential reasons which connect more overconfident analysts with less informative 
forecasts. First, an analyst with a higher overconfidence bias issues a less accurate forecast revision 
than another one with a lower overconfidence bias, given the same public and private information. 
Therefore, the more confident analyst is inferior in terms of forecast accuracy; although, her 
forecast is not necessary less accurate at the time of earnings announcement. Second, an 
overconfident analyst exaggerates her private information by giving higher forecasts under positive 
private information, and giving lower forecasts under negative private information. Consequently, 
the forecasts will be more volatile, and signal lower forecasting capability. Third, if an analyst is 
away from the consensus and turns out to be wrong, she will face greater disappointment from 
investors, and reputation loss. The gain of being away from the consensus but correct in the forecast 
is less than the loss from being incorrectly away from the consensus. Therefore, on average, the 
additional deviation from the consensus caused by the overconfidence bias reduces analysts’ 
reputation. These arguments are the basis for the next hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 6: The market reacts less strongly to forecasts issued by more overconfident analysts. 
An analyst with higher belief-persistence bias relies more on her prior belief and deviates less from 
her prior forecast. Therefore, with the same level of private information, an analyst with higher 
belief-persistence bias conveys less information to investors than another analyst with lower belief-
persistence bias. An analyst with higher belief-persistence may pay insufficient attention to news 
which is away from their prior forecasts, and in fact, this news is valuable to investors. The belief-
persistence bias is associated with lack of ability in making sufficient deviation from the prior 
forecasts to produce accurate forecasts or negligence to extreme news. I predict that the investors do 
not favor this bias, and as consequence, they will react less to analysts with high belief-persistence 
bias in the future. I would like to examine the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7: The market reacts less strongly to forecasts issued by analysts with higher belief-
persistence bias.  
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The confidence-enhancement bias exaggerates the overconfidence bias when the private 
information is supported by the prior forecasts and diminishes the overconfidence bias when the 
private information is not supported by the prior forecasts. The confidence-enhancement bias adds 
an additional degree of ambiguity to the overconfidence bias and decreases the reliability of the 
forecasts. Similar to Hugon & Muslu (2010), I would expect that investors prefer objective analysts, 
and therefore, the confidence-enhancement bias reduces analysts’ creditability and decrease market 
reaction to earnings forecasts. 
Hypothesis 8: The market reacts less strongly to forecasts issued by analysts with higher 
confidence-enhancement bias.  
The analysts’ biases may affect forecast informativeness only if investors recognize the existence of 
these biases, but do not have the ability to separate the biases from the stated forecasts. Hilary & 
Hsu (2013) study the relationship between forecasts’ consistency (i. e. accuracy of forecasts after 
cancelling the systematic optimism/pessimism) and forecast informativeness. They find that the 
consistency is even more important than the accuracy of stated forecasts in determining forecast 
informativeness. However, the effect of the stated accuracy is still significant after controlling for 
the de-biased accuracy. The argument is that investors recognize the existence of systematic 
optimism/pessimism in analysts’ forecasts, and partially abandon these biases from the stated 
forecasts to obtain the “true” forecasts.     
3.2 Testing Methodology   
The association between abnormal stock returns and forecast revisions has been used to measure the 
information content of earnings forecasts10. A stronger association between abnormal stock returns 
and forecast revisions indicates more informative forecasts, and vice versa. The basic regression 
is:	H]v = 8F + 8. 9:;, in which, CAR measures the abnormal stock returns around the forecast 
issuance date, and Dev measures the unexpected forecast revisions. To study the effects of analysts’ 
biases on the forecast informativeness, I add interactions between Dev and the interested variables 
into this model (Clement & Tse 2003; Hugon & Muslu 2010; Hilary & Hsu 2013). The variables of 
interest are: analysts’ overconfidence bias (*vH79*H*), belief-persistence bias 
                                                    
10
 (Givoly & Lakonishok 1979; Stickel 1992; Park & Stice 2000; Clement & Tse 2003; Hugon & Muslu 2010; Hilary & 
Hsu 2013) 
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(e**7	@*v*H*), and confidence-enhancement bias 
(H79*H*	*~]H***). 
The regression results may change dramatically by changing the controls in the regression. 
Therefore, more controls are applied to minimize the risk of incorrect inferences (i. e. type I error). 
Firstly, I control for firm-year fixed effects. The firm-year fixed effects will captures all possible 
firm characteristics variables measured on the annual basis. If I do not control for firm fixed effects, 
I will have to control for firm characteristic variable such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, beta, 
institutional holdings, and other variables (Frankel et al. 2006; Hugon & Muslu 2010). Secondly, I 
control for common used analyst characteristics, which include previous firm-specific accuracy 
(ACCURACY), All-America analyst status (STAR), experience (EXPERIENCE), and broker size 
(BROKERSIZE)11. Thirdly, I control for environmental characteristics which contain the distance to 
the actual earnings announcement (Horizon) 12 and the disagreement among financial analysts 
(Dispersion). Finally, I control for the characteristics of the forecasts, which are usually ignored in 
the previous literature (e. g., Hugon & Muslu 2010). I control for whether the unexpected forecast 
revision is positive or negative (Optimism Dummy), the magnitude of the revision (Boldness), ex-
post accuracy of the forecast (Accuracy Dummy), and  timeliness of the forecast (Leader-Follower 
Ratio).   
Before studying the effects of analyst characteristics on forecasts’ informativeness, I examine the 
informativeness of forecasts in isolation, which allows me to study the relative economic 
significance of the association between analyst characteristics and forecast informativeness. I run 
the following regression to obtain the average earnings forecast informativeness. 
Model IV (OLS Regression with Firm-Year Fixed Effects and Industry-Year Clustering):  
H]v =8F + TM. UVW + 8E. *vH79*H* + 8. e**7	@*v*H* +8. H79*H*	*~]H** + ]. HCI^AC_O +   
In which, the “Controls” include forecast characteristics (Accuracy Dummy and Leader-Follower 
Ratio), environmental characteristics (Horizon, Dispersion) and analyst characteristics 
                                                    
11
 (Park & Stice 2000; Stickel 1992; Hugon & Muslu 2010; Hilary & Hsu 2013) 
12
 (Sinha et al. 1997; Hilary & Hsu 2013) 
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(ACCURACY, STAR, EXPERIENCE, and BROKERSIZE). The estimated coefficient TM=  of Dev 
measure the informativeness of the earnings forecasts on average. Prior literature suggests a positive TM=  (i. e. forecast revisions are informative). 
To study the effect of overconfidence and belief-persistence biases on forecast informativeness, I 
add interaction terms between Dev and analysts’ bias variables (i. e. OVERCONFIDENCE, BELIEF 
PERSISTENCE, and CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT).  
Model V (OLS Regression with Firm-Year Fixed Effects and Industry-Year Clustering): 
H]v =8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. *vH79*H* + 8. e**7	@*v*H* +8. H79*H*	*~]H** + ]. HCI^AC_O + `M. UVW × aUa +`X. UVW × f	Ya + `. UVW × aUa	a +G. 9:; × %^BJBOJ	9zJJ + G. 9:; × eC_I:OO + 	e. 9:; × HCI^AC_O + 				   
The firm fixed effects capture the effects of firm characteristics on the forecast informativeness 
(Frankel et al. 2006). The estimated coefficients	`MS , `XS , and `S  of Dev×OVERCONFIDENCE, 
Dev×BELIEF PERSISTENCE, and Dev×CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT measure the effects of 
these biases on forecast informativeness. Hypothesis 6 predicts a negative `MS , Hypothesis 6 predicts 
a negative	`XS , and Hypothesis 8 predict a negative	`S . 
3.3 Variables Construction  
There are some additional variables compared to previous part and some modifications. Firstly, I 
use three-trading-day accumulative market adjusted abnormal returns surrounding the analyst’s 
forecast revision to measure the reaction of the market. The accumulation period is from one day 
before to one day after the forecast revision date (Ball & Kothari 1991; Clement & Tse 2003; Hilary 
& Hsu 2013). Secondly, the forecast revision is defined as the difference between the current 
forecast and the prior forecast of the same analyst (Park & Stice 2000; Clement & Tse 2003), and 
this variable is named as “Dev”. Some people may argue that less aggressive forecasts may stay 
closer to the prior forecasts; therefore the amount of information per one unit of deviation is 
mechanically magnified. To capture that, I use another definition of forecast informativeness that 
measures the total market reaction to the forecast revision instead of the market reaction on one unit 
of revision (Ball & Kothari 1991). I rerun models V and VI with the optimism dummy (i. e. equals 
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1 if Dev is positive and zero otherwise) instead of deviation as the measure for “Dev”. To 
distinguish models with two definitions of informativeness, I denote models with deviation as IV(a) 
and V(a), and models with the optimism dummy as IV(b) and V(5).     
Some other papers use the deviation from the consensus instead of the deviation from the prior 
forecast (Hugon & Muslu 2010; Hilary & Hsu 2013). The intuitions behind two definitions are 
different. Using prior forecast, we stand on the analyst’s point of view, and the deviation from the 
prior forecast measures the amount of information sent by the analyst. Using the consensus, we 
stand on the investors’ point of view. The deviation from the consensus is the amount of 
information received by the investors with an underlying assumption that the consensus is correctly 
reflect the earnings expectation of the investors. The two definitions produce highly correlated 
deviations (around 65%). Although the deviation from the prior forecast is used in the main 
analysis, the deviation from the consensus will be examined in the robustness checks.     
Thirdly, I present the constructions of overconfidence, belief-persistence, and confidence-
enhancement biases. It is possible that these biases vary from an analyst to another, from a firm to 
another, and even from a point in time to another. Because of the limitation of the data that many 
analysts issue few forecasts in a year and few forecasts for a firm, I assume that overconfidence and 
belief-persistence biases are constants for each analyst; I would calculate these biases on the 
analyst-firm basis if an analyst produced hundreds of forecasts for a firm in a fiscal year. I use all 
the forecasts given by an analyst in her entire career to estimate her overconfidence and belief-
persistence biases.  
To tackle the between-group variation issue, I use the firm centering method instead of including 
firm fixed effects for two following reasons. The first reason is that it seems to be too much if I put 
firm fixed effects on each analyst’s regression, because, many analysts issue few forecasts on some 
firms and the fixed effects will capture most of the variation. The second reason is the limitation of 
the computational power; it would take hours to run thousands of regressions with fixed effects. 
Before running regressions, I calculate the averages of FE, Dev, DevPrior, Horizon, Dispersion, 
ACCURACY, EXPERIENCE and BROKERSIZE for all forecasts given for a firm. Then, I subtract 
the averages from the corresponding variables. For simplicity, I remain the notations of group 
centered variables the same as original variables.  
For each analyst i, I run two regressions: 7* = 8F + TM. UVW + TX. UVWYZ[\Z +  and	7* =8F + 8E. 9:;@ABCA + 8. HCIBAJ + GF. 9:; + `M. UVW × a\bc[Zd + . For each analyst i, the 
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estimated coefficient TM=  of Dev from the first regression measures her overconfidence bias and is 
denoted as OVERCONFIDENCE. Her belief-persistence bias is TX=/&1 − TM=  ), and is denoted as 
BELIEF PERSISTENCE. The estimated coefficient `MS  of Dev×Confirm from the second regression 
is the measure for her confidence-enhancement bias (CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT). These 
measures, afterward, are classified into quintiles. 
Finally, Accuracy Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the forecast is more accurate than 
the consensus and equals 0 otherwise (Williams 1996; Chen & Jiang 2006). Optimism Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the forecast is above the consensus, and takes the 
value of 0 otherwise.  Boldness is the absolute value of the Dev variable. Leader-Follower Ratio is 
the logarithm of the average time distances from the forecast to the last two forecasts over average 
time distances from the forecast to the next two forecasts (Cooper et al. 2001). Environmental 
characteristics and analyst characteristics (Horizon, Dispersion, ACCURACY, STAR, 
EXPERIENCE, and BROKERSIZE) share the same constructions with the previous part.  
3.4 Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents the informativeness of earnings forecast and effects of analyst characteristics on 
forecast informativeness. The first two columns present the results of model IV(a) and V(a) with the 
variable Dev defined as the deviation from the consensus of the current forecast. The last two 
columns present Model IV(b) and Model V(b) with the variable Dev is defined as the optimism 
dummy. The first and the third columns present the regression results of Model IV(a) and Model 
IV(b)  (i. e. H]v = 8F + TM. UVW + 8E. *vH79*H* + 8. e**7	@*v*H* +8. H79*H*	*~]H** + ]. HCI^AC_O + ). The positive estimated coefficient GS of 
the variable Dev suggests that three days buy-and-hold abnormal returns is positively associated 
with the forecast revision; in other words, security analysts are informative. On average, 1 cent 
increase in the forecast revision is associated with 0.04% increase in the three-day abnormal returns 
(equivalent to 3.5% per annum). The average difference in three-day abnormal returns between 
upward and downward revisions is nearly 3.4%. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The second and fourth columns contain the regression results of Model V(a) and Model V(b) 
(H]v =8F + 8. 9:; + 8E. *vH79*H* + 8. e**7	@*v*H* +
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8. H79*H*	*~]H** + ]. HCI^AC_O + `M. UVW × aUa +`X. UVW × f	Ya + `. UVW × aUa	a +G. 9:; × %^BJBOJ	9zJJ + G. 9:; × eC_I:OO + 	e. 9:; × HCI^AC_O + ). The 
significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term Dev×OVERCONFIDENCE suggests that 
the higher an analyst’s overconfidence bias, the less informative her forecasts. From Model V(a), 
the difference in the three-day abnormal returns associated with 1 cent of forecast deviation from 
the consensus between analysts from the bottom and the top quintiles of the overconfidence bias is 
0.0076% (i. e. 0.189*(5-1)/100, equivalent to 0.6% per annum). In comparison with the average 
informativeness, this difference is about 18% of the average informativeness. From Model V(b), the 
difference in the incremental three-day abnormal returns associated with upward forecasts revisions 
between analysts from the bottom and the top quintiles of the overconfidence bias is 0.5% 
(equivalent to 14% of the average incremental three-day abnormal returns associated with upward 
forecast revisions). These results support Hypothesis 5 that investors react more strongly to analysts 
affected less by the overconfidence bias.  
The significantly negative coefficients of the interaction terms Dev×BELIEF PERSISTENCE and  
Dev×CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT suggest that the higher an analyst’s belief-persistence bias 
is, the less informative her forecasts are. From Model V(a), the difference in the three-day abnormal 
returns associated with 1 cent of forecast deviation from the consensus between analysts from the 
bottom and top quintiles of belief-persistence bias is 0.004% (i. e. 0.1*(5-1)/100, equivalent to 0.3% 
per annum), which is about 9% of the average forecast informativeness. The corresponding 
difference with respect to the confidence-enhancement bias is 0.004% (i. e. 0.09*(5-1)/100, 
equivalent to 0.3% per annum), which is about 8% of the average forecast informativeness. In total, 
the difference in forecast informativeness between analysts from the bottom and top quintiles of 
both belief-persistence and confidence-enhancement biases is 17% of the average forecast 
informativeness. From Model V(b), the difference in the incremental three-day abnormal returns 
associated with upward forecasts revisions between analysts from the bottom and the top quintiles 
of the belief-persistence (confidence-enhancement) bias is 7% (5%) of the average incremental 
three-day abnormal returns associated with upward forecast revisions. These results support 
Hypothesis 6 that investors react more strongly to analysts affected less by the overconfidence bias. 
To illustrate the economic significance of the effects of the cognitive biases on the forecast 
informativeness, I calculate the difference in informativeness between the top and the bottom 
quintiles in previous forecast accuracy from Model V(b). The difference is about 5% (i. e. 
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0.23*0.8/3.4), which is about a third of the overconfidence bias’ effect (14%), less than the belief-
persistence bias’ effect (7%), and about the confidence-enhancement bias’ effect (5%).   
Forecasts supporting the prior forecasts are under higher suspicion for the belief-persistence bias 
than forecast opposing the prior forecasts; consequentially, the supporting forecasts are less 
informativeness than opposing forecasts. From Model V(b), the difference in forecast 
informativeness between opposing and supporting forecasts is about 32% (i. e. 1.11/3.42) of the 
average forecast informativeness. I do not use Model V(a) because with the same level of deviation 
from the consensus, the deviation from the prior forecast is lower in the supporting forecasts than in 
the opposing forecasts. Investors react based on the deviation from the consensuses, the supporting 
forecasts have artificially increased amount of information per one unit of deviation from the prior 
forecast. 
While overconfidence bias accounts how the forecasts irrationally deviate from the optimal level, 
the traditional boldness (i. e. the difference from the forecast and the consensus) measures the total 
of underlying informativeness and cognitive biases. On average, the investors react less strongly per 
unit of deviation, but more strongly in total, as the absolute deviation from the consensus increases. 
Analysts with higher prior boldness in the prior year also gain more reputation and their forecasts 
are more informative this year. These results suggest that investors reward the underlying 
informativeness and penalize the cognitive biases. 
The estimated coefficients of the interactions between Dev and other control variables are sensible 
except the analyst status variable. The positive estimated coefficient of Dev×Accuracy Dummy 
suggests that ex-post accuracy is associated with the investors’ response to the forecasts. The 
information in the revision may come from the common knowledge or investors may sense the 
accuracy of the revisions. The positive estimated coefficient of Dev×Leader-Follower Ratio means 
that investors react more strongly to more timely forecasts. The negative estimated coefficient of 
Dev×Optimism Dummy suggests that investors react more strongly to negative news than positive 
news. Analysts, in general, tend to overreact to positive news and under-react to the negative news 
to please the managers (i. e. optimistic overconfidence bias). Therefore, investors recognize this 
bias and react less to the positive revisions. The positive estimated coefficient of Dev×Horizon 
advises that investors have higher demand for the forecast revisions at the beginning of the 
forecasting period than at the end. At the meantime, the negative estimated coefficient of 
Dev×Dispersion advises that investors are more disbelieving on the analysts when they are deviate 
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more from each other. The positive estimated coefficient of Dev×ACCURACY suggests that more 
accurate analysts are more informative than less accurate analysts. In addition, analysts covering 
less stocks and from bigger brokers are more informative. The negative effect of analyst’s All-
American status on the informativeness is opposing to Stickel (1992).  
3.5 Robustness Checks 
In the main analysis, I run regressions based on the forecast deviation from the prior forecast issued 
by the same consensus. However, from the investors’ perspective, they may primarily care about 
the forecast deviation from their current belief, which is measured as the current consensus (Hugon 
& Muslu 2010; Hilary & Hsu 2013). Therefore, I rerun the analysis on the deviation from the 
consensus of outstanding forecasts. The average informativeness is smaller than that in the main 
analysis, which suggests the deviation from the prior forecast is a better measure for the unexpected 
forecast revision. The effects of cognitive biases on forecast informativeness are also significant in 
these models.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Similar to the last section, I separate the sample into the two periods, from 1994 to 2000 and from 
2001 to 2010. The earlier period is during the boom of the stock market and before the Fair 
Disclosure Regulations. The latter period is during volatile stock market with crashes and 
recoveries, and following the implementation of the Fair Disclosure Regulations Act. My main 
results primarily hold in both periods. The average informativeness of forecasts during the latter 
period improved significantly. The estimated coefficient of the deviation in Model IV(a) in the 
latter (and earlier) period are 4.4 (and 3.5), and the estimated coefficient of the deviation dummy in 
Model IV(b) is in the latter (and earlier) period  3.8 (and 2.2). During the crises, investors may have 
an increased demand for professional advice. The effect of the overconfidence bias on forecast 
informativeness is higher, while the effect of the belief-persistence bias is smaller in the latter 
period than in the earlier period. 
In the calculation of the biases of the main analysis, I use mean-centered FE, Dev, and DevPrior 
within firms based on all forecasts given on the firm during the period from 1994 to 2010. This 
mean-centering method may be forward-looking and distort the results. Therefore, in the next 
robustness check, I recalculate the biases based on the raw values of FE, Dev, and DevPrior; then I 
repeat the main analysis using the obtained biases. The obtained results are consistent with the main 
Chapter I 
28 
 
analysis. The effect of overconfidence bias on the forecast informativeness is higher, when there is 
not a big change in the effects of the belief-persistence and confidence-enhancement biases.  
Finally, I adopt a more complicated calculation of CAR by controlling for size, book-to-market 
ratio (B/M) and momentum characteristics of the stock (Daniel et al. 1997; Loh & Stulz 2010). In 
this check, I also exclude concomitant earnings announcements. The coefficient reduces to 0.1 and 
is still significant at 5% level. To compute the three-day CAR for an analyst forecast, I create a 
benchmark portfolio with the same size, B/M, and momentum as the stock. The CAR is defined as 
the difference between the three-day buy-and-hold cumulative returns of the stock and the 
cumulative returns of the benchmark portfolioNi. e. H]v = ∏ &1 + v( −∏ N1 +vlm3llQQ. The benchmark portfolios are constructed as follows: Each July I assign stocks into 
125 portfolios through three steps. I sort stocks into 5 groups based on their size and then, within 
each group, I sort stocks into 5 sub-groups based on their B/M. Finally, within each sub-group, I 
sort stocks into 5 portfolios based on their prior 12 months buy-and-hold cumulative returns. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper studies how sell-side security analysts are affected by cognitive biases, specifically 
belief-persistence and overconfidence biases. I quantify the extent to which the biases affect 
analysts by analyzing analysts’ misweighting behavior in issuing earnings forecasts. An analyst 
tends to put too much weight on her prior forecasts, although her prior forecast is already reflected 
in the consensus (i. e. belief-persistence bias). She tends to believe that her prior forecast is superior 
to other outstanding forecasts, and deserves higher weight in the construction of the public 
information, or she tends to emphasize news which is closer to her prior forecasts. Between private 
information and public information, the analyst tends to overemphasize the importance of her 
private information and undervalue the public information (i. e. overconfidence bias). In addition, 
she tends to lay even higher emphasis on the private information when it is supported by her prior 
forecast (i. e. confidence-enhancement bias).   
Secondly, I study how investors react to these cognitive biases of analysts. I measure these biases (i. 
e. overconfidence bias, belief-persistence bias, and confidence-enhancement bias) for each analyst-
year based on all forecasts given by the analyst in the year. I find that analysts with higher cognitive 
biases issue lower informativeness (i. e. lower market reaction) forecasts in the subsequent year. 
The effects of the biases on the informativeness are economically and statistically significant. The 
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effect of the overconfidence bias on the forecast informativeness is nearly double the effect of the 
analyst’s firm-specific accuracy on the forecast informativeness. The effect of belief-persistence 
bias is also greater than the effect of the accuracy.  
Even though the research is confirmed by a number of robustness checks, there are some technical 
limitations. Firstly, there may be some cases where the belief-persistence bias creates direction 
disagreements between the private information and the realized forecast, and consequently, the 
inference based on the overconfidence bias is inaccurate. This limitation is difficult to overcome 
since the private information is unobservable. Secondly, the expected actual earnings, given the 
available information, may be different from the realized actual earnings because of management’s 
selective disclosure. I tackle this limitation by controlling for firm fixed effects; however, it does 
not solve the problem entirely. Thirdly, the research is based on the assumption that the 
distributions of released information and actual earnings are normal, while they are not. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of Overconfidence and Belief-Persistence Biases in Earnings Forecasts 
 
This figure illustrates overconfidence and belief-persistence biases. An analyst is issuing an earnings forecast based on 
the consensus c, her private information y, and her prior forecast	f′.   
• If she uses optimal weights, she would give a forecast of	f ¡¢£by the Bayes decision theory. 
• If she is overconfident on the precision of her private information, she will put more weight on her private 
information and give a forecast of	f. 
• If she is subject to the belief-persistence bias and her prior forecast were	f′ instead of	f, she would have 
been steered toward	f′, and the forecast would have been f′ instead of f.   
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Necessity of Group Centering or Including Fixed Effects 
 
This figure illustrates a possible issue of the observations are not centered within groups (i. e. firm-years or firms). 
Assume that there are three firms (round, star and square) and the values of FE and Dev are illustrated below. If I run 
regression FE = α + β. Dev + ε over each firm, I obtain three fitted (dashed) lines with positive slopes. However, if I 
run the regression on the pooled sample, I obtain one fitted (solid) line with a negative slope. To solve this issue, I must 
center the observations within groups or include group fixed effects. 
 
Dev 
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Figure 3: Optimistic Overconfidence Bias and Confidence-Enhancement Bias 
  
This figure presents the optimistic overconfidence and confidence-enhancement biases. I run four OLS regressions 
(FE = α + β. Dev + ε) on positive and negative Dev, and on supporting and opposing Dev. The left graph is for the case 
of no intercept and the right graph is for the case that FE and Dev are centered within each firm-year (i. e. including 
firm-year fixed effects). The slope is the measure of the overconfidence bias, and it is subject to change when I add 
belief-persistence bias and control variables into the regressions.   
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Table 1: Variables Definitions and Descriptive Statistic after Winsorization 
Panel 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
FE 
Dev  
DevPrior 
Confirm 
Horizon 
Dispersion 
ACCURACY 
 
BOLDNESS 
 
STAR 
EXPERIENCE 
BREADTH 
BROKERSIZE 
Current Forecast – Actual Earnings  
Current Forecast – Consensus 
Prior Forecast – Forecast 
1 if sign(Current Forecast –  Consensus) = sign(Prior Forecast – Consensus) and 0 
otherwise 
the logarithm of the number of days to the actual earnings announcement 
the standard deviation of the forecasts constituting the consensus 
1 – (Rank(abs(Forecast – Actual Earnings)) – 1)/( Number of analysts covering the firm – 
1) in the prior firm-fiscal year  
1 – (Rank(abs(Forecast – Consensus)) – 1)/( Number of analysts covering the firm – 1) in 
the prior firm-fiscal year  
1 if she is currently voted as an All-American analyst and 0 otherwise 
the logarithm of the number of days which she appears in I/B/E/S 
the logarithm of the number of stocks covered by the analyst in the current year 
the logarithm of the number of analysts working for the broker in the current year  
Panel 2: Summary Statistics 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
FE 0.11 0.77 -1.88 -0.08 -0.00 0.12 5.20 
Dev -0.03 0.28 -1.56 -0.07 -0.00 0.04 1.03 
PriorDev 0.04 0.32 -0.99 -0.05 0.01 0.08 1.92 
Confirm 0.55 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
Horizon 5.00 0.75 0 4.64 5.23 5.58 6.46 
Dispersion 0.17 0.30 0 0.03 0.07 0.16 2.07 
FIRMSIZE 2.66 0.66 0 2.20 2.77 3.18 4.19 
ACCURACY 0.52 0.23 0 0.32 0.50 0.71 1 
BOLDNESS 0.50 0.31 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1 
STAR 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
EXPERIENCE 7.63 0.84 0.69 7.10 7.74 8.27 9.26 
BREADTH 2.70 0.55 0 2.48 2.71 3.00 5.07 
BROKERSIZE 3.62 1.05 0 3.00 3.81 4.42 5.33 
N 1,108,992       
 
(Continued) 
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Panel 3: Correlation Matrix  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
FE 1             
Dev 2 -.08            
PriorDev 3 .26 -.66           
Confirm 4 .00 .03 -.06          
Horizon 5 .06 .01 -.01 .03         
Dispersion 6 .33 -.21 .29 .06 .08        
FIRMSIZE 7 -.06 .04 -.05 .04 -.02 .00       
ACCURACY 8 .01 -.00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00      
BOLDNESS 9 .00 -.01 .00 .02 .00 .00 -.00 .24     
STAR 10 -.01 -.01 -.01 .01 -.03 .01 .08 .03 .06    
EXPERIENCE 11 .00 -.00 .00 -.01 -.08 -.01 .03 .02 .09 .21   
BREADTH 12 .00 .00 -.00 -.01 -.03 -.01 .04 .00 .04 .14 .30  
BROKERSIZE 13 .00 -.02 -.01 .03 .01 .01 .08 .03 .05 .37 .03 .03 
This table presents the definition and descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables from 1994 
to 2010.  
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Table 2: Cognitive Biases  
 I   II   III   
Dev 0.527 *** (17.42) 2.716 *** (9.34) 1.242 *** (4.30) 
DevPrior 0.587 *** (29.35) 0.561 *** (22.24) -1.289 *** (-6.39) 
Dev X Confirm    0.078 *** (3.25) 0.402  (1.53) 
Dev X Positive    0.263 *** (4.92) 0.265 *** (5.08) 
DevPrior X Horizon       0.267 *** (9.22) 
DevPrior X Dispersion       -0.042  (-1.55) 
DevPrior X DFIRMSIZE       0.022  (0.95) 
DevPrior X ACCURACY       -0.004  (-0.10) 
DevPrior X BOLDNESS       0.009  (0.28) 
DevPrior X STAR       0.016  (0.39) 
DevPrior X EXPERIENCE       0.025  (1.44) 
DevPrior X BREADTH       0.059 *** (2.69) 
DevPrior X BROKERSIZE       0.032 * (1.92) 
Dev X Confirm X Horizon       -0.012  (-0.56) 
Dev X Confirm X Dispersion       0.180 *** (5.42) 
Dev X Confirm X FIRMSIZE       -0.007  (-0.27) 
Dev X Confirm X ACCURACY       -0.125 * (-1.67) 
Dev X Confirm X BOLDNESS       0.059  (1.20) 
Dev X Confirm X STAR       -0.097 * (-1.82) 
Dev X Confirm X EXPERIENCE       -0.021  (-0.88) 
Dev X Confirm X BREADTH       -0.031  (-0.88) 
Dev X Confirm X BROKERSIZE       -0.035 * (-1.79) 
Firm Fixed Effects yes   yes   yes   
Unshown Controls (1)   (2)   (2)   
R2 0.085   0.094   0.099   
N 1,108,992  1,108,992  1,108,992  
t-statistics in parentheses              * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Horizon, Dispersion, FIRMSIZE, ACCURACY, BOLDNESS, STAR, EXPERIENCE, BREADTH, 
     & BROKERSIZE 
(2): (1) & Confirm, Dev X Horizon, Dev X Dispersion, Dev X FIRMSIZE, Dev X ACCURACY, 
     Dev X BOLDNESS, Dev X STAR, Dev X EXPERIENCE, Dev X BREADTH, & Dev X BROKERSIZE 
 This table presents regression results of three OLS models with firm fixed effects and clustering by industry-year: 
• Model I: FE = αF + ªM. «¬­ + ªX. «¬­®¯°±¯ + A. Controls + ε  
• Model II: FE = αF + α. Dev + αE. PriorDev + A. Controls + »M. «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ + βE. Dev × Positive +B. Dev × Controls + ε  
• Model III: FE = αF + α. Dev + αE. DevPrior + A. Controls + ÁM. «¬­®¯°±¯ × ¼±½Â¯±ÃÄ + β. Dev ×Confirm + βE. Dev × Positive + BE. Dev × Controls + j. «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ × ¼±½Â¯±ÃÄ + ε 
In which, FE=Forecast – Actual Earnings, Dev=Forecast – Consensus, DevPrior=Prior Forecast – Forecast, Confirms 
equals 1 if (Forecast – Consensus) and (Prior Forecast – Consensus) having the same signs and 0 otherwise, and “×” 
stands for “interaction”. 
• Overconfidence Bias = Coeff. of Dev (Chen and Jiang predict (+) sign) 
• Belief-Persistence Bias = (Coeff. of DevPrior)/(Coeff. of Dev) (hypothesis 1 predicts (+) sign) 
• Confidence-Enhancement = Coeff. of «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ (hypothesis 1 predicts (+) sign) 
• Effects of Horizon on Belief-persistence Bias = Coeff. of «¬­®¯°±¯ × Æ±¯°Ç±½ and «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ ×Æ±¯°Ç±½ (hypothesis 2 predicts (+) signs) 
• Effects of Dispersion on Belief-persistence Bias = Coeff. of «¬­®¯°±¯ × «°ÄÈ¬¯Ä°±½ and «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ ×«°ÄÈ¬¯Ä°±½ (hypothesis 3 predicts (+) signs) 
• Effects of ACCURACY on Belief-persistence Bias = Coeff. of «¬­®¯°±¯ × É¼¼ÊËÉ¼Ì and «¬­ ×¼±½¾°¯¿ × É¼¼ÊËÉ¼Ì (hypothesis 4a and hypothesis 4b predict (-)signs) 
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Table 3: Robustness Check (Cognitive Biases)  
 
  Overconfidence Belief Persistence 
Confidence 
Enhancement 
Effect of 
Horizon on 
Belief 
Persistence 
Effect of 
Dispersion on 
Confidence 
Enhancement 
 Main Analysis 53% *** 55% *** 8%  *** 25% *** 2%  *** 
(1) Divided by Price 43% *** 47% *** 7%  *** 18% *** 1%  *** 
(2) Time-Weighted Consensus 62% *** 58% *** 7%  ** 29% *** 2%  *** 
(3) 1994 – 2000 55% *** 51% *** 5% 37% *** 2%  *** 
(4) 2001 – 2010 54% *** 56% *** 9%  *** 22% *** 2%  *** 
(5) No Fixed Effects 47% *** 57% *** 7%  ** 20% *** 2%  *** 
This table presents robustness checks for the existence of the cognitive biases and how does the Horizon and 
Dispersions variables affect these biases.  
• (1): I divide the forecast error, deviation from the consensus, the distance from the prior forecast to the current 
forecast, and dispersion among outstanding forecast by the stock price two days before the current forecast, 
and perform the same analysis. The results are weaker but similar to the main analysis. 
• (2): I use time-weighted consensus instead of the equally weighted consensus. The results are very similar to 
the main analysis except an increase in the overconfidence bias. 
• (3) & (4): I separate the sample into two sub-periods (1994-2000 and 2001-2010). The belief-persistence bias 
seems to be stronger after the passage of Fair-Disclosure Regulations and during the recessions. 
• (5): I exclude the firm fixed effects from the regressions. The results stay aligning with the main analysis.   
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Table 4: Cognitive Biases and Forecast Informativeness 
 IV(a)  V(a)  IV(b)  V(b)  
Dev 4.254 *** 10.091 *** 2.827 *** 1.543 *** 
 (18.03)  (9.14)  (27.36)  (3.38)  
Dev X OVERCONFIDENCE   -0.189 ***   -0.122 *** 
   (-4.47)    (-7.71)  
Dev X BELIEF PERSISTENCE   -0.100 **   -0.060 *** 
   (-2.34)    (-3.48)  
Dev X CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT   -0.090 ***   -0.041 *** 
   (-2.78)    (-2.68)  
Dev X Accuracy Dummy   2.429 ***   1.543 *** 
   (14.69)    (20.65)  
Dev X Confirm Dummy   0.270 **   -1.108 *** 
   (2.49)    (-19.70)  
Dev X Optimism Dummy   -4.277 ***     
   (-10.33)      
Dev X Boldness   -5.043 ***   2.847 *** 
   (-15.59)    (9.82)  
Dev X Leader-Follower Ratio   0.467 ***   0.407 *** 
   (11.37)    (17.60)  
Dev X Horizon   0.393 ***   0.651 *** 
   (2.74)    (11.84)  
Dev X Dispersion   -1.228 ***   -1.995 *** 
   (-6.11)    (-8.33)  
Dev X ACCURACY   0.490 ***   0.230 *** 
   (2.80)    (3.26)  
Dev X BOLDNESS   0.004    0.277 *** 
   (0.03)    (4.87)  
Dev X STAR   -1.038 ***   -0.604 *** 
   (-7.75)    (-8.31)  
Dev X EXPERIENCE   0.176 ***   0.044  
   (2.58)    (1.30)  
Dev X COVERAGE BREADTH   -1.028 ***   -0.905 *** 
   (-6.28)    (-11.51)  
Dev X BROKERSIZE   0.402 ***   0.308 *** 
   (7.08)    (11.47)  
Firm-Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Unshown Controls (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  
R2 0.024  0.043  0.029  0.051  
N 810,068  810,068  959,946  810,068  
t-statistics in parentheses              * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): OVERCONFIDENCE, BELIEF PERSISTENCE, CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT, 
     Accuracy Dummy, Leader-Follower Ratio, Confirm, Horizon, Dispersion, 
     FIRMSIZE, ACCURACY, BOLDNESS, STAR, EXPERIENCE, BREADTH, & BROKERSIZE 
This table presents regression results of two OLS models with firm-year fixed effects and clustering by industry-year: 
• Model IV: CAR = αF + ªM. «¬­ + αE. OVERCONFIDENCE + α. BELIEF	PERSISTENCE + α. CONFIDENCE	ENHANCEMENT + A. Controls + ε 
• Model V: CAR = αF + α. Dev + αE. OVERCONFIDENCE + α. BELIEF	PERSISTENCE + α. CONFIDENCE	ENHANCEMENT + A. Controls + »M. «¬­ × ×ØÙË¼×ÚÛÜ«ÙÚ¼Ù + »X. «¬­ ×ÁÙÝÜÙÛ	®ÙËÞÜÞßÙÚ¼Ù + ». «¬­ × ¼×ÚÛÜ«ÙÚ¼Ù	ÙÚÆÉÚ¼ÙàÙÚß + β. Dev × Optimism	Dummy +β. Dev × Boldness + 	B. Dev × Controls + ε				     
(Continued) 
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• Models IV(a) and V(a) use deviation from the prior forecast as Dev. The informativeness is measured as the 
change in market reaction per a unit change in the forecast deviation from the prior forecast.  
• Models IV(b) and V(b) use deviation dummy (i. e. equals 1 if the deviation is positive and 0 otherwise) as Dev. 
The informativeness is measure as the difference in market reactions between positive and non-positive 
forecast revisions. 
For each analyst year, I run two regressions over forecasts given by the analyst in the year: FE = αF + ªM. «¬­ +ªX. ®¯°±¯«¬­ + ε and	FE = αF + αE. PriorDev + α. Confirm + βF. Dev + »M. «¬­ × ¼±½¾°¯¿ + ε. The estimated 
coefficient ªM=  of Dev from the first regression measures her overconfidence bias and is denoted as 
OVERCONFIDENCE. Her belief-persistence bias is ªX=/&1 − ªM=  ), and denoted as BELIEF PERSISTENCE. The 
estimated coefficient »MS of Dev×Confirm from the second regression is the measure for her confidence-enhancement 
bias (CONFIDENCE ENHANCEMENT). These measures, afterward, are classified into quintiles. 
• Informativeness: Coeff. of Dev 
• Effect of overconfidence bias on forecast informativeness: Coeff. of «¬­ × ×ØÙË¼×ÚÛÜ«ÙÚ¼Ù (hypothesis 
5 predicts (–) sign) 
• Effect of belief-persistence bias on forecast informativeness: Coeff. of «¬­ × ÁÙÝÜÙÛ	®ÙËÞÜÞßÙÚ¼Ù 
(hypothesis 6 predicts (–) sign) 
• Effect of confidence-enhancement bias on forecast informativeness: Coeff. of «¬­ × ¼×ÚÛÜ«ÙÚ¼Ù	ÙÚÆÉÚ¼ÙàÙÚß(hypothesis 6 predicts (–) sign) 
In general the cognitive biases decrease the informativeness of future forecasts.  
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Table 5: Robustness Checks (Cognitive Biases and Forecast Informativeness) 
 
 
OVERCONFIDENCE BELIEF PERSISTENCE 
CONFIDENCE 
ENHANCEMENT 
 
 
Deviation Deviation Dummy Deviation 
Deviation 
Dummy Deviation 
Deviation 
Dummy 
(1) Main Analysis -0.76%*** -0.49%*** -0.40%** -0.24%*** -0.36%*** -0.76%*** 
 
 
(-18%) (-14%) (-9%) (-7%) (-8%) (-5%) 
(2) Deviation from Consensus -0.84%*** -0.50%*** -0.49%** -0.13%** -0.07% -0.84%*** 
 
 
(-22%) (-21%) (-13%) (-5%) (-2%) (-7%) 
(3) 1994-2000 -0.33% -0.29%*** -0.50%** -0.34%*** -0.45%* -0.33%** 
 
 
(-9%) (-13%) (-14%) (-15%) (-13%) (-9%) 
(4) 2001-1010 -0.85%*** -0.55%*** -0.39%* -0.23%*** -0.30%** -0.85%* 
 
 
(-19%) (-14%) (-9%) (-6%) (-7%) (-3%) 
(5) No Centering -0.89%*** -0.61%*** -0.48%*** -0.14%** -0.28%** -0.89%** 
 
 
(-21%) (-18%) (-11%) (-4%) (-7%) (-4%) 
(6) Size-B/M-Momentum -0.75%*** -0.48%*** -0.33%** -0.23%*** -0.35%*** -0.15%** 
 Adjusted  CAR (-18%) (-18%) (-8%) (-8%) (-9%) (-6%) 
This table presents robustness checks for effects of the cognitive biases on the forecast informativeness. The above 
numbers are the differences in informativeness associated with $1 of unexpected revision between the top and the 
bottom quintiles of cognitive biases. The numbers in parentheses are the ratios of the difference over the average 
forecast informativeness.  
• (1): I use the deviation from the consensus instead of the deviation from the prior forecast 
• (2) & (3): I separate the sample into two periods (1994-2000 and 2001-1010) and perform the same analysis as 
the main analysis on these two sub-samples. 
• (4): I calculate biases base on raw values of FE, Dev and DevPrior instead of centered values. 
• (5): No centering in the calculation of OVERCONFIDENCE, BELIEF PERSISTENCE, and CONFIDENCE 
ENHANCEMENT  
• (6): I use size-B/M ratio-momentum adjusted cumulative abnormal returns instead of market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns. 
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Appendix A 
Mean-Squared Error (MSE) Minimization 
Assume that the forecast, f, is weighted average of the private information, y, and public information, c. The 
optimal weight h put on y will minimize the expected squared distance between the forecast, f, and the real 
value, z. If the analyst put a weight of w on y, then the expected squared distance between f and z will be: 
*+& − (E- = *+&å + &1 − å( − (E- 	= * 2NåN + Q + &1 − å(& + ( − QE5 =  
* 2Nå + &1 − å(QE5 = åE*æEç + &1 − å(E*+E- + 2å&1 − å(*æç =  
åE% + &1 − å(
E% 																						 &assume	that	y	and	c	are	independent( 
The optimal weight w=h will minimize +& − (E- , such that: 
ë"ìíî#/&ïðì(íî $ëñ òñ6 = 0    ⇒    
6
# − &6(
 = 0  ⇒ ℎ = 
#
#/
   
Bayesian Framework 
I assume that z follows a diffuse zero-mean normal distribution and the prior distribution of z is ~ 0, ô!, 
with õ ≈ 0 because the analyst does not have prior belief on z. The public and private information are 
expressed as following:  =  +  0, 
 ! and  =  +  "0, 
#$. 
%&|, ( ∝ %&, |(%&( ∝ :ø% ù−%2 & − (E −−%2 & − (E − õ2 Eú 
∝ :ø% ù−%2 &E − ( − %2 &E − ( − õ2 Eú 
∝ :ø% ù12 æN% + % + õQE − 2N% + %Qçú 
∝ û % + %% + % + õ , xAü 
Then, 
*&|, ( = % + %% + % + õ ≈ % + %% + % = %% + %  + %% + %  = &1 − ℎ( + ℎ 
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Appendix B 
When the analyst has a prior belief on z, the prior distribution of the actual earnings is ~ ", 
ýðï$. 
Similarly, 
%&|, ( ∝ :ø% ù12 æN% + % + %3ðïQE − 2N% + % + õQçú 
∝ û% + % + õ% + % + %3ðï , xAü 
Then in this case, *&|, ( = 
 
 /
#/
ýðï  + 
#
 /
#/
ýðï  + 
ýðï
 /
#/
ýðï . It converges to the case in 
appendix A when %3ðï → 0. 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
41 
 
Chapter II: Analysts’ Additional Effort: Capital Expenditure Forecast Issuance 
Capital expenditure (CapEx) forecasts are more and more popular among sell-side security analysts; 
however, there is virtually no research on these forecasts. This paper fills the gap by studying 
different aspects of CapEx forecasts and provides four major findings. First, investors react more 
strongly to analysts’ reports containing CapEx forecasts than those without CapEx forecasts, which 
suggest that CapEx forecasts convey important information to investors. Second, analysts who are 
from bigger brokers, have less experience, cover fewer stocks, issue more number of earnings 
forecasts, have higher ex-post earnings forecast accuracy are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. 
Analysts are also more likely to issue CapEx forecasts if more of their colleagues issue CapEx 
forecasts.  These results suggest that analysts, who face higher motivation and lower issuing costs, 
are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. Third, CapEx forecast accuracy decreases with the 
distance from earnings announcement, and increases with analysts’ experience in CapEx forecasts. 
Analysts’ general experience and quality do not explain analysts’ CapEx forecast performance. 
Finally, analysts who issue CapEx forecasts, especially more accurate CapEx forecasts, are less 
likely to leave the profession, which is consistent with professional commitment and ability 
signaling arguments of CapEx forecast issuance.   
JEL classification: G24, G31 
Keywords: Security Analyst, Capital Expenditures, Forecast, Accuracy, Career   
1 Introduction 
Producing forecasts is the principal way analysts convey information to investors, demonstrate their 
abilities or pretend abilities to their existing and potential employers and clients. Almost all analysts 
issue earnings forecasts for all firms they cover. Some of them desire to enhance the value of their 
reports by adding other forecasts, such as target price, sales, cash-flow, long-term growth, dividend, 
and capital expenditure (henceforth, CapEx) forecasts. Since producing these additional forecasts 
costs time and effort, analysts have to compromise and consider the opportunity costs of this extra 
work. Analysts without an established reputation would like to gain recognition and develop their 
reputation by providing supplementary forecasts, while they are not able to imitate high quality 
analysts by producing forecasts which require too much time, efforts and resources. Supporting this 
hypothesis, Ertimur & Stubben (2006) propose that producing cash-flow forecasts requires 
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considerably more resources and as a result, analysts from larger brokerage houses are more likely 
to issue cash-flow forecasts. Ertimur et al. (2009) find that analysts with less established reputation 
are more likely to issue sales forecasts. This is not surprising because sales forecasting is one aspect 
of standard earnings forecasting procedure and therefore it requires minimal extra time to include 
these forecasts in a report. 
Although CapEx forecasts are not as popular as other forecasts, such as sales and target price 
forecasts, they are increasing in popularity among analysts. In 2011, about 57% of analysts issued at 
least one CapEx forecast and 70% of firms received at least one CapEx forecast. CapEx is an 
important input of the free-cash-flow valuation model which can directly affect the equity value. 
The free-cash-flow model is a function of the free cash-flows to firm and weighted average cost of 
capitali. e.		*zB^	x_z: = ∑ &/( − 9:y^	x_z:!. The free cash-flow to firm, FCFFt, is 
defined as net income, plus net non-cash charges, plus after-tax interest expenses, minus capital 
expenditure. The weighted average cost of capital, WACC, can also be affected by the capital 
expenditure through the risk level of new investments.    
CapEx forecasts could provide investors with valuable information about the firms and signal 
analysts’ ability. Since producing CapEx forecasts may be costly, some analysts are not issuing 
CapEx forecasts at all and some others issue CapEx forecasts on selected stocks. This paper studies 
the value of CapEx forecasts to investors and analyst’s career, and the determinants of CapEx 
forecast issuance and accuracy. Specifically, this paper answers four important questions on CapEx 
forecasts: (1) Do CapEx forecasts bring additional information to investors? (2) Which analysts are 
more likely to issue CapEx forecasts? (3) What are determinants of CapEx forecast accuracy? 
Furthermore, (4) how can CapEx forecasts impact an analysts’ career? 
Firstly, to assess the information value of CapEx forecasts, I study the stock price behavior around 
analysts’ report announcements. I find that market reacts more strongly to analysts’ reports 
containing CapEx forecasts than those without CapEx forecasts after controlling for firm-year fixed 
effects and other variables. To illustrate the economic significance, the marginal effect of CapEx 
forecasts is about 75% of the difference in stock price effects between the third and the first 
quartiles of ex-post earnings forecast accuracy.    
Secondly, to identify which analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts, I use logistic 
regression to find the marginal effects of analyst characteristics on analysts’ probability of issuing 
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CapEx forecasts, controlling for firm-year fixed effects. The regression results support the argument 
that issuing CapEx forecasts is beneficial, but costly to analysts. Analysts are more likely to issue 
CapEx forecasts if the benefits from CapEx forecast issuance increase and/or the costs decrease. 
Specifically, I find that analysts without established reputation, i. e. those with less broker tenure 
and firm-specific experience, tend to issue CapEx forecasts to stand out from the crowd. Analysts 
who have issued CapEx forecasts in the previous year on the same or on another firm and analysts 
from brokerage houses where CapEx forecasts are popular, are more likely to issue CapEx 
forecasts. Higher quality analysts, i. e. from bigger brokerage houses, star analysts, and more firm-
specific accurate earnings forecasters, are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. In addition, 
resource allocation is important to analysts’ CapEx forecast decisions. Consistent with Clement 
(1999), I find that analysts covering more firms are less likely to produce CapEx forecasts. I use the 
number of earnings forecasts on a firm given by an analyst as a proxy for the resources that analyst 
is allocating to that firm, and find that the more resources allocated to a firm, the more likely the 
analyst will issue CapEx forecasts on the firm. 
Thirdly, I examine the determinants of CapEx accuracy by regressing relative CapEx forecasts 
accuracy on characteristics of the forecast and the issuing analyst, controlling for firm-year fixed 
effects. Similar to earnings forecasts, CapEx forecasts that are issued later in the forecasting period 
are more accurate than those issued earlier. CapEx forecast accuracy is positively correlated with 
prior CapEx forecast accuracy, which is consistent with earnings forecasts (Clement 1999; Brown 
2001). I also find that experience in CapEx forecasting improves CapEx forecast accuracy; 
however, the experience in earnings forecasts does not increase CapEx forecast accuracy. In 
addition, I document a non-robust relationship between CapEx forecast accuracy and contemporary 
EPS forecast accuracy. The two types of forecasts may require different skills in collecting and 
processing information.  
Finally, I study the probability of analysts’ disappearance from the I/B/E/S database next year. I 
find that CapEx forecast issuance and accuracy reduce the analysts’ chance of leaving the financial 
analyst profession after controlling for year fixed effects and other variables. This result is 
consistent with Mikhail et al. (1997) who find that more accurate earnings forecasters are unlikely 
to leave the profession, and Call et al. (2009) who find that analysts issuing cash-flow forecasts and 
issuing more accurate cash-flow forecasts are less likely to be fired. Analysts who issue CapEx 
forecasts are 4.4% less likely to leave the profession than those who do not. To illustrate the 
economic significance, I compare this number with the marginal effects of earnings forecast 
Chapter II 
44 
 
accuracy on analysts’ likelihood of professional discontinuation. Analysts at the third quartile of 
earnings forecast accuracy are 4.3% less likely to leave the profession than those at the first quartile 
of earnings forecast accuracy. In addition, the best CapEx forecasters are less likely to leave the 
profession than the worst CapEx forecasters by 3%. 
This paper contributes to the vast literature on analysts’ forecasts. Prior literature on security 
analysts’ forecasts focuses extensively on earnings forecasts. Currently, there are a few papers on 
cash-flows forecasts, long-term growth forecasts, and sales forecasts, while there are virtually none 
on CapEx forecasts. This is surprising since managers’ CapEx decisions are among the most 
important decisions in a firm and have been studied extensively. This paper fills the gap by studying 
analysts’ CapEx forecasts. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss 
whether CapEx forecasts bring additional information to investors. In section 3, I identify which 
analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. Section 4 studies determinants of CapEx forecast 
accuracy. Section 5 examines the effects of CapEx forecasts on analysts’ career. The final section, 
section 6, is the conclusion.    
2 Information Content of Capital Expenditure Forecasts 
Capital expenditure (CapEx) forecasts have become increasingly popular among analysts since 
2006. The evolution of CapEx forecasts is illustrated in Figure 1. In 2011, about 57% of analysts 
issue at least one CapEx forecast on 70% number of firms. Although CapEx forecasts are becoming 
more popular, these forecasts have not received proper research attention. There is extensive 
literature studying the relationship between managers’ CapEx decisions and firm values. Although 
there is mixed evidence on the sign of the correlation between changes in firm investment levels 
and changes in firm value, the effects of investment level on firm value are indisputable, e. g. 
McConnell (1985). In addition, there is a rich literature on informativeness of earnings forecasts 
made by sell-side security analysts. The consensus of the studies is that the earnings forecasts 
contain information about the firm values. Therefore, CapEx forecasts potentially carry information 
which influences stock prices. Although, there are some papers examining the additional 
information contribution of supplementary forecasts, CapEx forecasts have been overlooked by the 
academic community, despite their potential information value.    
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]   
2.1 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Literature on relation between capital expenditure and firm values 
There have been mixed results on the relationship between CapEx decisions and the value of firms. 
McConnell (1985) finds that increases (decreases) in planned capital spending of an industrial firm 
are related to significant market positive (negative) responses. However, they find no similar 
evidence for public utility firms. Many follow-up studies also document a positive relation between 
CapEx and abnormal stock returns. Blackwell et al. (1990) and Gobola & Tsetsekos (1992) find 
negative abnormal stock returns following plant closures, i. e. capital divestment. Woolridge & 
Snow (1990), Blose & Shieh (1997) and Vogt (1997)) find positive market responses to firms’ 
capital investments. Timothy J. Brailsford & Daniel Yeoh (2010) and Akbar & Stark (2003) also 
find a positive relation for Australian and UK firms.  
On the other hand, other literature reveals mixed or non-significant evidence of the relation between 
CapEx and firm values. Chung et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (1995) argue that market reaction to a 
firm’s CapEx decisions depend on the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities; CapEx 
positively affects stock prices only if firms take advantage of valuable investment opportunities. 
Born & Ryan (2000) document a positive relationship if firms have high growth opportunities, but a 
negative relationship if firms have low growth opportunities. Jensen (1986) suggests an agency 
problem, in which managers’ investment decisions may convey bad signals such as overinvestment, 
entrenchment and empire-building. Statman & Sepe (1989) argue that firms are reluctant to divest, 
and that investors recognize divestments as good news; they find consistent empirical evidence to 
support this argument. Divestures may create value for firms simply by getting rid of unprofitable 
investments. Afshar et al. (1992) find positive market reactions to divestments and selloffs of UK 
firms in financial distress. Kalra et al. (1994) discover that firms experience below average returns 
in the short-term, but above average returns in long-term, after plant closures. Burton et al. (1999) 
document significant market responses to joint-venture announcements and immediately cash 
generating projects. Other CapEx announcements insignificantly affect stock prices. Kim et al. 
(2005) find similar results for Korean firms. Del Brio et al. (2003) find insignificant price reactions 
to both increases and decreases in CapEx for the Spanish market. 
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Literature on information value of analysts’ forecasts 
The information content of security analysts’ reports has been extensively studied, with particular 
on the informativeness of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The extant literature mostly documents that 
upward (downward) earnings forecast revisions are associated with positive (negative) abnormal 
returns13, in which, forecasts deviating more from the forecast consensus have higher price impact 
(Clement & Tse 2005). Some papers study the contribution of analysts’ characteristics on the 
informativeness of earnings forecasts. Stickel (1992) finds that higher-status analysts, i. e. analysts 
who have been voted as All-America analysts, have greater impact on stock prices than their lower-
status peers. Analysts with more accurate historical earnings forecasts have greater impact on the 
security prices than analysts with less accurate historical forecasts. In addition, Park & Stice (2000) 
find that the effect of analysts’ past accuracy on market reaction is stock-specific and does not spill-
over to other stocks covered by the same analyst.  
Some authors study the informativeness of analysts’ reports in which supplementary forecasts are 
taken into account. Brav & Lehavy (2003) claim that the market reacts significantly to information 
contained in analysts’ target price forecasts. The market also reacts to the information content of 
sales forecasts (Ertimur et al. 2003), and sales forecasts amplify the reaction to earnings forecasts 
(Ertimur et al. 2009; Keung 2010). In the meanwhile, Givoly et al. (2009) document limited market 
reaction to the information content of cash flow forecasts.  
Analysts’ CapEx forecasts are meaningless to investors and wasteful to analysts if they convey no 
additional information. The increasing popularity of CapEx forecasts suggests that such forecasts 
must be valuable. Therefore, in the first hypothesis, I would like to examine whether  the CapEx 
forecasts actually benefit investors by increasing the information content of the analysts’ reports or 
not. If the CapEx forecasts contain useful information for investors, the more (ex-post) accurate 
information should receive higher attention from the market, and in consequence, stronger market 
reaction.  
Hypothesis 1(a): Market reacts more strongly to analysts’ reports which include CapEx forecasts 
than those which do not. 
                                                    
13
 (Givoly & Lakonishok 1979; Abdel-Khalik & Ajinkya 1982; Lys & Sohn 1990; Asquith et al. 2005) 
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Hypothesis 1(b): Market reacts more strongly to CapEx forecasts which are more accurate (ex-
post) than less accurate ones. 
2.2 Testing Methodology 
Forecast informativeness is usually defined as the unexpected market reaction around the earnings 
forecast issuance in the direction of the forecast revision14. However, the direction of the relation 
between CapEx forecasts and stock price reactions is vague. An increase or decrease in investment 
does not create or destroy firm value in an obvious way. I overcome the issue of this ambiguous 
relationship by studying the absolute cumulative abnormal returns of stocks. I conjecture that 
additional information of CapEx forecasts would lead to stronger market reaction to analysts’ 
reports.  
I use absolute three-trading-day cumulative market adjusted abnormal returns surrounding the 
analyst’s report issuance to measure the unexpected market reaction. The accumulation period is 
from one day before to one day after the event (Ball & Kothari 1991; Clement & Tse 2003; Hilary 
& Hsu 2013). To test Hypothesis 1(a), I use the independent variable CapEx Forecast Dummy, 
which equals 1 if the reports include CapEx forecasts and zero otherwise. To test Hypothesis 1(b), I 
include analysts’ ex-post CapEx forecast accuracy, measured by CapEx Forecast (ex-post) 
Accuracy, into the regression. Investors may react differently to earnings forecasts due to the 
differences in firm characteristics. I include firm-year fixed effects to capture all possible firm 
characteristics measured on an annual basis.  
Model I(a):  at forecast level with firm-year fixed effects 
]yOC_z^:	]yICAJx_	v:^zAIO = 8 + G ∗ Hx%*ø	7CA:xO^	9zJJ + Γ ∗ HCI^AC_O +   
Model I(b):  at forecast level with firm-year fixed effects 
]yOC_z^:	]yICAJx_	v:^zAIO = 8 + G ∗ Hx%*ø	7CA:xO^	]zAx + Γ ∗ HCI^AC_O +   
The variables are defined as follows: 
Dependent variable:  
                                                    
14
 (Ball & Kothari 1991; Park & Stice 2000; Clement & Tse 2003; Hilary & Hsu 2013) 
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]yOC_z^:	]yICAJx_	v:^zAIO = |∑ &Stock	Return − Market	Return( | (Right-winsorized at 
1%) 
Independent variables: 
Hx%*ø	7CA:xO^	9zJJ = 1						if	analystsreports	include	CapEx	forecasts0																				otherwise																																																	 
Hx%*ø	7CA:xO^	]zAx = ¢&£	¢	¢	(¡		¢	¢   
The accuracy measure equals 1 if the forecast is most accurate and 0 if the forecast is least accurate 
among all CapEx forecasts given on the firm in the current fiscal year. Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) 
predict positive coefficients of CapEx Forecast Dummy and CapEx Forecast Accuracy. 
Control variables: 
x_:O	7CA:xO^	9zJJ = 1		if	analystsreports	include	sales	forecasts0														otherwise																																																	 
HxOℎ − 7_Cå	7CA:xO^	9zJJ = 1				if	analystsreports	include	CF	forecasts0											otherwise																																																	 
*@	7O^. 9:;Bx^BCI = |Earnings	Forecast − Previous	Earnings	Forecast| (Winsorized at 1% 
level) 
@COB^B;:	*@	7O^. = 1	if	Earnings	Forecast > Previous	Earnings	Forecast0																														otherwise																																																	 
9BO^xI:	^C	*@	]IIJ^. = ln&Earnings	Announcement − Forecast	Date( 
9BO%:AOBCI	C	*@	7O^. = Std. Dev. &Outstanding	Earnings	Forecasts( (Winsorized at 1% 
level) 
*@	7O^.		 − 7	vx^BC = ln	"¢#	 ¡	$ ¢	¡	%	£¢	&	¢"¢#	 ¡	$ ¢	¡	%		&	¢!  (Cooper et al. 2001) 
*@	7CA:xO^	]zAx = ¢&£	'(	¢	(¡		'(	¢   
zJy:A	C	^C1O = ln&number	of	stocks	coverd	by	the	analyst	in	the	current	year( 
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]Ix_O^	7BAJ	*ø%:AB:I:= ln&number	of	years	which	the	analyst	has	been	covering	the	firm( 
]Ix_O^	*ø%:AB:I: = ln&number	of	years	which	the	analyst	has	been	in	I/B/E/S( 
eAC1:A	B: = ln&number	of	analysts	working	for	the	brokerage	house( 
xPP:	*@	7O^. ]zAx = EPS	Forecast	Accuracy	of	the	analyst	in	the	previous	year 
xPP:	*@	7O^. eC_I:OO = Average 2¢&'(	.*" ¢ (¡		'(	¢5 	in	the	previous	year  
2.3 Data Description 
I collect analysts’ forecasting information from the I/B/E/S database during the period from 2006 to 
2011. The stock returns are extracted from the CRSP database. Information on the All-America 
analysts is extracted from the Institutional Investor website up to 2010. Table 1 presents the number 
of analysts issuing at least one CapEx forecast, the number of firms with at least one CapEx 
forecast, and the number of analyst-firm pairs with at least one CapEx forecast each year. 
Corresponding values associated with EPS forecasts are also presented for comparison purposes. In 
2005, there are as little as 12 CapEx analyst-firm pairs, 11 analysts on 9 firms.  In 2006, the number 
of analyst-firm pairs spiked to about 4,400 CapEx analyst-firms (11.5% of the sample) from nearly 
1,000 analysts (24.3% of the sample) on approximately 2,000 firms (39.4% of the sample). The 
number of CapEx analyst-firms increase to nearly 15,500 (38.1% of the sample) from nearly 2,400 
analysts (57.3% of the sample) on approximately 3,100 firms (70.0% of the sample) in 2011.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides further information on distributions and correlations among variables. There are 
about 400,000 earnings forecasts from 2006 to 2011, in which about 10% are together with CapEx 
forecasts. In the meanwhile, 67% and 14% of earnings forecasts are accompanied by sales and cash-
flow forecasts. A concern might be that analysts issuing CapEx forecasts may issue sales or cash-
flow forecasts as well. However, the correlation between CapEx Forecast Dummy, Sales Forecast 
Dummy, and Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy are less than 20%, and there is, therefore, no risk of 
multicollinearity among these variables. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The absolute cumulative market adjusted abnormal returns from one day before the forecasts to one 
day after the forecasts are 5.1% on average. The correlation matrix shows a positive correlation 
between Absolute Abnormal Returns and CapEx Forecast Dummy, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis1(a). The correlations among the independent variables display no risk of 
multicollinearity.    
2.4 Empirical Results  
Table 3 presents the regression results of Model I(a) and Model I(b). Technically, Model I(b) is run 
with earnings forecasts which are together with CapEx forecasts; therefore, the number of 
observations is reduced from nearly 400,000 in Model I(a) to nearly 38,000 in Model I(b). The 
differences between the number of observations in the regressions and descriptive statistics table are 
due to firm-year fixed effects.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The positive coefficient of CapEx Forecast Dummy in Model I(a) supports Hypothesis I(a) which 
suggests that earnings forecasts associated with CapEx forecasts affect stock prices more than those 
not associated with CapEx forecasts. CapEx forecasts significantly increase the absolute three-day 
abnormal returns by 0.26%, equivalent to 22% per annum, which is also economically significant. 
To demonstrate the economic significance, I compare the marginal effects of  CapEx Forecast 
Dummy with marginal effects of some other variables which are directly linked to the information 
content of the earnings forecasts. The effects of adding CapEx forecasts are about 75% of the 
differential market reaction between earnings forecasts at the third and the first quartiles in 
deviation from the prior forecasts, and about 72% of the differential market reactions between 
earnings forecasts at the third and the first quartile of ex-post accuracy. The marginal effect of 
CapEx Forecast Dummy on market reaction is nearly half of the marginal effects of sales forecasts.   
The second column presents the results of Model I(b) which use ex-post CapEx forecast accuracy as 
the interested independent variable. The coefficient of Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy is 
significantly positive at 5% level.  The marginal effects of ex-post CapEx forecast accuracy is not 
as strong as the marginal effects of whether the CapEx forecasts are issued or not. The differential 
market reactions between forecasts at the third and the first quartile of ex-post CapEx forecast 
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accuracy is about 0.11% (equivalent to 9% per annum). The marginal effects of ex-post CapEx 
forecast accuracy are about one fourth of marginal effects of ex-post earnings accuracy. 
The coefficients of the other control variables have signs consistent with the existing literature. 
Consistent with Ertimur et al. (2003), Ertimur et al. (2009) and Keung (2010), earnings forecasts 
associated with sales forecasts are more informative. The negative coefficient of the cash-flow 
forecast dummy seems to be counter-intuitive; however, this coefficient is insignificant in some of 
my robustness tests, which is consistent with Givoly et al. (2009).The negative coefficient of 
Positive EPS Fcst. suggests that negative earnings revisions bring more information than positive 
revisions15. The positive coefficient of EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio suggests that leaders are more 
influential than followers (Cooper et al. 2001). Reports issued by more experienced analysts and 
analysts from bigger brokers have more impact on stock price16. Prior earnings forecast accuracy 
becomes unimportant after controlling for current forecast accuracy. Unlike Stickel (1992), I find 
that All-America status has a negative impact on market reaction to analysts’ reports.    
2.5 Robustness Checks 
In the first robustness check, I control for concomitant firm events. Following Loh & Stulz (2010), I 
remove from the sample the earnings forecasts which occur in the three days around firm events, 
specifically quarterly earnings announcements, because it is difficult to disentangle the price impact 
of an analyst’s forecast and a firm event if they occur at about the same time. The coefficient of the 
CapEx forecast dummy variable reduces significantly from 0.26 to 0.11 (i. e. reduces by 58%); 
however, it is still significant at 5% level. At the same time, the effects of other analyst 
characteristics variables on forecast informativeness are also reduced. For example, the coefficient 
of the ex-post forecast accuracy variable also reduces from 0.83 to 0.52 (i. e. reduces by 37%). 
In the second robustness check, I adopt a more complicated calculation of CAR by controlling for 
size, book-to-market ratio (B/M) and momentum characteristics of the stock (Daniel et al. 1997; 
Loh & Stulz 2010). In this check, I also exclude concomitant earnings announcements. The 
coefficient reduces to 0.1 and is still significant at 5% level. To compute the three-day CAR for an 
analyst forecast, I create a benchmark portfolio with the same size, B/M, and momentum as the 
                                                    
15
 (Givoly & Lakonishok 1979; Abdel-Khalik & Ajinkya 1982; Lys & Sohn 1990; Asquith et al. 2005) 
16
  (Park & Stice 2000; Stickel 1992; Hugon & Muslu 2010; Hilary & Hsu 2013) 
Chapter II 
52 
 
stock. The CAR is defined as the difference between the three-day buy-and-hold cumulative returns 
of the stock and the cumulative returns of the benchmark portfolioNi. e. H]v = ∏ &1 + v( −∏ N1 + vlm3llQ Q. The benchmark portfolios are constructed as follows: Each July I assign 
stocks into 125 portfolios through three steps. I sort stocks into 5 groups based on their size and 
then, within each group, I sort stocks into 5 sub-groups based on their B/M. Finally, within each 
sub-group, I sort stocks into 5 portfolios based on their prior 12 months buy-and-hold cumulative 
returns. 
3 Determinants of Capital Expenditure Forecast Issuance  
3.1 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development  
Ertimur & Stubben (2006) find that analysts from larger brokerage houses, issuing earnings 
forecasts more frequently but having less accurate prior earnings forecasts are more likely to issue 
cash-flow forecasts. In contrast, less reputable analysts, who have less experience and are employed 
by less prestigious brokerage houses, are more likely to issue dis-aggregated earnings forecasts 
(Ertimur et al. 2009).  
In general, there are three motivations for analysts to issue CapEx forecasts. First, analysts are more 
likely to issue CapEx forecasts when the benefit of issuing or the harm of not issuing CapEx 
forecasts is higher. Second, analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts when the costs of 
issuing those forecasts are smaller. Third, analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts when 
analysts have more resources. Applying these general motivations, I have five predictions. 
First, I predict that analysts, who issued CapEx forecasts on the same firm and/or on another firm in 
the previous year, are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts in the current year. An analyst’s 
employer and clients form expectations from the analyst’s past performance, and they are 
disappointed if they do not receive what they expected. Therefore, the cost of seizing to issue 
CapEx forecasts is higher than the cost of not issuing CapEx forecasts at all. Analysts, who issued 
CapEx forecasts before, may have more experience on issuing CapEx forecasts, which lowers the 
costs of issuing such forecasts in the current year. These analysts may have received more resources 
from their employer to issue CapEx forecasts. 
Hypothesis 2(a): Analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts if they have issued CapEx 
forecasts on the same and/or on another firm in the previous year.   
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Second, I predict that an analyst is more likely to issue CapEx forecasts if there are more of her 
colleagues issuing CapEx forecasts. If issuing CapEx becomes a more common practice within a 
broker, analysts may face a greater risk of losing their job if they do not issue CapEx forecasts. 
Analysts may learn the CapEx forecasting skills from their colleagues, who are working for the 
same broker, and in consequence, reduce the costs of issuing CapEx forecasts. In addition, 
brokerage houses where issuing CapEx is a common practice might simply offer more resources 
associated with CapEx forecasts to analysts. 
Hypothesis 2(b): Analysts are likely to issue CapEx forecasts if a high percentage of their 
colleagues issue CapEx forecasts.  
Third, analysts with less experience are more motivated to issue CapEx forecasts. They are 
competing with analysts who have been producing analytical reports for many years; therefore, they 
have to add more items to their reports to increase their reports’ quality and visibility. This 
prediction is consistent with the finding of Ertimur et al. (2009) that less experienced analysts are 
more likely to issue dis-aggregated earnings forecasts. However, more experienced analysts may 
face lower CapEx forecast issuing costs, which leads to the higher popularity of CapEx forecast 
among experienced analysts. These conflicting arguments urge us a test for the following 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2(c): Inexperienced analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts.         
Fourth, analysts have scarce resources and they have to allocate these resources over the firms they 
cover. If an analyst covers many stocks, the amount of resources available for each stock is small. 
Therefore, analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts if they cover fewer firms. In addition, 
the resources are also allocated unequally among covered firms. The favorite firms receive more 
attention from analysts and those firms are more likely to receive CapEx forecasts from the 
analysts. I conjecture that the number of earnings revisions per year is a good proxy for resource 
allocation, and firms which receive more earnings forecast revisions are more likely to receive 
CapEx forecasts. 
Hypothesis 2(d): Analysts are more likely to produce CapEx forecasts on firms which receive more 
resources. 
Finally, high quality analysts, i. e. from bigger brokers, voted as All-America financial analysts, 
higher earnings forecast accuracy in the same year, are usually given more resources. They may 
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also find issuing CapEx forecasts less costly than low quality analysts. In the consequence, the high 
quality analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. However, the reputation argument of 
Ertimur et al. (2009) predicts that high quality analysts have well established reputation, and they 
have less motivation to issue additional forecasts. Therefore, I would like to verify those 
contradicting arguments by testing the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2(e): High quality analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. 
3.2 Testing Methodology 
I use logistic regression to capture the determinants of CapEx forecast issuance. The dependent 
variable is the probability of an analyst to issue at least one CapEx forecast on the firm in the 
current year. The interested independent variables are analyst characteristics variables. To control 
for firm characteristics, which potentially affect analysts’ CapEx issuing decisions, I use two types 
of controls: firm characteristics together with industry-year fixed effects, and firm-year fixed 
effects. The two regressions are run on analyst-firm-year basis.  
Model II (a): at analyst-firm-year level with industry-year fixed effects and clustering for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity among industries. 
@&Hx%*ø	7O^. 9zJJJ( = 8 + Β ∗ ]Ix_O^	HℎxAx^:ABO^BO + C ∗ 7BAJ	HℎxAx^:ABO^BO +  
Model II (b): at analyst-firm-year level with firm-year fixed effects and clustering for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity among industries. 
@&Hx%*ø	7O^. 9zJJJ( = 8 + Β ∗ ]Ix_O^	HℎxAx^:ABO^BO +   
The analyst characteristic variables are defined as follows: 
xPP:	Hx%*ø	7O^. 9zJJ = ,1						if	the	analyst	issued	at	least	one	CapEx	forecast	on	the	same	firm	in	the	previous	year 	0																															otherwise																																																	 
xPP:	Hx%*ø	9zJJ	^ℎ:A	7BAJ = ,1						if	the	analyst	issued	at	least	one	CapEx	forecast		on	another	firm	in	the	previous	year 	0																																otherwise																																																	 
Hypothesis 2(a) predicts positive coefficients for these variables.  
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xPP:	eAC1:A	Hx%*ø	vx^BC = ¡		¢¢£-	& #		%	¢¡	  #	¢	¢	 	%	" 	-¢ 	¡		¢¢£-	& #		%	¢¡		 	%	" 	-¢  
Hypothesis 2(b) predicts a positive coefficient for this variable. 
]Ix_O^	eAC1:A	:IzA: = ln&No. of	years	the	analyst	has	been	working	for	the	broker(  
]Ix_O^	7BAJ	*ø%:A:BI: = ln&No. of	years	the	analyst	has	been	covering	the	firm(  
Hypothesis 2(c) predicts negative coefficients for these variables. 
zJy:A	C	*@	7O^. =ln&No. of	EPS	forecasts	given	by	the	analyst	on	the	firm	in	the	current	year(  
zJy:A	C	^C1O = ln&No. of	stocks	covered	by	the	analyst	on	the	firm	in	the	current	year(  
Hypothesis 2(d) predicts a positive coefficient for	zJy:A	C	*@	7O^., and a negative 
coefficient for	zJy:A	C	^C1O. 
eAC1:A	B: = ln&No. of	analysts	working	for	the	broker	in	the	current	year(  
*ø	@CO^	*@	7O^. ]zAx = ¢&£	'(	¢	(¡		'(	¢ 	in	the	current	year   
]Ix_O^	^x^zO = 1		if	the	analyst	appear	in	Institutional	Investor	magazine	last	October	0																																																																	otherwise																																																	  
Hypothesis 2(e) predicts positive coefficients for these variables. 
In Model II (a), I control for size of the firm (Lagged Market Capitalization), growth opportunity 
(Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio), managers’ cash-in-hand (Lagged Cash), profitability (Lagged Net 
Income), historical capital expenditure (Lagged Capital Expenditure), and stock market liquidity 
(Lagged Share Turnover). These variables are defined as follows: 
Lagged Market Capitalization = ln(share price * number of share outstanding) the end of the most 
current fiscal year (i. e. ln(prcc_f*csho)). 
Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio = ln(book value of common equity / market value of equity) at the 
end of the most current fiscal year (i. e. ln(ceq/(prcc_f*csho))). 
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Lagged Cash = cash and short-term investments on total assets at the end of the most current fiscal 
year (i. e. che/at). 
Lagged Net Income = net income on total assets at the end of the most current fiscal year (i. e. 
ni/at). 
Lagged Capital Expenditure = capital expenditure on total assets at the end of the most current 
fiscal year (i. e. capx/at). 
Lagged Share Turnover = ln(number of shares traded in the previous fiscal years / number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year) (i. e. ln(cshtr_c/csho)) 
3.3 Data Description and Empirical Results 
In this section, I use sample from 2007 to 2011 for the regression, and retain the year 2006 to 
calculate analysts’ past CapEx performance because CapEx forecasts popularity takes off in 2006. 
The sample includes 152,441 analyst-firm-years, and 27% of those observations are associated with 
CapEx forecasts. Panel 1 of Table 4 presents the distribution of analysts’ characteristics variables. 
20% of analysts have produced CapEx forecasts on the same firm in the previous year, and 43% of 
them have produced CapEx forecasts on another firm. At a broker level, on average, 43% of 
analysts working for the broker have issued at least one CapEx forecast in the previous year. An 
average analyst has nearly 4 years of tenure with the current broker and 3 years of firm-specific 
experience. Analysts, on average, cover nearly 14 stocks and issue 3.5 forecasts on each stock in a 
year. Each broker employs 36 analysts on average. Finally, there are nearly 10% of firms covered 
by star analysts. Note that the average is calculated from observations at analyst-firm-year level; it 
is subject to change if the average is calculated from observations at analyst-year or broker-year 
levels instead of analyst-firm-year level.        
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 presents empirical results of Model II(a) and Model II(b). The two models produce very 
similar results. The first column presents the coefficients associated with analyst characteristics and 
firm characteristics variables in Model II(a), and the second column presents the marginal effects of 
these variables on probability of CapEx forecast issuance. The third and the forth columns presents 
the coefficients and marginal effects of analyst characteristics variables in Model II(b). In general, 
the regression results suggest that analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts when they have 
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higher potential benefits and lower costs of doing so. Specifically, I have four findings. First, the 
positive coefficients of Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy and Lagged CapEx Dummy Other Firm are 
supporting Hypothesis 2(a) that analysts with experience in CapEx forecasts are more likely to issue 
CapEx forecasts. Analysts who issued CapEx forecasts on the same firm in the previous year are 
25% more likely to issue CapEx forecasts on the focal firm this year (from Model II(b)). Analysts 
who issued CapEx forecasts on other firms are 14% more likely to issue CapEx forecasts on the 
focal firm this year (from Model II(b)). The positive coefficient of Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio is 
also consistent with Hypothesis 2(b) that broker norms are important to analysts’ CapEx forecast 
decisions. Analysts from brokers at the third quartile of Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio (i. e. 65%) are 
about 20% more likely to issue CapEx forecasts than analysts from brokers at the first quartile of 
Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio (i. e. 14%) (from Model II(b)). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, the coefficients of analysts’ broker tenure and firm-specific experience are significantly 
negative, which demonstrate the validity of Hypothesis 2(c), namely that less experienced analysts 
are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. By issuing CapEx forecasts, inexperienced analysts gain 
more, through the recognition of their employers and investors, than experienced analysts. On 
average, analysts at the first quartile of broker tenure are 6% more likely to issue CapEx forecasts 
than those at the third quartile of broker tenure; the similar figure for firm-specific experience is 5% 
(from Model II(b)). I also use analysts’ general experience instead of firm-specific experience in 
robustness checks and find similar, but weaker effects. 
Third, analysts covering less stocks are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts on their covered 
stocks, and those stocks which are given more earnings forecasts are more likely to be associated 
with CapEx forecasts. These findings are consistent with Clement (1999)’s limited resource 
argument embedded in Hypothesis 2(d). The difference in the probability of issuing CapEx 
forecasts of analysts at the first and the third quartile of number of earnings revisions is 3.5%, and 
the difference for analysts at the first and the third quartile of the number of covering stocks is 2% 
(from Model II(b)).        
Fourth, I find that higher quality analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts, which is 
consistent with the ability argument of Hypothesis 2(e). Specifically, analysts from bigger firms, 
analysts with higher ex-post firm-specific earnings forecast accuracy, and All-America analysts are 
more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. The findings are also consistent with the resource argument, 
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that high quality analysts are given more resources, and are in consequence, more likely to issue 
CapEx forecasts. Analysts from the third quartile of broker size are 3% more probable to issue 
CapEx forecasts than analysts from the first quartile. Analysts in the third quartile of ex-post 
earnings forecast accuracy are 2% more likely to issue CapEx forecasts than those in the first 
quartiles of accuracy (from Model II(b)). I also use the past earnings forecast accuracy instead of 
ex-post accuracy in the robustness checks, but I do not find a significant relationship with the 
probability of CapEx forecast issuance. Analysts may decide to issue CapEx forecasts when they 
foresee future information advantages. High status analysts are nearly 3% more likely to issue 
CapEx forecasts than low status analysts (from Model II(b)).  
Model II(a) also offers some insights on the firm characteristics which attract CapEx forecasts. In 
general, the effects of firm characteristics on the likelihood of CapEx forecast issuance are much 
smaller than the effects of analyst characteristics. First, the results of Model II(a) suggest that bigger 
firms and growth firms receive more CapEx forecasts from security analysts. The difference in the 
likelihood of receiving CapEx forecasts from an analyst between a firm at the third and the first 
quartiles in size is 1.7% and between a firm at the first and the third quartiles in book-to-market 
ratio quartiles is 0.7%. Second, firms holding less cash receive more attention on CapEx forecasts 
than those holding more cash. The difference in the likelihood of receiving CapEx forecasts from an 
analyst between a firm at the first and the third quartiles in level of cash in the balance sheet is 
1.5%. Third, profitable firms receive more CapEx forecasts; however, the result is not economically 
significant. The difference in the likelihood of receiving CapEx forecasts from an analyst between a 
firm at the third and the first quartiles in net income is only 0.3%   
4 Determinants of Capital Expenditure Forecast Accuracy 
4.1 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development on CapEx Forecast Accuracy 
Earnings forecast accuracy has been extensively studied for the last two decades. The extant 
literature documents that earnings forecasts are more accurate if they are produced later in the 
forecasting period, produced by All America analysts (i. e. star analysts), produced by analysts with 
more firm-specific experience, produced by analysts with higher prior forecast accuracy, produced 
by analysts from bigger brokerage houses, or produced by analysts who follow fewer firms and 
Chapter II 
59 
 
industries17. Although Kim et al. (2011) find a significant relationship between earnings forecast 
accuracy and general experience, Jacob et al. (1999) do not find such a relationship. Clement et al. 
(2007) suggest that earnings forecast accuracy is associated with innate ability and task-specific 
experience. Earnings forecast accuracy is increasing with the number of forecasts made during the 
forecasting intervals (Jacob et al. 1999) and the walk-down pattern (Ke & Yu 2006). Clement & Tse 
(2005) find that bold forecasts are more accurate. Earnings forecasts which are supplemented with 
cash flow and sales forecasts are more accurate18. Bolliger (2004) studies the European market and 
reports similar findings to the US market, namely that earnings forecast accuracy is positively 
related to analysts’ firm-specific experience, and negatively related to the number of countries 
covered by analysts, while there is no relationship with the general experience and brokerage house 
sizes. 
Pae & Yoon (2011) study the relationship between analyst characteristics and cash-flow forecast 
accuracy, and their results are similar to those of earnings forecast accuracy. They find that cash-
flow forecast accuracy is positively associated with cash-flow forecasting frequency, cash-flow 
forecasting experience and prior cash-flow forecasting performance, while it is negatively 
associated with the number of companies followed and the forecast horizon. 
In general, a forecast is the product of two processes: information collection and information 
analysis. Both processes can be positively correlated with the ability of analysts and the level of 
resources allocated to analyze the firm. In addition, the first process can also be improved by the 
amount of public information available in the market and the analysts’ sources to collect non-public 
information. Although CapEx forecasts are fundamentally different to other types of forecasts, they 
may share some common determinants. I focus on the effects of analysts’ available information, 
experience, quality, and resources on the accuracy of CapEx forecasts. It is generally agreed in 
existing studies that earnings forecasts issued closer to the earnings announcements are more 
accurate than those issued earlier, and I predict that CapEx forecasts behave similarly.   
Hypothesis 3(a): CapEx forecasts produced later in the forecasting period are more accurate than 
forecasts produced earlier.  
                                                    
17
 (O’brien 1988; Stickel 1992; Mikhail et al. 1997; Jacob et al. 1999; Brown 2001; Kim et al. 2011) 
18
 (Call et al. 2009; Pae et al. 2007; Keung 2010) 
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Second, analysts with more firm-specific experience produce better earnings forecasts. Pae & Yoon 
(2011) find that the cash-flow forecasting quality is also affected by the cash-flow forecasting 
experience. Therefore, I predict that the CapEx forecasting ability is also positively correlated with 
the analysts’ firm-specific CapEx experience, which is the basis for the following hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 3(b): CapEx forecast accuracy increases with analysts’ experience in CapEx 
forecasting. 
Third, prior research has found that better forecasters in the prior periods tend to produce better 
forecasts in the subsequent periods. Therefore, I would expect that analysts with more accurate prior 
CapEx forecasts tend to produce better future CapEx forecasts.   
Hypothesis 3(c): Analysts, who were more accurate in CapEx forecasts in the previous year, 
produce more accurate CapEx forecasts in the current year. 
Fourth, resources are important for analysts to produce accurate forecasts. Past research has 
demonstrated that analysts produce more accurate forecasts if they do not split their resources over 
many stocks, industries, or countries. Therefore, CapEx forecasters are likely to issue better 
forecasts if they cover fewer stocks. In addition, analysts’ concentration of resources on some 
stocks may cause more accurate CapEx forecasts on those stocks. These arguments serve as the 
basis for the next hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 3(d): Analysts produce more accurate CapEx forecasts on the firms which receive more 
resources. 
Finally, the existing literature agrees that high quality analysts, i. e. those from bigger brokerage 
houses and those that have been voted as All-America analysts, are better at earnings forecasting. I 
conjecture that those high quality analysts are also better at CapEx forecasting. In addition, I would 
expect that better earnings forecasters are better CapEx forecasters.   
Hypothesis 3(e): Higher quality analysts issue more accurate CapEx forecasts. 
4.2 Testing Methodology 
I use two OLS regression models to examine the determinants of CapEx forecast accuracy. The 
difference between the two models is that the first model does not include the lagged CapEx 
forecast accuracy variable as a dependent variable. However it includes the lagged CapEx issuance 
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indicator variables as dependent variables. Model III(b) constrains itself to analysts who have at 
least two years of CapEx firm-specific experience since it requires past CapEx forecast accuracy 
data. 
Model III(a): at analyst-firm-year level with firm-year fixed effects 
Hx%*ø	7O^. ]zAx = 8 + Β ∗ ]Ix_O^	HℎxAx^:ABO^BO +   
Model III(b): at analyst-firm-year level with firm-year fixed effects 
Hx%*ø	7O^. ]zAx =8 + G ∗ xPP:	Hx%*ø	7O^.		]zAx + Β ∗ ]Ix_O^	HℎxAx^:ABO^BO +    
The variables are defined as follows: 
To test Hypothesis 3(a) 
9BO^xI:	^C	*@	]IIJ^. = ln&Earnings	Announcement − Forecast	Date( 
Hypothesis 3(a) predicts a negative coefficient for this variable. 
To test Hypothesis 3(b) 
]Ix_O^	Hx%*ø	*ø%:A:BI: = ln&No. of	years	the	analyst	has	been	issuing	CapEx	forecasts(  
Hypothesis 3(b) predicts positive coefficients for this variable.  
To test Hypothesis 3(c) (in Model III(b) only) 
xPP:	Hx%*ø	7O^. ]zAx = ¢&£	¢	¢	(¡		¢	¢ 	in	the	previous	year  
Hypothesis 3(c) predicts positive coefficients for this variable. 
To test Hypothesis 3(d) 
zJy:A	C	*@	7O^. =ln&No. of	EPS	forecasts	given	by	the	analyst	on	the	firm	in	the	current	year(  
zJy:A	C	^C1O = ln&No. of	stocks	covered	by	the	analyst	in	the	firm	in	the	current	year(  
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Hypothesis 3(d) predicts a positive coefficient for	zJy:A	C	*@	7O^., and a negative 
coefficient for	zJy:A	C	^C1O. 
To test Hypothesis 3(e) 
eAC1:A	B: = ln&No. of	analysts	working	for	the	broker	in	the	current	year(  
*ø − @CO^	*@	7O^. ]zAx = ¢&£	'(	¢	(¡		'(	¢   in the current year 
]Ix_O^	^x^zO =
1		if	the	analyst	appears	in	the	Institutional	Investor	magazine	last	October	0																																																																										otherwise																																																	  
Hypothesis 3(e) predicts positive coefficients for these variables. 
4.3 Data Description and Empirical Results 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in Model III(a) and Model III(b) at 
analyst-firm-year level on analysts who produce at least one CapEx forecast on the firm. On 
average, CapEx forecasters have 2.8 years of experience in CapEx forecasting, and 6.2 years of 
general experience. Consistent with the determinants of CapEx forecast issuance, CapEx forecasters 
are covering fewer stocks, issuing more earnings forecasts on the stocks, work in bigger brokerage 
houses, are more accurate earnings forecasters, and have higher status.     
[Insert Table 6 about here]     
From the regression results of Model III(a) and Model III(b) presented in Table 7, I obtain five 
findings. First, the significant negative coefficients of Distance to EPS Anncmt. in both models 
support Hypothesis 3(a), namely that CapEx forecasts given later in the forecasting period are more 
accurate than those given earlier. The difference in the forecast accuracy score between forecasts 
issued at the first and the third quartiles of distance to earnings announcements is 6%. Second, 
analysts significantly improve their CapEx forecast accuracy from their CapEx forecast experience 
(i. e. supporting Hypothesis 3(b)), but not from their earnings forecast experience (after controlling 
for their CapEx forecast experience). Analysts in the third quartile of CapEx forecast experience 
have 2% CapEx forecast accuracy higher compared to those in the first quartile of CapEx forecast 
experience. Third, analysts’ prior firm-specific CapEx forecast accuracy is an important 
determinant of analysts’ current CapEx forecast accuracy. The most accurate CapEx forecasters in 
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the previous year have 10%  CapEx forecast accuracy higher than the worst accurate CapEx 
forecasters. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Fourth, resource allocation affects analysts’ CapEx forecast accuracy. I find that analysts give more 
accurate CapEx forecasts on firms which are given more earnings forecasts in the same year. This 
finding is in line with the resource allocation argument of Hypothesis 3(d). However, I do not find 
any significant effects of coverage breath on CapEx forecast accuracy. Finally, unlike earnings 
forecasts, there is no robust evidence supporting Hypothesis 3(e), namely that high quality analysts 
produce more accurate CapEx forecasts. Although I document a positive relationship between 
earnings forecast accuracy and CapEx forecast accuracy in the same year, this relationship becomes 
insignificant in the sub-sample of analysts with firm-specific CapEx forecast experience.    
5 Capital Expenditure Forecast and Analyst’ Job Separation 
5.1 Related Literature 
Prior research documents positive (negative) career outcomes associated with higher (lower) 
analysts’ forecasting performance. More accurate earnings forecasters are less likely to lose their 
job (Mikhail et al. 1999) and are more likely to move to high-status brokerage houses (Hong & 
Kubik 2003). However, Hong & Kubik (2003) also document that analyst optimism is positively 
related to a successful career, and that optimism is even more important than accuracy when 
covered firms have underwriting relationships with the analysts’ brokerage houses. Hong et al. 
(2000) find that young analysts are more likely to lose their job for  bold and inaccurate earnings 
forecasts. Clement & Tse (2005) find that analysts covering more firms are more tolerated for 
inaccurate bold forecasts. Ke & Yu (2006) find that analysts who revise earnings forecasts 
downward from initial over-optimistic forecasts are less likely to be fired.   
Supplementary forecasts are also important to analysts’ career. Call et al. (2009) and Pandit et al. 
(2012) find that cash-flow forecast issuance and accuracy reduce analysts’ likelihood of job loss. 
Pandit et al. (2012) also find that cash-flow forecasts accuracy is more important to analysts’ career 
if firms are covered by more analysts. Ertimur et al. (2009) find that earnings forecast 
disaggregation assists less reputable analysts to increase their chance of promotion and decrease 
their chance of demotion or termination. Jung et al. (2012) document those analysts who issue long-
term forecasts are less likely to leave the profession or move to smaller brokerage houses. 
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Similar to other supplementary forecasts, security analysts’ CapEx forecasts may signal two things. 
First, issuing CapEx forecasts may signal analysts’ commitment to develop their career as analysts; 
therefore, these analysts are less likely to leave the profession. Second, issuing CapEx forecasts 
may signal analysts’ ability because, unlike issuing sales forecasts, issuing CapEx forecasts is 
costly. CapEx forecasts require different skills and procedures compared to other forecasts. 
Therefore, I predict that the chance of leaving the profession is lower for analysts who are issuing 
CapEx forecasts. If the ability signaling argument is correct, more accurate CapEx forecasters 
should be less likely to leave the profession since the signals about their ability are more apparent. 
These arguments are the basis for the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 4(a): CapEx forecast issuers are less likely to leave their profession than other analysts.   
Hypothesis 4(b): More accurate CapEx forecasters are less likely to leave their profession than less 
accurate ones. 
5.2 Testing Methodology 
I run logistic regressions to find relationships between likeliness of analysts’ job loss and analysts’ 
CapEx forecast performance. Model  IV(a) includes the analysts’ CapEx forecast issuance indicator 
variable and other control variables. In Model IV(b), the CapEx forecast issuance indicator variable 
is replaced by the relative CapEx forecast accuracy variable.  
Model IV (a): at analyst-year level with year fixed effects 
@A&@AC:OOBCIx_	9BOCI^BIzx^BCI( = 8 + G ∗ Hx%*ø	7O^.		9zJJ + Γ ∗ HCI^AC_O +    
Model IV (b): at analyst-year level with year fixed effects 
@A&@AC:OOBCIx_	9BOCI^BIzx^BCI( = 8 + G ∗ Hx%*ø	7O^.		]zAx + Γ ∗ HCI^AC_O +   
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
Interested independent variables 
Hx%*ø	7O^.		9zJJ = ,1					if	the	analyst	issues	at	least	one	CapEx	forecast		in	the	current	year 	0																												otherwise																																																	   
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Hx%*ø	7O^. ]zAx = ];:AxP: 2¢&£	¢	¢	(¡		¢	¢ 5 	in	the	current	year    
Hypothesis 4(a) predicts a negative coefficient for Hx%*ø	7O^.		9zJJ and Hypothesis 4(b) 
predicts a negative coefficient for	Hx%*ø	7O^. ]zAx. 
Control variables 
x_:O	7CA:xO^	9zJJ = ,1					if	the	analyst	issues	at	least	one	sales	forecast		in	the	current	year 	0																												otherwise																																																	 
HxOℎ − 7_Cå	7CA:xO^	9zJJ = ,1					if	the	analyst	issues	at	least	one	cash − flow	forecast		in	the	current	year 	0																												otherwise																																																	  
*@	7CA:xO^	]zAx = Average 2¢&£	'(	¢	(¡		'(	¢ 5 	in	the	current	year      
*@	7O^.		 − 7	vx^BC =
Average 2ln	"¢#	 ¡	$ ¢	¡	%	£¢	&	¢"¢#	 ¡	$ ¢	¡	%		&	¢!5 	in	the	current	year    
*@	7O^. eC_I:OO = Average 2¢&'(	.*" ¢ (¡		'(	¢5 	in	the	current	year    
/x_1	9CåI	CA: = Average+walk	down	indicator-, in which walk-down indicator equals 1 if 
the last EPS forecast of the analyst on the firm in the fiscal year is smaller than his last EPS forecast 
on the same firm in the first half of the fiscal year, and equals 0 otherwise (Ke & Yu 2006; Libby et 
al. 2007). 
zJy:A	C	^C1O = ln&number	of	stocks	coverd	by	the	analyst	in	the	current	year( 
zJy:A	C	*@	7O^.= ln&No. of	EPS	forecasts	given	by	the	analyst	on	the	firm	in	the	current	year( 
]Ix_O^	^x^zO
= 1		if	the	analyst	appears	in	the	Institutional	Investor	magazine	this	October	0																																																																											otherwise																																																	 
eAC1:A	B: = ln&number	of	analysts	working	for	the	broker	in	the	current	year( 
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]Ix_O^	*ø%:AB:I: = ln&number	of	years	which	the	analyst	has	been	in	I/B/E/S( 
5.3 Data Description and Empirical Results 
I use a sample from 2006 to 2010 because the All-America analysts data is up to 2010, and on 
average, 15% of security analysts leave the profession each year. Table 8 presents some descriptive 
statistics of the variables at analyst-year level. There are about 40% of analysts issuing at least one 
CapEx forecast, nearly 90% of them issuing at least one sales forecast, and only 26% of analysts 
issuing at least one cash-flow forecast. The correlation among	Hx%*ø	7O^.		9zJJ, x_:O	7CA:xO^	9zJJ, and HxOℎ − 7_Cå	7CA:xO^	9zJJ are less than 30% (the correlation 
matrix is unreported); therefore, there is no risk of multicollinearity among these variables.       
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Table 9 presents regressions results of Model IV(a) and Model IV(b) on 35,906 analyst-years from 
2006 to 2010. In the first column, a negative coefficient of CapEx Fcst. Dummy suggests that 
CapEx forecast issuance reduces analysts’ chance of leaving their profession. Analysts who issue at 
least one CapEx forecast are 4.4% less likely to leave the profession than those who do not. This 
finding is in line with Hypothesis 4(a). This finding is consistent with Call et al. (2009) finding hat 
analysts who issue cash-flow forecasts are less likely to leave their profession. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In the third column, the coefficient of CapEx Fcst. Accuracy is significantly negative at 10% 
significance level, which means that more accurate CapEx forecasters are less likely to leave the 
analyst profession. The most accurate CapEx forecasters are 3% less likely to leave their profession 
than the least accurate CapEx forecasters. This result is consistent with Mikhail et al. (1999) who 
document that more accurate earnings forecasters are less likely to leave the profession.  
To demonstrate the economic significance of CapEx forecasts’ marginal effects on the professional 
discontinuation likelihood, I further analyze the marginal effects of control variables. Negative 
coefficients of EPS Fcst. Accuracy suggests that more accurate earnings forecasters are less likely 
to leave the profession than less accurate earnings forecasters. Analysts at the third quartile of 
earnings forecast accuracy are 4.4% less likely to leave the profession than analysts at the first 
quartile; this figure is around the marginal effects of the CapEx forecast issuance dummy. The 
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difference in job termination probability between analysts at the third and the first quartiles of 
coverage breadth is 4.7%, which is a little higher than the marginal effects of the CapEx forecast 
issuance dummy. Analysts at the third quartile of number of earnings forecasts per stock are 9% 
less probable to leave their profession than those at the first quartile, which is double of the 
marginal effects of the CapEx forecast issuance dummy. Furthermore, the marginal effects of All-
America analyst status is lower than the marginal effects of CapEx forecast issuance dummy on the 
job termination probability. 
6 Conclusion 
Issuing CapEx forecasts have become a popular exercise among security analysts. At the end of 
2011, 57% of analysts were issuing at least one CapEx forecast and 70% of listed firms were given 
at least one CapEx forecast, despite the fact that CapEx forecasts were first issued only six years 
ago. I investigate the effects of the CapEx forecasts on the market influence of analysts’ reports. I 
study analysts’ characteristics which may affect the likelihood of CapEx forecast issuance and 
CapEx forecast accuracy. I also examine the impact of CapEx forecast issuance and accuracy on 
analysts’ career.  
I find that CapEx forecasts increase the market reaction to financial analysts’ reports, and more 
accurate CapEx forecasts have stronger effects on stock prices. However, CapEx forecasts are also 
costly to issue; therefore, selective groups of analysts with more motivation and lower costs are 
more likely to issue CapEx forecasts. Specifically, analysts with less broker tenure and firm-specific 
experience are more motivated to impress their employers and clients by issuing CapEx forecasts. 
More experienced analysts in CapEx forecasts and high quality analysts are more likely to issue 
CapEx forecasts because they may face lower producing costs. The social norm is also an important 
factor; analysts are more likely to issue CapEx forecasts if their colleagues, who work for the same 
brokers, are issuing CapEx forecasts.   
More experienced analysts in CapEx forecasts are more accurate CapEx forecasters. Analysts with 
more general experience and higher general quality are not necessary better CapEx forecasters.  
Similar to EPS forecasts, CapEx forecasts issued later in the forecasting period are more accurate 
than those issued earlier. Furthermore, I find that analysts’ CapEx forecast issuance and accuracy 
are negatively associated with their probability of leaving the financial analyst profession. With 
regard to the effects of CapEx forecasts on analysts’ career, I find that analysts are less likely to 
leave their profession if they issue CapEx forecasts. The CapEx forecast accuracy is also negatively 
Chapter II 
68 
 
correlated with the job termination likelihood. The findings are consistent with professional 
commitment and the ability signaling arguments.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of CapEx Forecasts 
Panel 1: Number of Analysts with CAPEX forecasts and with EPS forecasts 
 
Panel 2: Number of Firms with CAPEX forecasts and with EPS forecasts 
 
This figure presents the evolution of CapEx forecasts from 2005 to 2011. Panel 1 displays the number of analysts in 
I/B/E/S and number of analysts issuing at least one CapEx forecast by year. The red bar shows the number of analysts 
that issue at least one annual earnings forecast in the year. The blue bar shows the number of analysts that issue at least 
one CapEx forecast in that specific year. Panel 2 displays the number of firms covered by at least one analyst and the 
number of firms which are given at least one CapEx forecast per year. The red bar shows the number of firms which 
receive at least one annual earnings forecast from all analysts in the year. The blue bar shows the number of firms that 
receive at least one CapEx forecast from all analysts in that specific year. There is an increasing trend in both graphs.  
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Figure 2: CapEx Forecasts over Industries 
 
This figure presents the heterogeneity of CapEx forecasts over industries, classified by two-digit SIC codes, from 2006 
to 2011. The bars display the percentage of the analyst-firm-year triplets with at least one CapEx forecast over the total 
number of analyst-firm-year triplets. The upper axis displays the number of analyst-firm-year triplets for each industry. 
CapEx forecasts are most popular in the communication, educational services, and furniture and fixtures industries. 
Legal and financial services industries attract the least CapEx forecasts.   
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Table 1: Evolution of CapEx Forecasts   
 
This table presents a comparison between EPS forecasts and CapEx forecasts in three levels: analyst-firm, analyst, and 
firm levels. The second column presents the number of analyst-firm pairs with at least one EPS forecast, the third 
column presents the number of analyst-firm pairs with at least one CapEx forecast, and the numbers in parenthesis 
present the ratio between the two. Similarly, the forth column shows the number of analysts who issue at least one EPS 
forecast, the fifth column shows the number of analysts who issue at least one CapEx forecast, and the numbers in 
parenthesis shows the ratio between the two. The sixth column presents the number of firms which receive at least one 
EPS forecast, the seventh column presents the number of firms which receive at least one CapEx forecast, and the 
numbers in parenthesis present the ratio between the two. There is a significantly increasing trend in all three levels. 
From 2006 to 2011, CapEx forecast rate increased from 11% to 38% in the analyst-firm level, from 24% to 57% in the 
analyst level, and from 39% to 70% in the firm level. 
 
 
  
Year 
Number of 
Analyst-Firms 
With EPS 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Analyst-Firms 
With CAPEX 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Analysts 
With EPS 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Analysts 
With CAPEX 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Firms 
With EPS 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Firms 
With CAPEX 
Forecasts 
2005 36,589 12 4,001 11 4,847 9 (0.03%) (0.27%) (0.19%) 
2006 38,334 4,397 4,074 988 4,985 1,965 (11.47%) (24.25%) (39.42%) 
2007 39,674 7,571 4,166 1,453 5,060 2,778 (19.08%) (34.88%) (54.90%) 
2008 38,252 8,491 4,068 1,549 4,664 2,710 (22.20%) (38.08%) (58.10%) 
2009 36,732 10,055 3,836 1,782 4,479 2,688 (27.37%) (46.45%) (60.01%) 
2010 39,834 13,574 4,050 2,185 4,558 3,035 (34.08%) (53.95%) (66.59%) 
2011 40,660 15,479 4,152 2,378 4,427 3,099 (38.07%) (57.27%) (70.00%) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Forecast Level) 
Panel 1: Distribution 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Absolute Abnormal Returns 5.13 5.52 0 1.40 3.29 6.79 29.73 
CapEx Forecast Dummy 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 0 1 
Sales Forecast Dummy 0.67 0.47 0 0 1 1 1 
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 0.52 0.32 0 0.25 0.53 0.80 1 
EPS Fcst. Deviation 0.18 0.30 0 0.03 0.07 0.19 2.01 
Positive EPS Fcst. 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
Distance to EPS Anncmt. 5.12 0.58 0 4.72 5.25 5.61 6.02 
Dispersion of EPS Fcst. 0.21 0.34 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.21 2.36 
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio -0.01 1.95 -4.65 -1.31 0 1.33 4.64 
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.53 0.28 0 0.30 0.53 0.76 1 
Number of Stocks 2.74 0.51 0 2.56 2.77 3.04 4.60 
Lagged EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.55 0.28 0 0.33 0.56 0.78 1 
Lagged EPS Fcst. Boldness 0.50 0.16 0 0.39 0.49 0.60 1 
Analyst Firm Experience 1.47 0.60 0.69 1.10 1.39 1.95 3.40 
Analyst Experience 2.03 0.64 0.69 1.61 2.08 2.48 3.40 
Analys Status 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Broker Size 3.68 1.03 0 3.04 3.78 4.54 5.26 
N 399,192      
Panel 2: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Absolute Abnormal Returns 1                 
CapEx Forecast Dummy 2 .03                
Sales Forecast Dummy 3 .11 .19               
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy 4 -.04 .16 .03              
EPS Fcst. Deviation 5 .12 -.00 -.04 .02             
Positive EPS Fcst. 6 -.06 .03 .03 -.00 -.11            
Distance to EPS Anncmt. 7 .02 .00 .04 -.01 .05 .03           
Dispersion of EPS Fcst. 8 .05 -.02 -.09 .07 .62 -.06 .06          
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio 9 .00 -.02 -.03 .02 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.02         
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 10 .04 .03 .04 -.01 .01 .01 -.41 -.03 -.00        
Number of Stocks 11 -.03 -.02 -.05 -.01 .01 -.00 -.01 .02 .02 .01       
Lagged EPS Fcst. Accuracy 12 .00 .00 .01 .00 -.00 -.00 -.01 .02 .00 .04 .00      
Lagged EPS Fcst. Boldness 13 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 -.00 .00 .01 .05 -.02 .02 -.08     
Analyst Firm Experience 14 -.07 -.00 -.05 -.00 .00 .01 -.05 .01 .01 .02 .13 .02 .08    
Analyst Experience 15 -.03 .00 -.02 -.02 -.00 .01 -.03 -.00 .01 .01 .25 -.00 .05 .57   
Analyst Status 16 -.06 -.00 -.02 .02 .00 .01 -.03 .02 .03 .00 .13 .01 .05 .16 .16  
Broker Size 17 -.03 .03 .10 .05 -.03 .01 -.02 -.01 .09 -.00 .13 .02 .04 -.01 -.01 .34 
  
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in Model I(a) and Model I(b) over the period from 2006 to 
2011 with nearly 400,000 forecasts. Panel 1 and Panel 2 present the distributions and correlation matrix of the variables. 
• Absolute Abnormal Returns: absolute three days cumulative market adjusted returns of stocks around analysts’ 
forecasts (in % and right-winsorized at 1% level) 
• CapEx Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if CapEx forecasts are included in analysts’ reports and 0 otherwise 
• Sales Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if sales forecasts are included in analysts’ reports and 0 otherwise  
• Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if cash-flow forecasts are included in analysts’ reports and 0 otherwise  
• EPS Fcst. Deviation: absolute deviations from analysts’ prior forecasts (winsorized at 1% level) 
• Positive EPS Fcst.: equals 1 if earnings forecasts are revised upward and 0 otherwise 
(Continued) 
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• Distance to EPS Anncmt.: distance from the forecast to the earnings announcement (logarithm) 
• Dispersion of EPS Fcst.: standard deviation of available earnings forecasts (winsorized at 1% level) 
• EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio: leader-follower ratio of the earnings forecast 
• Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy: ex-post accuracy of the earnings forecast 
• Number of Stocks: number of stocks covered by the analyst in the current year (logarithm) 
• Lagged EPS Fcst. Accuracy: firm-specific earnings forecast accuracy of the analyst in the previous year 
• Lagged EPS Fcst Boldness: firm-specific earnings forecast boldness of the analyst in the previous year 
• Analyst Firm Experience: number of years in which the analyst has been following the firm (logarithm) 
• Analyst Experience: number of years in which the analyst has been in I/B/E/S 
• Analyst Status: equals 1 if the analyst has been voted as an All-America analyst recently and 0 otherwise 
• Broker Size: number of analysts working for the broker in the current year (logarithm)  
Detailed variable definitions are presented in subsection 2.2.  
The absolute three-day cumulative abnormal returns are about 5% on average. There are only 10% of analysts’ reports 
containing CapEx forecasts, while this number for sales and cash-flow forecasts are 67% and 14%. The correlation 
matrix does not display any risk of multicollinearity. 
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Table 3: Information Content of CapEx Forecasts (Forecast Level) 
 Model I(a)  Model I(b) 
CapEx Forecast Dummy 0.257 ***   
 (8.99)    
Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy   0.224 ** 
   (2.29)  
Sales Forecast Dummy 0.638 *** 0.583 *** 
 (17.12)  (3.82)  
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy -0.083 ** -0.111 * 
 (-2.54)  (-1.71)  
EPS Fcst. Deviation 2.118 *** 2.169 *** 
 (14.97)  (8.17)  
Positive EPS Fcst. -0.108 *** -0.279 *** 
 (-2.71)  (-3.05)  
Distance to EPS Anncmt. -0.012  0.099  
 (-0.16)  (0.89)  
Dispersion of EPS Fcst. 0.431 ** 1.005 *** 
 (2.55)  (3.21)  
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio 0.036 *** 0.036 ** 
 (5.04)  (2.12)  
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.825 *** 0.877 *** 
 (13.45)  (6.26)  
Number of Stocks 0.014  0.075  
 (0.75)  (1.36)  
Lagged EPS Fcst. Accuracy -0.060 ** -0.073  
 (-2.24)  (-0.85)  
Lagged EPS Fcst. Boldness 0.153 *** -0.094  
 (4.12)  (-0.62)  
Analyst Firm Experience 0.013  -0.006  
 (0.87)  (-0.10)  
Analyst Experience 0.056 *** 0.146 ** 
 (3.94)  (2.23)  
Analyst Status -0.044 * -0.232 ** 
 (-1.96)  (-2.40)  
Broker Size 0.048 *** 0.144 *** 
 (3.69)  (3.69)  
Constant 3.511 *** 2.596 *** 
 (9.11)  (3.78)  
Firm-Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
R2 0.019  0.017  
N 399,192  37,822  
 
This table presents regression results of Model I(a) and Model I(b) over the period from 2006 to 2011. 
• Model I(a): Absolute	Abnormal	Returns = α + β ∗ CapEx	Forecast	Dummy + Γ ∗ Controls + ε  
• Model I(b): Absolute	Abnormal	Returns = α + β ∗ CapEx	Forecast	Accuracy + Γ ∗ Controls + ε  
These models include firm-year fixed effects. Positive coefficients of CapEx Forecast Dummy and Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. 
Accuracy suggest that the market reacts more strongly to analysts’ reports containing CapEx forecasts and even 
stronger to ex-post accurate CapEx forecasts. The results support Hypothesis 1(a) and Hypothesis 1(b). * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01, t-statistics in parentheses.               
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Analyst-Firm-Year Level) 
Panel 1: Distribution 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
CapEx Fcst. Dummy 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lagged CapEx Dummy Other Firm 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio 0.43 0.28 0.00 0.13 0.49 0.65 1.00 
Analyst Broker Tenure 1.32 0.77 0.00 0.69 1.39 1.95 3.40 
Analyst Firm Experience 1.09 0.78 0.00 0.69 1.10 1.61 3.40 
Number of EPS Fcst. 1.25 0.68 0.00 0.69 1.39 1.79 5.18 
Number of Stocks 2.63 0.65 0.00 2.40 2.71 3.00 4.60 
Broker Size 3.59 1.04 0.00 2.94 3.66 4.48 5.26 
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.50 0.30 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 
Analyst Status 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Lagged Market Capitalization 7.65 1.77 1.25 6.38 7.54 8.86 13.13 
Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio -0.84 0.83 -10.71 -1.29 -0.77 -0.30 2.82 
Lagged Cash 0.19 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.26 1.00 
Lagged Net Income 0.02 0.17 -9.20 0.00 0.04 0.08 4.83 
Lagged Capital Expenditure 0.06 0.08 -0.15 0.01 0.03 0.07 2.01 
Lagged Share Turnover 14.56 0.87 7.32 14.10 14.64 15.13 17.89 
N 108,825       
 
Panel 2: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
CapEx Fcst. Dummy 1                 
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy 2 .53                
Lagged CapEx Dummy Other Firm 3 .47 .53               
Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio 4 .41 .38 .54              
Analyst Broker Tenure 5 -.06 .06 .10 -.04             
Analyst Firm Experience 6 -.02 .16 .10 .04 .43            
Number of EPS Fcst. 7 .06 .11 .07 .02 .11 .23           
Number of Stocks 8 -.04 .02 .13 .04 .30 .21 .19          
Broker Size 9 .06 .06 .06 .07 .08 .00 .08 .13         
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 10 .04 .02 .03 .04 -.00 .02 .17 .04 .02        
Analyst Status 11 .02 .03 .03 -.01 .15 .18 .09 .15 .29 .02       
Lagged Market Capitalization 12 .08 .07 .03 .00 .05 .19 .13 -.03 .15 -.00 .16      
Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio 13 -.07 -.04 -.07 -.01 .04 .07 .04 .06 -.01 .01 .01 -.20     
Lagged Cash 14 -.05 -.05 -.02 .02 -.07 -.13 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.00 -.08 -.25 -.34    
Lagged Net Income 15 .06 .05 .04 -.00 .04 .06 .05 -.01 .06 -.00 .03 .33 -.04 -.28   
Lagged Capital Expenditure 16 .10 .09 .11 .02 -.04 -.04 .09 .02 -.04 .00 -.00 .02 -.06 -.15 .05  
Lagged Share Turnover 17 .05 .07 .08 .08 -.01 .10 .14 .08 -.00 .01 .04 .12 -.01 .05 .06 .10 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in Model II(a) over the period from 2007 to 2011 with more 
than 150,000 analyst-firm-year observations.  
• CapEx Fcst. Dummy: equals 1 if the analyst issue at least one CapEx Forecast on the firm in the current year and 0 
otherwise 
• Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy: equals 1 if the analyst issue at least one CapEx forecast on the firm in the previous year 
and 0 otherwise 
• Lagged CapEx Fcst. Other Firm: equals 1 if the analyst issue at least one CapEx forecast on any firm other than the 
focal firm in the previous year and 0 otherwise 
• Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio: number of analysts issuing at least one forecasts over number of analysts working for 
the broker in the previous year (to measure the social norm) 
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• Analyst Broker Tenure: number of years in which the analyst has been working for the broker (logarithm) 
• Analyst Firm Experience: number of years in which the analyst has been following the firm (logarithm) 
• Number of EPS Fcst.: number of earnings forecast given by the analyst on the firm (logarithm) 
• Number of Stocks: number of stocks covered by the analyst in the current year (logarithm) 
• Broker Size: number of analysts working for the broker in the current year (logarithm)  
• Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy: ex-post accuracy of the earnings forecast 
• Analyst Status: equals 1 if the analyst has been voted as an All-America analyst recently and 0 otherwise 
• Lagged Market Capitalization: market value of the common shares at the end of the most current fiscal year 
(logarithm) 
• Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio = book value over market value of common shares at the end of the most current fiscal 
year (logarithm). 
• Lagged Cash = cash and short-term investments on total assets at the end of the most current fiscal year  
• Lagged Net Income = net income on total assets at the end of the most current fiscal year  
• Lagged Capital Expenditure = capital expenditure on total assets at the end of the most current fiscal year  
Detailed variable definitions are presented in the subsection 3.2.  
There are 27% of analyst-firm-years are associated with CapEx forecasts, while this figure for the previous year is only 
20%. There are about 43% of analysts issuing at least one CapEx forecast in a year.   
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Table 5: Capital Expenditures Forecast Issuance (Analyst-Firm-Year Level) 
 Model II(a) Marg. Effects Model II(b) Marg. Effects 
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy 1.789 *** 0.222 *** 1.748 *** 0.245 *** 
 (41.49)  (37.81)  (83.66)  (27.18)  
Lagged CapEx Dummy Other Firm 1.079 *** 0.134 *** 1.006 *** 0.141 *** 
 (23.21)  (25.12)  (46.84)  (23.27)  
Lagged Broker CapEx Ratio 2.810 *** 0.350 *** 2.947 *** 0.413 *** 
 (36.79)  (34.85)  (68.08)  (30.29)  
Analyst Broker Tenure -0.328 *** -0.041 *** -0.336 *** -0.047 *** 
 (-11.60)  (-10.99)  (-27.06)  (-19.88)  
Analyst Firm Experience -0.418 *** -0.052 *** -0.402 *** -0.056 *** 
 (-14.95)  (-15.43)  (-30.77)  (-20.13)  
Number of EPS Fcst. 0.199 *** 0.025 *** 0.228 *** 0.032 *** 
 (9.06)  (8.93)  (15.18)  (14.33)  
Number of Stocks -0.282 *** -0.035 *** -0.256 *** -0.036 *** 
 (-10.29)  (-10.61)  (-16.04)  (-11.54)  
Broker Size 0.127 *** 0.016 *** 0.132 *** 0.019 *** 
 (5.50)  (5.44)  (14.20)  (16.82)  
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.290 *** 0.036 *** 0.259 *** 0.036 *** 
 (9.30)  (9.25)  (9.38)  (9.46)  
Analyst Status 0.199 *** 0.025 *** 0.202 *** 0.028 *** 
 (2.80)  (2.76)  (6.72)  (6.29)  
Lagged Market Capitalization 0.057 *** 0.007 ***     
 (7.62)  (7.66)      
Lagged Book-to-Market Ratio -0.060 *** -0.007 ***     
 (-2.96)  (-2.96)      
Lagged Cash -0.504 *** -0.063 ***     
 (-4.56)  (-4.59)      
Lagged Net Income 0.346 *** 0.043 ***     
 (3.89)  (3.85)      
Lagged Capital Expenditure 0.157  0.020      
 (0.92)  (0.91)      
Lagged Share Turnover -0.008  -0.001      
 (-0.45)  (-0.45)      
Constant -3.004 ***       
 (-10.68)        
Industry-Year Fixed Effects yes        
Firm-Year Fixed Effects     yes    
Pseudo-R2 0.369    0.367    
N 108,825  108,825  120,355  120,355  
 
This table presents the regression results of Models II(a) and II(b) over the period from 2007 to 2011. 
Model II(a): P&CapEx	Fcst. Dummmy( = α + Β ∗ Analyst	Characteristics + C ∗ Firm	Characteristics	 + ε 
This model includes industry-year fixed effects to capture effects of firm characteristics, and clustering by industry-year 
to capture heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation among industries 
Model II(b): P&CapEx	Fcst. Dummmy( = α + Β ∗ Analyst	Characteristics + ε  
This model includes firm-year fixed effects to capture effects of firm characteristics, and clustering by industry-year to 
capture heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation among industries 
• Hypothesis 2(a) predicts positive coefficients of Lagged CapEx Fcst. Dummy, Lagged CapEx Fcst. Other Firm, and 
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Other Firm 
• Hypothesis 2(b) predicts negative coefficients of Analyst Broker Tenure and  Analyst Firm Experience 
• Hypothesis 2(c) predicts a positive coefficient of Number of EPS Fcst.  
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• Hypothesis 2(d) predicts a negative coefficient of  Number of Stocks 
• Hypothesis 2(e) predict positive coefficients of Broker Size, Ex-Post EPS Fcst., and Analyst Status 
The table also demonstrates that bigger firms, growth firms, profitable firms, and firms with less cash attract more 
CapEx forecasts. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, t-statistics in parentheses.               
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Analysts with CapEx Forecasts (Analyst-Firm-Year Level) 
Panel 1: Description 
Panel 2: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 1          
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 2 .11         
Distance to EPS Anncmt. 3 -.15 -.04        
CapEx Experience 4 .04 .03 -.01       
Analyst Experience 5 .03 .03 -.02 .52      
Number of EPS Fcst. 6 .04 .01 -.10 .19 .19     
Number of Stocks 7 .02 .01 -.00 .33 .35 .19    
Broker Size 8 .01 -.01 -.03 .06 .01 .06 .21   
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 9 .05 .01 -.10 .05 .06 .14 .06 .01  
Analyst Status 10 .01 -.00 -.04 .09 .17 .10 .16 .29 .02 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in Model III(a) and Model III(b) over the period from 2007 to 
2011 with nearly 36,000 analyst-firm-year observations.  
• Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy: ex-post accuracy of the CapEx forecast 
• Lagged CapEx Fcst. Accuracy: accuracy of the CapEx forecast in the previous year 
• Distance to EPS Anncmt.: distance from the forecast to the earnings announcement (logarithm) 
• CapEx Experience: number of years in which the analyst has been issuing CapEx forecasts (logarithm)    
• Analyst Experience: number of years in which the analyst has been in I/B/E/S (logarithm)    
• Number of EPS Fcst.: number of earnings forecast given by the analyst on the firm (logarithm) 
• Number of Stocks: number of stocks covered by the analyst in the current year (logarithm) 
• Broker Size: number of analysts working for the broker in the current year (logarithm)  
• Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy: ex-post accuracy of the earnings forecast 
• Analyst Status: equals 1 if the analyst has been voted as an All-America analyst recently and 0 otherwise 
Detailed variable definitions are presented in subsection 4.2.  
  
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Ex-Post CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 0.50 0.35 0 0.20 0.50 0.80 1 
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 0.52 0.35 0 0.24 0.50 0.83 1 
Distance to EPS Anncmt. 4.72 0.81 0 4.48 4.70 5.28 6.16 
CapEx Experience 1.02 0.58 0 0.69 1.10 1.39 1.95 
Analyst Experience 1.82 0.85 0 1.39 1.95 2.40 3.40 
Number of EPS Fcst. 1.32 0.65 0 1.10 1.39 1.79 3.83 
Number of Stocks 2.59 0.66 0 2.40 2.71 3.00 4.25 
Broker Size 3.70 0.99 0 3.09 3.78 4.52 5.13 
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.51 0.29 0 0.28 0.50 0.75 1 
Analyst Status 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1 
N 35,906       
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Table 7: Capital Expenditure Forecast Accuracy (Analyst-Firm-Year Level)  
 Model III(a)  Model III(b)  
Lagged CapEx Fcst. Accuracy   0.101 *** 
   (10.64)  
Distance to EPS Anncmt. -0.073 *** -0.093 *** 
 (-20.89)  (-14.99)  
CapEx Experience 0.027 *** 0.036 ** 
 (4.87)  (2.58)  
Analyst Experience 0.002  0.007  
 (0.47)  (1.12)  
Number of EPS Fcst. 0.012 *** 0.041 *** 
 (2.79)  (5.00)  
Number of Stocks -0.001  0.002  
 (-0.19)  (0.21)  
Broker Size 0.000  -0.004  
 (0.10)  (-0.85)  
Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.047 *** 0.013  
 (5.71)  (1.01)  
Analyst Status 0.002  -0.013  
 (0.20)  (-1.06)  
Constant 0.771 *** 0.788 *** 
 (35.34)  (18.46)  
Firm-Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Pseudo-R2 0.030  0.056  
N 35,906  14,643  
 
This table presents regression results of Model III(a) and III(b) over the period from 2007 to 2011. 
• Model III(a): CapEx	Fcst. Accuracy = α + Β ∗ Analyst	Characteristics + ε  
• Model III(b): CapEx	Fcst. Accuracy = α + β ∗ Lagged	CapEx	Fcst.		Accuracy + Β ∗ Analyst	Characteristics + ε   
These models include firm-year fixed effects to capture effects of firm characteristics.  
• Hypothesis 3(a) predicts a negative coefficient of Distance to EPS Anncmt.  
• Hypothesis 3(b) predicts a positive coefficient of CapEx Experience 
• Hypothesis 3(c) predicts a positive coefficient of Lagged CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 
• Hypothesis 3(d) predicts a positive coefficient of Number of EPS Fcst. and a negative coefficient of Number of 
Stocks 
• Hypothesis 3(e) predicts positive coefficients of Broker Size, Ex-Post EPS Fcst. Accuracy, and Analyst Status 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, t-statistics in parentheses.               
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (Analyst-Year Level) 
Panel 1: Description 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Professional Discontinuation 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 
CapEx Fcst. Dummy 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
CapEx Fcst. Accuracy 0.48 0.26 0 0.33 0.50 0.63 1 
Sales Forecast Dummy 0.89 0.31 0 1 1 1 1 
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
EPS Fcst. Accuracy 0.50 0.18 0 0.40 0.51 0.60 1 
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio -0.20 0.89 -4.60 -0.75 -0.22 0.33 4.50 
EPS Fcst. Boldness 0.50 0.11 0 0.44 0.50 0.55 1 
Walk-Down Score 0.20 0.22 0 0 0.17 0.31 1 
Number of EPS Fcst. 1.27 0.51 0 0.99 1.34 1.61 4.08 
Number of Stocks 2.06 0.93 0 1.61 2.30 2.71 4.60 
Analys Status 0.06 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 
Broker Size 3.44 1.18 0 2.71 3.53 4.38 5.26 
Analyst Experience 1.55 0.88 0 0.69 1.61 2.20 3.37 
N 16,289       
Panel 2: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Professional Discontinuation 1             
CapEx Fcst. Dummy 2 -.13            
Sales Forecast Dummy 3 -.03 .25           
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy 4 -.03 .24 .09          
EPS Fcst. Accuracy 5 -.28 .07 .02 -.01         
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio 6 -.06 -.01 -.02 .04 .07        
EPS Fcst. Boldness 7 .04 -.01 -.00 .03 -.15 .11       
Walk-Down Score 8 -.07 .04 .06 -.02 .14 .00 .00      
Number of EPS Fcst. 9 -.37 .09 .00 .11 .27 .11 .04 .11     
Number of Stocks 10 -.25 .13 .09 -.05 .09 .03 -.04 .08 .21    
Analys Status 11 -.08 .03 .05 .01 .05 .07 .03 .04 .16 .18   
Broker Size 12 -.03 .04 .15 .02 .04 .21 .04 .01 .12 .14 .25  
Analyst Experience 13 -.09 .07 .05 -.01 .04 -.00 .03 .07 .18 .38 .17 -.01 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in Model IV(a) and Model IV(b) over the period from 2006 
to 2010 with more than 16,000 analyst-year observations and turn-over rate is 15% per year. 
• Professional Discontinuation: equals 1 if the analyst is not in I/B/E/S in the following year and 0 otherwise  
• CapEx Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if  the analyst issues at least one CapEx forecast  this year and 0 otherwise 
• Sales Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if the analyst issues at least one sales forecast this year and 0 otherwise  
• Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy: equals 1 if the analyst issue at least one cash-flow forecast this year and 0 otherwise  
• CapEx Fcst. Accuracy: average forecast accuracy of all CapEx forecasts given by the analyst this year 
• EPS Fcst. Accuracy: average forecast accuracy of all earnings forecasts given by the analyst this year 
• EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio: average leader-follower ratio of all earnings forecasts given by the analyst this year 
• EPS Fcst Boldness: average forecast boldness of all earnings forecasts given by the analyst this year 
• Walk-Down Score: walk-down rate over all firms covered by the analyst this year 
• Number of EPS Fcst.: average number of earnings forecast given by the analyst per stock (logarithm) 
• Number of Stocks: number of stocks covered by the analyst in the current year (logarithm) 
• Broker Size: number of analysts working for the broker in the current year (logarithm)  
• Analyst Status: equals 1 if the analyst has been voted as an All-America analyst recently and 0 otherwise 
(Continued) 
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Detailed variable definitions are presented in subsection 5.2.  
The table shows that 41% of analysts are issuing at least one CapEx forecast, while the percentage of analysts  issuing 
at least one sales (or cash-flow) forecast is 89% (or 26%). On average, analysts walk-down on 20% of the covered 
firms, issue 3.6 earnings forecasts per stock, cover 7.8 stocks, are from broker size of 31 analysts,  and have 4.7 years of 
experience.  
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Table 9: Professional Discontinuation (Analyst-Year Level) 2006-2010 
 Model IV(a) Marg. Eff. Model IV(b) Marg. Eff. 
CapEx Fcst. Dummy -0.542 *** -0.044 ***     
 (-9.15)  (-9.18)      
CapEx Fcst. Accuracy     -0.564 *** -0.030 *** 
     (-3.21)  (-3.21)  
Sales Forecast Dummy 0.165 ** 0.013 ** 0.109  0.006  
 (2.07)  (2.07)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
Cash-Flow Forecast Dummy -0.029  -0.002  -0.092  -0.005  
 (-0.47)  (-0.47)  (-0.90)  (-0.90)  
EPS Fcst. Accuracy -2.656 *** -0.216 *** -2.794 *** -0.148 *** 
 (-19.76)  (-19.17)  (-10.00)  (-9.61)  
EPS Fcst. L-F Ratio -0.047 * -0.004 * -0.139 ** -0.007 ** 
 (-1.80)  (-1.80)  (-2.53)  (-2.52)  
EPS Fcst. Boldness 0.129  0.011  0.447  0.024  
 (0.70)  (0.70)  (1.15)  (1.15)  
Walk-Down Score 0.018  0.001  0.095  0.005  
 (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.47)  (0.47)  
Number of EPS Fcst. -1.799 *** -0.146 *** -1.334 *** -0.071 *** 
 (-33.39)  (-32.39)  (-12.35)  (-12.26)  
Number of Stocks -0.525 *** -0.043 *** -0.622 *** -0.033 *** 
 (-18.19)  (-17.84)  (-10.85)  (-10.51)  
Analys Status -0.487 *** -0.040 *** 0.029  0.002  
 (-2.83)  (-2.85)  (0.12)  (0.12)  
Broker Size 0.111 *** 0.009 *** 0.086 * 0.005 * 
 (5.15)  (5.14)  (1.93)  (1.92)  
Analyst Experience 0.114 *** 0.009 *** 0.026  0.001  
 (3.83)  (3.81)  (0.45)  (0.45)  
Constant 1.739 ***   0.601    
 (10.63)    (1.11)    
Year Fixed Effects yes    yes    
Pseudo R2 0.25    0.19    
N 16,289  16,289  6,030  6,030  
 
This table presents regression results of Model IV(a) and IV(b) over the period from 2006 to 2010. 
• Model IV (a): Pr&Professional	Discontinuation( = α + β ∗ CapEx	Fcst.		Dummy + Γ ∗ Controls + ε   
• Model IV (b): Pr&Professional	Discontinuation( = α + β ∗ CapEx	Fcst.		Accuracy + Γ ∗ Controls + ε 
These models include year fixed effects.  
• Hypothesis IV(a) predicts a negative coefficient of CapEx Forecast Dummy 
• Hypothesis IV(b) predicts a negative coefficient of CapEx Fcst. Accuracy  
Analysts who issue CapEx forecasts are 4.4% less likely to leave the profession than those who do not. The most 
accurate CapEx forecasters are 3% less likely to leave the profession than those issuing less accurate CapEx forecasts. 
Consistent with prior research, more accurate earnings forecasters, leaders, more active analysts, and higher status 
analysts are less likely to leave the profession. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, t-statistics in parentheses.               
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Chapter III: Does Lehman’s Collapse Confirm Equity Underwriting Relationship Value? 
This paper re-examines the question of the underwriting relationship value proposed by Fernando, 
May & Megginson in the Journal of Finance (2012). The authors find that Lehman’s underwriting 
clients had abnormal returns of nearly 3% below the abnormal returns of comparable banks’ 
underwriting clients in the seven day period around Lehman’s collapse. Additionally, they argue 
that the fell in market valuation came from the underwriting relationship value destroyed by the 
collapse. I show that these clients reacted differently to Lehman’s collapse mainly because they 
were in different industries and were characteristically different. Lehman’s clients belonged to more 
affected industries and had characteristics which were associated with more severe side-effects of 
the collapse than clients of other big banks. Specifically, the marginal effect of being a Lehman 
client reduces from -2.7% to around -0.3% (i. e. insignificant) after controlling for industry and firm 
characteristics.  This means that it is invalid to reject the null hypothesis, namely that being a 
Lehman’s client has no marginal effect on the stock price reaction to Lehman’s collapse.  
JEL classification: G24, G01 
Keywords:  Lehman Brothers, Collapse, Underwriting Relationship, Market Reactions 
1 Introduction 
The Lehman bankruptcy was a shock to the underwriting services industry because Lehman was a 
major underwriting services provider, occupying the sixth position in total proceeds from global 
debt, equity and equity-related transactions in 2008. Fernando et al. (2012) (FMM hereafter) try to 
measure the magnitude of the firms’ portion in the value created from the equity underwriting 
relationship by comparing the reactions to the collapse between Lehman’s former equity 
underwriting clients (Lehman’s clients hereafter) and former clients of the other top 10 underwriters 
(other big banks’ clients hereafter), namely Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP 
Morgan, Citibank, UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, and Wachovia. They 
argue that the value created from the equity underwriting relationship between Lehman and former 
Lehman’s clients vanished with the collapse, while this did not happen to other banks and their 
clients. The average seven-day cumulative abnormal returns in the period from five days before the 
event to one day after the event obtained from Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (CAR7 
hereafter) of Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ clients were -4.85% and -1.91%; the difference 
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between these two values was nearly -3%, which is statistically and economically significant. The 
results remain even after excluding firms with a lending relationship to Lehman. FMM claim that 
this -3% is mostly due to the value of the equity underwriting relationship destroyed by the 
collapse.  
I have three concerns about their methodology. First, Lehman’s collapse was not simply a shock to 
the underwriting industry; it was a shock to the whole economy. It was the most remarkable event 
of the credit crunch period (2007-2009). The S&P 500 index went down by 4.7% in the day of the 
bankruptcy announcement, the 15th of September 2008. In addition, there were multiple events 
happening around that fateful 15th of September. During the weekend before the event, Bank of 
America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch was announced (Sorkin 2008). On the day after the event, 
the 16th of September 2008, the large insurer American International Group (AIG)’s credit rating 
was downgraded, which required the company to supply additional collaterals, pushing AIG close 
to default if it could not find additional liquidity. The credit crisis had truly begun with an additional 
drop of 4.5% in the S&P 500 index the day after, the 17th of September, 2008.  
Second, firms with different characteristics were affected differently by Lehman’s collapse and 
other events around the collapse. I study how different industries were affected by Lehman’s 
collapse. I calculate average abnormal returns of firms in industries classified by two-digit SIC 
codes, excluding Lehman’s and other big bank’s clients, and observe that different industries 
responded differently to the collapse. Some industries experienced significant negative abnormal 
returns around the collapse, e. g. metal mining, coal mining, oil and gas extraction, and local and 
interurban passenger transit, while some other industries experienced positive abnormal returns  or 
were not significantly affected by the collapse. In addition, Tong & Wei (2010) use Lehman’s 
collapse as an event study to examine the effects of the credit crunch on firms over 24 emerging 
countries. The estimated coefficients of their control variables indicate that bigger and less levered 
firms are less affected by the collapse. FMM’s cross-sectional analysis of Lehman’s clients also 
points out that younger, smaller and more financially constrained clients were more affected by the 
collapse than others.  
Third, there is a hidden assumption behind FMM’s methodology that Lehman’s clients and other 
big banks’ clients were similarly affected by the collapse, except that Lehman’s clients had 
additional effects because of their lost underwriting relationship. However, if Lehman’s clients were 
not comparable with other big banks’ clients in term of firm characteristics, then FMM’s results 
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may not be correct. Therefore, I would like to examine the following null hypothesis, taking into 
account the characteristics of the banks’ clients. 
Null hypothesis: Being Lehman’s client had no marginal effect on the stock’s reaction to Lehman’s 
collapse. 
The extant literature has different views on the relationship between firms and their investment 
banks, which partially support and reject the null hypothesis. There are many papers suggesting that 
the relationship between investment banks and their clients creates values through different 
channels. Investment banks may play a monitoring role to constrain their clients’ managers from 
value-destroying decisions (Hansen & Torregrosa 1992). Investment banks also may create value 
through their relationship with institutional investor networks19. Some authors argue that firms 
experience switching costs when they move from an underwriter to another one20, although 
Krigman et al. (2001) document a high frequency of underwriter switching among client firms. On 
the other hand, there are papers showing that the underwriting relationship is short-lived21, which 
would suggest that Lehman’s collapse had little effect on firms which have had an underwriting 
relationship with Lehman in the distant past.  
In addition, Lehman’s collapse was not a total evaporation of the bank. Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt because it held large positions in sub-prime and low-rated mortgage tranches in structured 
finance. Meanwhile, the investment-banking division was profitable and was a likely candidate for 
acquisition by other banks, e. g. Barclays and Bank of America, in case of a bank collapse. In fact, 
only one day after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman, Barclays declared its interest in the investment-
banking and trading divisions (Teather & Clark 2008). Barclays would retain the inherited 
relationship between Lehman and its former clients after the acquisition. Therefore, Lehman’s 
clients would not lose all the value, if there was any, of their relationship with Lehman.  
I reexamine Lehman’s collapse from a different angle, namely that the bank’s collapse and other 
events around the collapse affected every firm in the economy. I examine whether Lehman’s clients 
were more affected due to their lost relationship, and I have three findings. First, by running a 
regression of the CAR7 on characteristic variables over the firms which had no underwriting 
relationship with any big bank controlling for industry abnormal returns, I find that the event 
                                                    
19(Benveniste & Spindt 1989; Cornelli & Goldreich 2001; Ritter & Welch 2002) 
20(Burch et al. 2005; Ellis et al. 2000) 
21(Ellis et al. 2000; Schultz & Zaman 1994; Aggarwal 2000; Corwin et al. 2004) 
Chapter III 
87 
 
affected mostly small, young, high market-to-book ratio, and potentially distressed firms. This 
finding is consistent with FMM and Tong & Wei (2010). 
Second, I use t-tests to compare characteristics of Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ clients and 
find that Lehman’s clients, on average, were from more severely affected industries compared to the 
clients of other big banks. For example, nearly 16% of Lehman’s clients (compared to 7% of other 
big banks’ clients) were in the oil and gas extraction industry and this industry was severely harmed 
by the collapse of Lehman. In addition, Lehman’s clients were, on average, significantly bigger, 
younger, more levered and closer to potential distress than other big banks’ clients.  
Third, I find no significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis after controlling for the client 
firms’ industries and characteristics. Industry abnormal returns played a crucial role in explaining 
the difference in average the CAR7 of Lehman and other big banks’ clients. Characteristic variables 
also had contribution to explain that difference. To illustrate the importance of industry factor, I 
exclude the oil and gas extraction industry and calculate the difference between average abnormal 
returns of Lehman and other big banks’ clients. Surprisingly, the difference is only -1.3% and 
statistically insignificant, while the difference is -2.7% and statistically significant if the oil and gas 
extraction industry is included. To formally test the null hypothesis, I use the ordinary linear 
regression (OLS) method to capture the marginal effect of being Lehman’s clients, controlling for 
industry abnormal returns and firm characteristics. The regression includes the dependent variable 
of seven-day abnormal returns, i. e. the CAR7, of Lehman and other big banks’ clients and the 
independent variable LehmanClient, which equals to 1 if the firm was Lehman’s client and equals 
zero otherwise. After controlling for industry abnormal returns, but not firm characteristics, the 
marginal effect of being Lehman client drops from -2.7% to -0.9% and becomes insignificant. To 
avoid endogeneity issues, I define the industry abnormal returns based on firms which were not 
Lehman’s clients, nor other big banks’ clients. When I control for industry abnormal returns and 
firm characteristics, the marginal effect decreases further to about -0.3% and it is not significant. 
Using a number of setting modifications in the robustness checks, I  find that the difference in the 
CAR7 between Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ client is economically significant if Lehman’s 
clients are not clients of any other big banks. Due to the small number of observations, it is not 
statistically significant.  
My paper contributes to the existing literature in two dimensions. Firstly, it contributes to the 
literature on the effects of financial shocks on the economy. Some industries were heavily affected 
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by the collapse while others were not, and less reputable and more risky firms were hit harder by 
the event. Secondly, it discards the finding of FMM that Lehman’s clients reacted more strongly to 
the Lehman’s collapse than other big banks’ clients because of the destroyed relationship value. My 
results are consistent with studies showing that the value of market making provided by 
underwriters is short-lived22. Nevertheless, my paper does not reject the existence of underwriting 
relationship value, nor rejects the significance of clients’ share in this value. The insignificant 
reaction of Lehman’s clients to the bank’s collapse may be because the value of their relationship 
was not destroyed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cumulative abnormal stock 
returns around Lehman’s collapse. Section 3 discusses the effects of Lehman’s collapse on non-
Lehman-client firms. Section 4 illustrates the differences between Lehman and other big banks’ 
clients and tests the marginal effects of being a Lehman client on the stock price reaction to the 
collapse. I discuss some robustness checks in section 5, and the conclusion comes at the end.    
2 Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns around Lehman’s Collapse  
2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Calculation 
I use the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model to calculate the CAR7 of firms. FMM use five 
methods, namely the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, the Fama-French three-factor model, 
the capital market model, the size-book-to-market matched model and the industry-size matched 
model, which provide similar results when evaluating the difference in abnormal returns between 
Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients. I use the four-factor model for the detailed analysis because 
it is the most advanced model for capital asset pricing among models used by FMM. Other selected 
models are used in the robustness check section. For each stock i, I run the following regression: 
v, − v3, = 8 + Gv0, + Oe + ℎ~ + zu9 + , 
The setting in the regression is similar to FMM.  v is the return of stock i at day t minus risk-free 
rate on day t, v0, is market premium on day t, and e,~, u9 are the returns to the small-
minus-big (SMB), high-minus-low (HML), and up-minus-down (UMD) portfolios to capture size, 
book-to-market, and return momentum effects, respectively. Parameters 8, G, O, ℎ, and z are 
                                                    
22(Ellis et al. 2000; Schultz & Zaman 1994; Aggarwal 2000; Corwin et al. 2004) 
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estimated using data from day minus 290 to day minus 31 (day zero is the event date, the 15th of 
September 2008). Abnormal returns of stock i during the event window, i. e. the event window is 
from day minus 5 to day plus 1, are calculated from the following equation: 
]v = v − v3, − N812 + G13v0, + O12e + ℎ13~ + z12u9Q 
After having abnormal returns for every single day in the event window for all stocks, abnormal 
returns are summed over seven days (from day minus 5 to day plus 1) for each stock to obtain 
seven-day cumulative abnormal return for stock i, which is denoted as CAR7 for short.  
2.2 Data 
The share price and daily stock returns data are extracted from CRSP. I keep firms with at least 30 
data points in the pre-event window (-290,-31) (the event date, day zero, is the 15th of September 
2008) and with all 7 data points in the event window (-5, +1). The characteristics data of these firms 
is taken from Compustat and I keep the firms which do not miss the total assets variable or the 
CUSIP code. I extract only common stock deals from data on equity underwriting deals, which are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters. Data of risk free rate, market premium, small-minus-big, high-
minus-low, and up-minus-down, is taken from Kenneth R. French’s website.    
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 illustrates the process of data refining. From the CRSP data of 6,832 firms and Compustat 
data of 9,865 firms, I use CUSIP codes to obtain 4,667 matched firms. From Thomson Reuters, 
2,568 firms had at least one common equity underwriting deal with at least one of top eleven banks, 
namely Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citibank, UBS, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, Wachovia and Lehman Brothers, in ten years before the 
bankruptcy date. 442 firms of those were Lehman clients and 2,146 firms were clients of the other 
top ten banks. However, only 249 Lehman clients and 999 other big banks’ clients are matched with 
CRSP and Compustat data. The data of other firms are not available because they went bankrupt or 
delisted or the data from Compustat is incomplete. Following FMM, I exclude firms with SIC code 
beginning with 6 (financial firms) and 49 (utility firms), and firms with missing data to calculate 
characteristic variables. 3,289 firm observations are left, in which 173 former Lehman’s clients and 
716 former clients of other top 10 underwriters. These numbers are slightly different from those of 
FMM because of the following three main reasons: first, I define a firm as an equity underwriting 
client of a bank if the bank is one of the managers in at least one of common equity issuances; 
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second, I do not exclude firms with material financial exposure to Lehman; and third, some firms 
have missing data.  
2.3 Overview of the CAR7 
At first glance, Lehman’s clients and clients of other big banks had different cumulative abnormal 
returns. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the CAR7 of three subsets of the sample: Lehman’s 
clients, other big banks’ clients and other firms. On average, the CAR7 of Lehman’s clients were the 
smallest (-4.6%), the CAR7 of other big banks’ clients were the highest (-1.9%) and the CAR7 of 
other firms are in between (-3.5%). If the Lehman bankruptcy is viewed as a shock to the 
underwriting industry, ones could interpret that the firms, which are more likely to need the 
underwriting services from Lehman, will be more severely affected by the collapse. Lehman’s 
former clients were most likely to use services from Lehman again and former clients of other 
banks were least likely to use services from Lehman because they already had a relationship with 
other reputable banks. However, this hypothesis stands only when the differences in the CAR7 
between the two groups are significant after controlling for firm characteristics.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
3 Effects of Lehman’s Collapse on Lehman’s Non-Client Firms 
Lehman’s collapse was not only a shock to the underwriting industry, but also to the whole 
economy. To study the effects of the collapse, which are not due to the loss of the underwriting 
relationship, I study the share price reaction of Lehman’s non-clients to the collapse. Lehman’s non-
clients are defined as firms which did not have any equity underwriting deals with Lehman Brothers 
within the 10 year period before the collapse. Although some of Lehman’s non-clients could be 
potential equity underwriting clients of Lehman, the stock price reactions of these firms to the 
collapse were not due to any loss of established relationships.  
3.1 Testing Methodology 
I run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on firms which are not Lehman’s former clients. On 
the left hand side of the regression, I use the 7-day cumulative abnormal price returns to capture the 
effects of Lehman’s collapse on firms, and on the right hand side, I use multiple firm characteristics 
as explanatory variables. Different industries might be exposed to different risk factors, which 
create heteroskedaticity in the standard errors between industries. I run two similar models: the first 
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one controls for heteroskedasticity between industries, and the second one controls for both industry 
fixed effects and heteroskedaticity.  I use two-digit SIC codes to classify firms into industries. 
Model I(a): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + 4 ∗ H~]v]H*v +  
Model I(b):OLS regression, controlling for industry fixed effects and between industry 
heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + 4 ∗ H~]v]H*v +  
H~]v]H*v is a set of characteristics variables of Lehman’s non-client i, which includes: 
logarithm of firms’ market capitalization (MarketValue),  logarithm of firms’ number of days 
appearing in CRSP (Age), market-to-book ratio of firms’ values (MarketToBook), net of firms’ 
debts (i. e. long-term and short-term debts) to cash over market values (NetLeverage), Altman’s Z-
Score (ZScore), and financial distress dummy (DistressDummy). The details of these variables are 
described in Appendix Table 1. A significantly positive estimated coefficient		4 suggests that firms, 
which had a lower value of the corresponding characteristic variable, were more fragile to the shock 
and vice versa. If the estimated coefficient is insignificant, we can conclude that there was no 
significant relation between the corresponding characteristics variable and the stock price response 
to the shock.  
3.2 Data Description 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of characteristics of firms which have no underwriting 
relationship with Lehman. These firms had an average of -3.1% abnormal stock returns in the 7 day 
period around Lehman’s collapse. The average size, age, book-to-market ratio, and net leverage of 
these firms were about $850 million, 10 years, 1.8 times, and 0.1%. Lehman’s non-client firms had 
an average Altman’s Z-Score of 6.1, and 17% of these firms were at the risk of financial distress (i. 
e. the Z-Score is below 1.8). The correlation matrix in Panel B of this table shows no risk of 
multicollinearity.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
3.3 Regression Results 
Table 4 presents regression results of the CAR7 on firm characteristics including firm size, firm age, 
market-to-book ratio, net leverage and distress dummy. Model I(a) in the first column controls for 
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heteroskedasticity between industries, and Model I(b) in the second column controls for industry 
fixed effects and heteroskedasticity between industries. The two models agree on all the signs of the 
estimated coefficients. Firstly, the positive estimated coefficients of MarketValue  and FirmAge 
suggest that smaller and younger firms were more affected by the collapse, which is consistent with 
FMM and Tong & Wei (2010). The difference in the CAR7 between firms at the third and the first 
quartiles in size and age were 3.6% and 1.3%.  
[Insert table 4 about here] 
Secondly, the negative estimated coefficient of MarketToBook suggests that firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios were more affected by the collapse. These firms were growth firms and the 
collapse severely damaged their prospective growth opportunities. Firms at the first quartiles of 
market-to-book ratio experienced 1.3% higher inCAR7 than firms at the third quartiles of market-to-
book ratio. Finally, firms closer to potential financial distress were hit harder by the collapse; on 
average, firms in potential financial distress had 2.6% lower CAR7 compared to firms further away 
from potential financial distress. Meanwhile, Alman’s Z-Score has statistically insignificant 
capability in explaining the stock price reactions to the collapse; the DistressDummy  variable 
proves its dominance over ZScore in this context. 
4 Effects of Lehman’s Collapse on Lehman and Other Big Banks’ Clients 
This section firstly analyzes the differences in industry allocation and firm characteristics between 
Lehman and other big banks’ clients. After that, I study the marginal effects of being Lehman’s 
clients on the stock price reaction to the collapse, controlling for industry and firm characteristics. 
The previous section demonstrated that firms with different characteristics reacted differently to the 
collapse. Therefore, controlling for firm characteristics is necessary when we study the value of the 
underwriting relationship.  
4.1 Testing Methodology 
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regressions to find the marginal effect of being Lehman’s 
clients on the CAR7 of stocks. I perform a cross-sectional regression among firms which are 
common equity underwriting clients of Lehman and other top ten underwriters.  I run five models 
with different levels of control. The general form of these models is: H]v7 = 8 + G ∗
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:ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ +	4 ∗ Hv + , where :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ equals 1 if firm i 
is a former equity underwriting client of Lehman and 0 otherwise. 
Model II(a): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ +  
Model II(b): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ +	4 ∗ H~]v]H*v +  
Model II(c): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ + p ∗ IzO^A]yIv:^	 +  
Model II(d): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ +	4 ∗ H~]v]H*v + p ∗ IzO^A]yIv:^ +  
Model II(e): OLS regression, controlling for industry fixed effects and between industry 
heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^9zJJ +	4 ∗ H~]v]H*v +  
H~]v]H*v is a set of control variables which include some firm characteristics variables: size 
(MarketValue), age (FirmAge), market-to-book ratio (MarketToBook), net leverage (NetLeverage), 
Altman’s Z-Score (ZScore), and distress dummy (DistressDummy). The Lehman bankruptcy is an 
exogenous event to firms’ characterisitcs, thus eliminating endogeneity issues in these models. 
The 7-day cumulative industry abnormal returns variable (IndustryAbnRet) is calcualted as the 
average of the CAR7 of all non-client firms (those are not former clients of any big banks) in the 
industry to isolate the underwriting relationship value from the effects of Lehman’s collapse. This 
variable is a good proxy for the effects of the collapse excluding the effects of the underwriting 
relationship destroyed, and it is exogenous to the effects of the collapse due to the loss of the 
underwriting relationship. IndustryAbnRet does not perfectly capture the effects of the collapse 
excluding the lost underwriting relationship on big banks’ clients due to the differences in firm 
characteristics between client and non-client firms. 
Model II(a) does not contain any control variable, and the estimated coefficient GK  is the same as the 
difference in the CAR7 between Lehman and other big banks’ clients in a simple t-test. This model 
controls for between industry heteroskedasticity, which leads to a lower significance level. Model 
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II(b) controls for firm characteristics, Model II(c) controls for industry abnormal returns, and Model 
II(d) controls for both firm ccharacteristics and  industry abnormal returns. The industry abnormal 
returns variable (IndustryAbnRet) does not capture all the industry related effects of the collapse; 
therefore, I controls for industry fixed effects in Model II(e). The industry fixed effects may be 
endogenous because they partially capture the loss of underwriting relationship of Lehman’s clients.  
If G is significantly negative, we can assert that Lehman’s clients were more affected by the 
collapse than clients of other big banks. It is consistent with FMM and G can be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of being Lehman’s clients on the CAR7. If G is significantly positive, then Lehman 
clients are less affected by the collapse than clients of other big banks. However, it is counter-
intuitive and is unlikely to be the case. If G is insignificant, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
Lehman and other big banks’ clients were equally affected by Lehman’s collapse. An 
insignificant	G will go against FMM’s findings and there could be a number of explanations for 
that. Clients might receive insignificant shares from value created by underwriting relationship, or 
the value of the relationship did not vanish due to the collapse, or the value created by the 
relationship with Lehman was not significant. 
Before applying data into the models, it is worthy to compare the characteristics of Lehman’s and 
other big banks’ clients. Specifically, I examine the difference in industry allocation and firm 
characteristics of the two groups of clients. 
4.2 Variation of the CAR7 over Industries and Industry Allocation of the Big Banks’ Clients 
Figure 1 illustrates the variation in reaction among industries and the allocation of Lehman and 
other big banks’ clients over industries. The top half of Figure 1 presents the average of CAR7 over 
non-client firms (i. e. those are neither clients of Lehman nor clients of other big banks) in each 
industry classified by two-digit SIC code. There is a huge variation among industries. Coal mining 
(SIC code 12), oil and gas extraction (SIC code 13), metal mining (SIC code 10), general building 
contractors (SIC code 15), and local and interurban passenger transit (SIC code 41) industries are 
the most affected industries. While some other industries were unaffected by the collapse such as 
transportation by air (SIC code 45), lumber and good products (SIC code 24), agricultural services 
(SIC code 7), building materials & garden supplies (SIC code 53), and furniture and home 
furnishings stores (SIC code 57). The industry abnormal returns are calculated as average of the 
CAR7 over non-client firms, and the number of non-client firms is presented at the upper border of 
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the figure. Industries with very few number of constituents may have unreliable industry abnormal 
returns.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The bottom half of Figure 1 presents allocations of Lehman and other big banks’ clients over 
industries. The most noticeable difference lies in the oil and gas extraction industry (two-digit SIC 
code 13). About 16% of Lehman’s clients were in this industry while only 7% of other big banks’ 
clients were in this industry, and, this industry was heavily affected by the collapse with industry 
abnormal returns of around -16%.  
Table 5 presents the t-test results between Lehman and other big banks’ clients before and after 
excluding firms in this industry. After excluding firms in this industry the absolute average 
difference between two groups drops from 2.7% (significant) to 1.3% (insignificant). This early 
result confirms the importance of controlling for industry and potentially firms’ characteristics 
when we assess the marginal effect of being Lehman’s clients on the CAR7.   
[Insert table 5 about here] 
4.3 Characteristics of Lehman and Other Big Banks’ Clients  
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the CAR7, firm characteristics, and industry abnormal 
returns of Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients. These firms had abnormal returns of -2.4% 
around the collapse, while the average industry abnormal returns were around -4.1%, and 19% of 
them were Lehman’s former clients. On average, big banks’ clients had $1.5 billion in 
capitalization, 7 years of listing age, 2 times of market-to-book ratio, and 2% of net leverage. In 
addition, the average Altman’s Z-Score was 5.8 and 21% of the big banks’ clients were at potential 
financial distress. The correlation matrix in Panel B does not show any risk of multicollinearity; the 
highest correlation is 0.5 between market-to-book ratio and Z-Score. 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
Panel C of Table 6 illustrates that the characteristics of Lehman’s clients and clients of other big 
banks were significantly different. Leman’s clients carried characteristics related to more severe 
effects from the collapse. Specifically, they were significantly younger, had higher leverage, were 
closer to potential distress, and concentrated in industries which have lower industry abnormal 
returns compared to other big banks’ clients. The only exception was that Lehman clients were 
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bigger and bigger firms were less affected by the collapse. Lehman clients, on average, were 40% 
bigger and 17% younger than their peers. Lehman clients were bearing more risk than other big 
banks’ clients. Lehman clients had significantly higher market net leverage, 10% compared to -
0.4% of other big banks’ clients. Lehman’s clients were less in red zone of potential distress 
compared to their peers; 31% of Lehman’s clients had Z-Scores lowers than 1.8, while only 20% of 
other big banks’ clients had Z-Scores lower than that level. Finally, Lehman’s clients concentrated 
on industries which are more affected by the shocks. The average seven-day cumulative abnormal 
returns of industries where the Lehman clients in was -5.6% while that of other big banks’ clients 
was only -3.7%.  
4.4 Marginal Effect of Being Lehman’ Clients on the CAR7 
Table 7 presents the regression results of 5 models with the same dependent variable, CAR7, and 
independent variable of interest LehmanClient and different sets of control variables. The estimated 
coefficient of the LehmanClient variable represents the marginal effect of being Lehman’s clients 
on CAR7. Model II(a) uses no control variables and has virtually the same estimated coefficients as 
a simple t-test. However the significance level is changed because the between industry 
heteroskedasticity is controlled. The marginal effect is -2.7% and significant at 10% level; this 
result is in line with FMM. Model II(b) controls for characteristic variables including market value, 
firm age, market-to-book ratio, net leverage, Z-Score and distress dummy. Model II(c) controls for 
industry abnormal returns, and Model II(d) controls for both industry abnormal returns and firm 
characteristics. Model II(e) is similar to Model II(d), but controls for industry fixed effects instead 
of industry abnormal returns.  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
The insignificant estimated coefficient of LehmanClient in Model II(b), II(c), II(d), and II(e) 
suggests that being a Lehman’s client did not exert a significant marginal effect on CAR7. In Model 
II(b), controlling for firm characteristics, the marginal effect of LehmanClient decreases from -2.7% 
to about -2.1% and is statistically insignificant. The firm characteristics variables together explain 
around -0.6% of stock abnormal returns of Lehman’s clients. The marginal effect of LehmanClient 
declines dramatically to -0.9 (i. e. statistically and economically insignificant) when the industry 
abnormal returns are controlled for. Firms’ industrial allocations singularly can explain -1.8% of the 
abnormal returns. After controlling for both industry abnormal returns and firm characteristics, the 
marginal effect of LehmanClient drops to around 0.3%, which is minimal. The estimated coefficient 
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of LehmanClient is even positive in Model II(e). However, this positive estimated coefficient 
cannot be interpreted as an underwriting relationship gain to the Lehman’s clients because the 
industry fixed effects partially capture the underwriting relationship loss. 
The estimated coefficient of IndustryAbnRet in Model II(d) has the value of 0.95, which suggests 
that the stock prices of big banks’ clients exhibited similar behavior to stock prices of non-client 
firms in response to the collapse. In addition, the signs of the estimated coefficients of other control 
variables are ,in general, consistent with those of the characteristic model (table 5) and cross-
sectional analysis in FMM. The estimated coefficients of market value and firm age have positive 
signs and estimated coefficients of net leverage and distress dummy have negative signs, although 
the significance level changes from one model to another.  
4.5 Interaction Effects between Lehman’s Client Dummy Variable and Firm Characteristics 
In this sub-section, I study the interaction effects between Lehman’s client dummy (LehmanClient), 
and industry and firm characteristics (IndustryAbnRet and CHARACTER). The interaction terms 
will capture the differences in the sensitivity of the CAR7 to firm characteristics between Lehman 
and other big banks’ clients. I run two models as follows. 
Model III(a): OLS regression, controlling for between industry heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^ +	4 ∗ H~]v]H*v + p ∗ IzO^A]yIv:^ +Φ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^	6	H~]v]H*v + 7 ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^ 	6	IzO^A]yIv:^+	 
Model III(b): OLS regression, controlling for industry fixed effects and between industry 
heteroskedasticity H]v7 = 8 + G ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^ +	4 ∗ H~]v]H*v +Φ ∗ :ℎJxIH_B:I^	6	H~]v]H*v+	 
H~]v]H*v is a set of control variables which include some firm characteristic variables: firm’s 
capitalization (MarketValue), firm’s age (FirmAge), firm’s market-to-book ratio (MarketToBook), 
firm’s net leverage (NetLeverage), firm’s Altman’s Z-Score (ZScore) and distress dummy 
(DistressDummy).  
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[Insert table 8 about here] 
Table 8 presents regression results of Model III(a) and Model III(b). H~]v]H*v and IzO^A]yIv:^ are not shown in the table to save space. The negative estimated coefficient of 
net leverage suggests that the CAR7 of Lehman’s clients were much more sensitive to net leverage 
than the CAR7 of other big banks’ clients. The difference in CAR7 between Lehman’s clients at the 
first and the third quartiles in net leverage is 0.7%, while this number for other big banks’ clients is 
almost zero. The estimated coefficients of other interaction terms remain insignificant. Although 
being Lehman’s clients had no significant marginal effects on the stock price, Lehman’s clients 
with high leverage were hit harder by the collapse than comparable other big banks’ clients. 
In an unreported regression, I include the interaction terms between LehmanClient and industry 
dummies basing on 1-digit SIC codes to capture the effects of being Lehman’s clients on stock price 
reaction to the collapse over different industries. I do not find any significant interaction effects, 
which suggests that there is no specific industry in which the underwriting relationship loss was 
significantly more than other industries.   
5 Robustness Check 
I perform a number of robustness checks by altering settings over four dimensions. For the first 
dimension, different models of calculating cumulative abnormal returns are used, namely the Fama-
French three-factor model and the capital market model. I also use actual cumulative returns as 
dependent variable. In this setting, I control for market risk premium, i. e. coefficient of market 
premium in the capital market model over the pre-event window (-290;-31), and momentum, i. e. 
average returns in the pre-event window (-290;-31),  (Whited & Wu 2006; Tong & Wei 2010) in 
addition to industry abnormal returns and firm characteristics. For my second dimension, three 
levels of relationship are used: firms have Lehman as a lead manager at least once within the 10 
years before the collapse, firms have Lehman as a lead manager in the last equity issuance before 
the collapse, and firms have Lehman as the only big lead manager within the 10 years before the 
collapse. If firms have relationships with other big banks, i. e. firms have alternatives to Lehman, 
then they will be less affected by the loss of equity relationship.  
For the third dimension, I use two definitions of equity underwriting clients. The first one is that a 
firm is a client of a bank if it has at least one common stock underwriting deal with the bank in ten 
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years before Lehman’s collapse. The second one is that a firm is a client of a bank if it uses any of 
the following services of the bank: common stock underwriting, convertible underwriting, equity 
private placements and equity pipeline & registrations. Depending on definitions used, the sets of 
Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients change. Finally, for the forth dimension, I use two horizons 
of relationships: 10 years and 5 years. I cannot further shorten the horizon due to limitations in the 
sample size.   
[Insert table 9 about here] 
Table 9 demonstrates that the marginal effects of being Lehman’s clients are statistically 
insignificant in every setting. These marginal effects are also economically insignificant except 
firms that had equity deals with Lehman, and no equity deals with other big banks. It is potential 
evidence that firms are affected more by an underwriter’s collapse if the firm lacks existing 
relationships with other banks. The number of those firms, however, are only 47 and 35 for 10-year 
and 5-year horizons, and I cannot draw a statistically significant conclusion.  
6 Conclusion 
This paper reexamines the valuation of underwriting relationships using Lehman’s collapse as an 
exogenous shock.  Fernando et al. (2012) argue that Lehman’s former clients had relationships with 
Lehman, and the value of these relationships was destroyed by Lehman’s collapse, while the 
relationships between other banks and their clients remained unaffected by Lehman’s collapse. 
They empirically document that Lehman’s clients experienced lower stock price abnormal returns 
around the collapse compared to other big banks’ clients; however, they do not take into account the 
differences in characteristics of Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients. 
I study the effects of the collapse (and other events around the collapse) on firms which were not 
Lehman’s clients and find that some industries were more affected by the collapse than others. 
Stocks of small, young, growth and potentially distressed firms experienced worse abnormal returns 
around the event. In addition, Lehman’s clients bear many characteristics associated with greater 
damage by the collapse. Lehman’s clients were younger, highly levered, closer to potential financial 
distress, and from more affected industries. The marginal effect of being a Lehman’s client on the 
stock price reaction to the collapse was insignificant after controlling for the differences in 
characteristics between Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients. Nevertheless, I find the stock price 
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abnormal returns of Lehman’s clients were sensitive to leverage, while other big banks’ clients are 
not.   
Although my findings suggests that Lehman’s collapse does not significantly affect its former 
clients more than comparable firms, my findings do not reject the existence of the underwriting 
relationship value. There are three possible explanations for my findings: the relationship was short 
lived, the investment banks captured the majority of the relationship value, or the collapse did not 
destroy the relationship value. My paper urges further research in capturing the value of the 
relationship between investment banks and their clients, and how the value is distributed among 
parties.   
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Figure 1: Industry Abnormal Returns and Firm Allocations 
 
This figure illustrates significant deviation in abnormal returns around Lehman’s collapse over different industries and 
allocations of Lehman and other big banks’ clients over industries. The upper half of the figure displays average CAR(-
5;+1) of firms in industries over two-digit SIC codes classification. The averages are calculated from firms having no 
equity underwriting relationship with any big banks. Some industries are heavily affected by the collapse such as metal 
mining (SIC code 10), coal mining (SIC code 12), oil and gas extraction (SIC code 13), and local and interurban 
passenger transit (SIC code 41). The lower half of the figure displays allocations of Lehman and other big banks’ clients 
over industries. The y-axis on the right hand side presents percentage of firms being allocated in each industry for 
Lehman’s clients (above and in red) and other big banks’ clients (below and in green). The graph illustrates the 
differences in industrial allocations between two groups. The most significant difference is that around 16% of 
Lehman’s clients were in oil and gas extraction industry while around 7% of other big banks’ clients were in this 
industry and this industry was highly affected by the collapse.  
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Table 1: Data Filtering Process 
Types of firms    Lehman’s Clients Other big banks’ Clients All 
Sources of data   Thomson Reuters CRSP Compustat 
Number of firms extracted 422 2,146 6,832 9,865 
Merge CRSP with Compustat   4,667 
Merge with Thomson Reuters 249 999 4,667 
Delete utility and financial firms 189 769 3,498 
Delete firms with missing data 173 716 3,289 
 
This table presents the data filtering process. There are nearly 7,000 firms on CRSP at the time of Lehman’s collapse 
with at least 30 data points in the pre-event windows (-290;-31) and nearly 10,000 firms on Compustat with non-
missing total assets. I match these two samples by using 8-digit CUSIP codes. About 4,700 firms are matched. I define 
a firm as Lehman’s client (or other big banks) if it has Lehman (or other big banks) as a lead manager in at least one 
common stocks deal in 10 years before the collapse. There were nearly 700 Lehman clients and 3,800 clients of other 
big banks in Thomson One data base, in which around 250 Lehman’s clients and around 1,000 other big banks’ clients 
are matched with CRSP and Compustat by using 6-digit CUSIP codes. The unmatched clients might have gone 
bankrupted or delisted. After excluding financial and utility firms and firms with missing data, I have 173 Lehman’s 
clients, 716 clients of other big banks and 2,400 non-client firms. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of CAR(-5;+1) over Sub-Samples 
Firms N      mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Lehman's Clients 173 -4.58 0.13 -0.71 -0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.31 
Other Banks' Clients 716 -1.9 0.13 -1.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 1.19 
Non-Clients 2,400 -3.54 0.11 -0.66 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.32 
Total 3,289 -3.24 0.13 -1.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 1.19 
 
This table presents distributions of CAR(-5;+1) of Lehman’s clients, other big banks’ clients and other firms. On 
average, Lehman’s clients, other big banks’ clients and other firms had average CAR(-5;+1) of -4.6%, -1.9% and -3.5%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Lehman’s Non-Clients 
Panel A: Distributions 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
CAR7 -3.09 12.64 -111.37 -8.45 -1.51 3.80 119.25 
MarketValue 6.74 2.08 1.26 5.26 6.54 8.09 13.86 
FirmAge 8.22 1.12 4.48 7.59 8.41 8.99 10.32 
MarketToBook 0.60 0.58 -0.77 0.18 0.50 0.93 3.85 
NetLeverage 0.00 0.25 -1.84 -0.12 0.00 0.14 0.78 
ZScore 6.07 9.06 -1.77 2.20 3.56 6.11 66.37 
DistressDummy 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 
IndustryAbnRet -3.50 4.83 -23.46 -5.09 -2.61 -2.10 14.60 
N 3,253       
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CAR7 1        
MarketValue 2 .18       
FirmAge 3 .17 .22      
MarketToBook 4 -.08 .13 -.18     
NetLeverage 5 .04 .31 .18 -.12    
ZScore 6 -.07 -.09 -.23 .49 -.25   
DistressDummy 7 -.09 -.02 -.03 -.24 .29 -.27  
IndustryAbnRet 8 .38 .02 .14 -.16 .09 -.13 -.05 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of firms which are neither client of Lehman nor of other big banks. Panel A 
presents distributions of variables and Panel B presents correlation coefficients among variables. The average size, age, 
book-to-market ratio, and net leverage of Lehman’s non-clients were about $850 million, 10 years, 1.8 times, and 0.1%. 
Lehman’s non-client firms had average Altman’s Z-Score of 6.1, and 17% of these firms were at the risk of financial 
distress (i. e. the Z-Score is below 1.8). Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for definitions of variables.  
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Table 4: Effects of Lehman’s Collapse on Lehman’s Non-Client Firms 
 Model I(a)  Model I(b)  
MarketValue 1.07 *** 1.26 *** 
 (6.7)  (9.1)  
FirmAge 1.23 *** 0.93 *** 
 (3.5)  (3.3)  
MarketToBook -2.06 *** -1.67 *** 
 (-3.1)  (-2.8)  
NetLeverage -1.02  -1.39  
 (-0.6)  (-0.9)  
ZScore -0.02  0.02  
 (-0.3)  (0.8)  
DistressDummy -3.48 *** -2.55 ** 
 (-3.4)  (-2.6)  
Constant -18.51 *** -18.00 *** 
 (-5.6)  (-8.1)  
Industry Fixed Effects no  yes  
R2 0.07  0.06  
N 3,122  3,122  
This table presents the results of regression of Lehman’s non-client firms with dependent variable CAR(-5,+1). Model 
I(a) controls for market value, age, market-to-book ratio, net leverage, Z-Score, and financial distress dummy. Model 
I(b) further controls for industry fixed effects. Firms that are smaller, younger, with higher market-to-book ratios, and 
closer to potential distress were more affected by the collapse. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, and t-statistics in 
parentheses. Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Oil and Gas Extraction Industry Exclusion 
 
Lehman's Clients Other Banks' Clients Difference t-statistics 
CAR7 -4.6 -1.9 -2.7*** (-2.7) 
CAR7 (SIC-code 13 Excluded) -2.5 -1.2 -1.3*** (-1.3) 
This table presents the difference in CAR(-5;+1) between Lehman and other big banks’ clients. The difference is -2.7% 
and significant. However if I exclude oil and gas extraction industry (two-digit SIC code 13) – 28 Lehman’s clients and 
36 other big banks’ clients are excluded – the difference drops to -1.3% and becomes insignificant. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Lehman and Other Big Banks’ Clients 
Panel A: Distributions 
 mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
CAR7 -2.42 11.78 -71.17 -7.69 -1.18 4.79 31.50 
LehmanClient 0.19 0.40 0 0 0 0 1 
MarketValue 7.29 1.50 1.62 6.28 7.15 8.22 12.30 
FirmAge 7.84 1.08 5.27 7.04 8.01 8.55 10.32 
MarketToBook 0.68 0.57 -0.42 0.24 0.59 1.01 3.56 
NetLeverage 0.02 0.27 -1.20 -0.13 0.01 0.18 0.78 
ZScore 5.79 8.15 -1.77 1.95 3.27 5.80 66.37 
DistressDummy 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
IndustryAbnRet -4.08 5.03 -23.46 -5.55 -3.54 -2.10 14.60 
N 889       
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CAR7 1         
LehmanClient 2 -.09        
MarketValue 3 .07 .09       
FirmAge 4 .10 -.07 .40      
MarketToBook 5 .01 .02 .09 -.18     
NetLeverage 6 -.03 .15 .44 .19 -.21    
ZScore 7 -.02 -.01 -.11 -.23 .50 -.32   
DistressDummy 8 -.13 .13 .00 .03 -.29 .37 -.31  
IndustryAbnRet 9 .40 -.15 -.06 .00 .00 .02 .06 -.12 
Panel C: Differences between Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ clients 
 Lehman's Clients Other Banks' Clients Difference  t-statistics 
MarketValue 7.55 7.22 0.33 *** (2.62) 
FirmAge 7.69 7.88 -0.20   ** (-2.16) 
MarketToBook 0.70 0.68 0.02  (0.45) 
NetLeverage 0.10 -0.00 0.10 *** (4.53) 
ZScore 5.60 5.84 -0.23  (-0.34) 
DistressDummy 0.32 0.19 0.14 *** (4.01) 
IndustryAbnRet -5.63 -3.70 -1.92 *** (-4.56) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the LehmanClient dummy and control variables. Panel A presents 
distributions of variables and Panel B presents correlation coefficients among variables. Panel C presents the 
differences in characteristics of Lehman’s clients and other big banks’ clients. On average, Lehman’s clients were 
bigger, younger, higher levered, more in financial distress, and in more affected industries compared to other big banks’ 
clients. We would expect that Lehman and other big banks’ clients are affected differently by the collapse due to their 
characteristic differences. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 7: Effects of Lehman’s Collapse on Lehman and Other Big Banks’ Clients 
 Model II(a)  Model II(b)  Model II(c)  Model II(d)  Model II(e)  
LehmanClient -2.69 * -2.05  -0.90  -0.34  0.33  
 (-1.8)  (-1.5)  (-0.9)  (-0.3)  (0.4)  
MarketValue   0.44    0.83 *** 1.01 *** 
   (1.2)    (2.9)  (3.9)  
FirmAge   0.73    0.59 * 0.41  
   (1.4)    (1.9)  (1.1)  
MarketToBook   -0.19    -0.02  -0.48  
   (-0.2)    (-0.0)  (-0.6)  
NetLeverage   -1.21    -4.03 ** -1.59  
   (-0.6)    (-2.5)  (-1.0)  
ZScore   -0.06    -0.10  -0.11 * 
   (-0.8)    (-1.5)  (-1.8)  
DistressDummy   -3.82 **   -2.18 * -3.26 *** 
   (-2.4)    (-1.9)  (-3.5)  
IndustryAbnRet     0.93 *** 0.95 ***   
     (8.1)  (8.1)    
Constant -1.90 * -9.61 ** 1.55 ** -8.06 *** -11.45 *** 
 (-2.0)  (-2.5)  (2.1)  (-2.7)  (-4.0)  
Industry Fixed Effects no  no  no  no  yes  
R2 0.01  0.04  0.16  0.19  0.04  
N 889  889  889  889  889  
 
This table presents the results of regressions with dependent variable CAR(-5;+1) over the sub-sample of Lehman and other big banks’ clients. The estimated coefficient 
of LehmanClient represents the marginal effects of being Lehman’s clients on CAR(-5;+1). Model II(a) has no control variable (i. e. equivalent to t-test), the marginal 
effect is -2.7% and significant. Model II(b) controls for firm characteristics, and the marginal effect reduces to -2.1% and it is not significant. Model II(c) controls for 
only average abnormal returns of non-clients in the industries, and the marginal effect drops dramatically to -0.9% . Model II(d) controls for firm characteristics and  
industry abnormal returns, and  the marginal effect is almost zero. Model II(e) controls for firm characteristics and industry fixed effects, and produces similar results. 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that Lehman’s and other big banks’ clients were equally affected by Lehman’s collapse. All of these models are 
controlled for between industry heteroskedasticity. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, and t-statistics in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 8: Interaction Effects 
 Model III(a)  Model III(b)  
LehmanClient -7.57  -5.79  
 (-1.1)  (-1.0)  
MarketValue 0.87 *** 0.91 *** 
 (2.7)  (3.0)  
FirmAge 0.37  0.35  
 (1.1)  (0.9)  
MarketToBook -0.27  -0.62  
 (-0.2)  (-0.6)  
NetLeverage -2.47  0.47  
 (-1.4)  (0.3)  
ZScore -0.08  -0.08  
 (-1.0)  (-1.1)  
DistressDummy -2.73 * -3.84 *** 
 (-1.8)  (-3.2)  
IndustryAbnRet 0.95 ***   
 (6.5)    
LehmanClient X MarketValue 0.02  0.80  
 (0.0)  (0.9)  
LehmanClient X FirmAge 0.95  0.16  
 (1.4)  (0.2)  
LehmanClient X MarketToBook 0.40  -0.01  
 (0.2)  (-0.0)  
LehmanClient X NetLeverage -10.74 * -13.30 ** 
 (-2.0)  (-2.4)  
LehmanClient X ZScore -0.12  -0.13  
 (-1.3)  (-1.5)  
LehmanClient X DistressDummy 2.38  2.29  
 (1.1)  (1.3)  
LehmanClient X IndustryAbnRet -0.05    
 (-0.3)    
Constant -6.39 * -10.12 *** 
 (-2.0)  (-3.4)  
Industry Fixed Effects no  yes  
R2 0.20  0.05  
N 889  889  
 
This table presents the results of regressions with dependent variable CAR(-5;+1) over the sub-sample of Lehman’s and 
other big banks’ clients. The independent variables include Lehman’s client dummy, industry abnormal returns, firm 
characteristics, and interactions between Lehman’s client dummy and characteristic variables. The estimated coefficients of 
characteristic variables are not shown to save space. The significantly negative coefficient of LehmanClient X NetLeverage 
suggests that Lehman’s clients with high leverage were affected more than other big banks’ clients with similar leverage 
level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, and t-statistics in parentheses.   
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Table 9: Robustness Check 
 Lehman’s clients Lehman’s clients in the last deals 
Lehman’s client and not 
client of any other big bank 
4-factor model -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% -0.1% -0.6% -0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% -1.6% -1.4% 
3-factor model -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.4% -1.0% -1.0% 
-0.3% -0.3% 0.0% -0.1% -2.0% -1.9% 
CAMP 
model 
-0.8% -0.9% -0.5% -0.5% -1.0% -0.8% 
-0.4% -0.4% -0.1% -0.2% -2.0% -1.7% 
Cumulative 
returns 
-0.8% -0.9% -0.5% -0.6% -1.2% -1.0% 
-0.3% -0.4% -0.1% -0.3% -2.3% -2.2% 
I organize each Model Type – Relationship Level pair as following: 
 10 years 5 years 
Common stock deals x x 
All equity deals x x 
 
 
This table presents the marginal effect of being a Lehman’s client with 4 directional modifications.  
• I use 3 models to calculate abnormal returns, namely the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, the Fama-French three 
factor-model, the capital model, and the cumulative returns. Model types are organized by rows.  
• I use 3 levels of relationship: firms have Lehman as a lead manager at least once within the 10 years before the collapse, 
firms have Lehman as a lead manager in their last equity issuance before the collapse, and firms have Lehman as the 
only big lead manager within the 10 years before the collapse. Relationship levels are organized by columns. 
• I use 2 definitions of relationship: a firm is a bank’s client if it has at least one common stock deal with the bank within 
the 10 years before the collapse, and a firm is a bank’s client if it has at least one equity deal (common stock, private 
placement, convertible, or equity pipeline & registrations) with the bank within the 10 years before the collapse. 
Relationship definitions are organized by rows within 2X2 cells of each model type & relationship level pair. 
• I use 2 relationship horizons: 10 years and 5 years. Relationship horizons are organized by column within 2X2 cells of 
each model type & relationship level pair. 
The marginal effect of being a Lehman’s client is statistically insignificant at significance level 10% over all settings. The 
marginal effect is economically significant (around -2%) when firms have equity deals with Lehman, and no equity deals 
with other big banks. The numbers of observations in this setting are 47 for 10 years horizon and 35 for 5 years horizon, 
which are small.  
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Appendix Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
FirmAge Logarithm of age 
Formula: _I&zJy:A	C	xO	OBI:	^ℎ:	x%%A:xI:	CI	Hv@( 
Data source: CRSP 
CAR7 Seven-day cumulative abnormal returns from Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model CAR(-5;+1) 
Data source: CRSP, Kenneth R. French’s website 
DistressDummy Distress dummy variable 
Formula: equals 1 if ZSCORE<1.8 and equals 0 otherwise 
Data source: Compustat, CRSP 
IndustryAbnormalReturn Average of the CAR7 of firms those are neither clients of Lehman nor other top 
ten banks in industries. I use 2-digit SIC code for the industry classification. 
Formula: ];:AxP:3ms	o	6t	o89sm&H]v7( 
Data source: CRSP, Kenneth R. French’s website 
LehmanClient Lehman’s clients dummy,  
Formula: equals 1 if the firm is a former equity underwriting client of Lehman 
and equals 0 otherwise 
Data source: Thomson Reuters 
MarketToBook Logarithm of market-to-book ratio of firms’ assets 
Formula:_I&&OℎC ∗ 	%A_ + _^(/x^( 
Data source: Compustat 
MarketValue Logarithm of market value  
Formula: ln	&OℎC ∗ 	%A_ + _^(.  
Data source: Compustat  
NetLeverage Net leverage 
Formula: &_^^ + _ − ℎ:(/&%A ∗ OℎACz^( 
Data source: Compustat 
ZScore Altman’s Z-Score 
Formula: 3.3 ∗ :yB^ + A:;^ + 1.4 ∗ &IB − ;^( + 1.2 ∗ &x^ − _^((/x^ +0.6 ∗ &OℎC ∗ 	%A_ − _^(/&_^( 
Data source: Compustat 
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